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     Abstract 
Resolving disputes resulting from high speed and fast-moving financial transactions has 
become an essential requirement for the stability of global financial markets as proven by 
previous crises. In the 2007 crisis, millions of investors ended with worthless investment 
agreements. The public did not believe they could pursue claims in state courts and had no 
faith in the operating regulatory systems.  
Delays in the enforcement of compensatory awards drained the concept of justice of its 
meaning. Bankers were bailed out instead of being made to pay for acts of recklessness, 
information asymmetry and mis-selling. The result was panic and a run on investment banks 
and the financial crisis ensued. 
The question is whether an arbitration process that guarantees immediate payment of arbitral 
awards can accelerate recovery from a crisis and alleviate the burden on state bailouts using 
taxpayers’ money? 
Empirical research show that enforceable and swift dispute resolution for financial disputes 
can establish certainty in the financial markets and assist in deterring imbedded acts of moral 
hazard within the financial sector. This in turn will impede the main ingredient for financial 
crises generated within the financial institutions sector and reduce the possibility of 
recurrences of financial crises such as that of 2007/2008.  
It is against this background that this thesis is proposing the instant monetizing mechanism of 
arbitral awards that result from banking disputes. The purpose behind the choice of the 
financial sector as a pilot for such a proposal is the ready availability of interbank clearing 
networks. Such networks can play an important role re-injecting funds back into the market 
through the ease of monetizing the awards and instantly transferring funds to claimant 
investors. 
Applying this concept particularly in the financial sector will clear backlogs of investors’ 
funds that will unfailingly find their way back into the financial markets through the banks. 
Recycling the funds back into the markets will instantly speed the markets’ recovering cycle 
and avert deep crises. 
This thesis acknowledges the role of arbitration in the settlement of financial disputes and the 
integral role that the enforcement of financial dispute can have in facilitating financial 
stability in a crisis. It recognises that an arbitration process is as effective as the swiftness by 
which its awards are enforced. It, as such, argues that a framework that can use existing 
interbank clearing networks to enforce and clear arbitral awards will efficiently address 
investors’ disputes. In turn it will help stabilize financial markets by removing uncertainty. 
The proposed framework will identify possibilities of clearing, trading and discounting 
arbitral awards while guaranteeing the maintenance of liquidity within the financial markets. 
Once implemented, the framework will remain innovative as it will operate through already 
functioning networks using up-to-date clearing technology such as blockchain. As the 
clearing networks continue to develop in to match the speed by which financial markets 
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  A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL DISPUTES 
Financial and Bank disputes are defined in terms of the participants, claims, situations, 
strategies, social objectives and outcomes. For the sake of clarity, bank disputes can be 
stripped down to their components of interbank disputes where at least one party of the 
disputants is a bank. For that purpose, it is essential to determine who should be represented 
in banking and financial dispute resolution processes and whose interests should be 
considered.  
Chapter Two clearly identifies the nature and anatomy of financial disputes and their 
disputants. The core of those disputes usually represents itself in the form of financial 
misbehaviour where investors claiming that their monies were lost because of misleading 
statements on the part of the banker. 
Financial misbehaviour includes actions such as mis-selling, unauthorised trading, 
misrepresentation and misappropriation. The latter is a euphemism for theft.1 The 
socioeconomic outcome of such behaviours has a profound effect on social development, 
economic reconstruction and improvement.2  
This statist perspective is, however, overly narrow and selective. Private and public banks 
committing international offenses, their victims can range from other state owned banks to 
domestic and international financial institutions. Individuals and corporate, national and 
multinational organizations, governmental and non-governmental authorities, global and 
regional organizations are all possible victims to misguided investment advice from bankers.3 
The international financial crisis of 2007-08 has shown that the importance of interconnected 
and complex financial institutions is far reaching, in the sense that their failure could 
endanger the stability of the entire global financial system. The financial crisis made it clear 
that we should not only focus on ‘too big to fail’ organizations. The need is to understand the 
needs of financial investors who drive the markets that are systemically predisposed to moral 
hazard and geared for panic runs. So, what is a Financial Crisis? 
Anatomy of Financial Crisis: There are many forms of investment transactions with some 
bearing higher risk than others. Placing a deposit with a bank or a Money Market Fund are  
form of investments. However, other forms of complex investment contracts such as futures 
                                                 
1
 D.E. Robins, Seven Deadly Sins that Lead to Arbitration Disaster, 820 PLI/Corp 489, Practising Law Institute, 
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series (July-August 1993). 
2
 The term “socioeconomics” refers broadly to the "use of economics in the study of society". Contemporary 
practice considers behavioural interactions of individuals and groups through social capital and social 
"markets" and the formation of social norms. In the latter, it studies the relation of economics to social values 
and legislations imposed by the society's lawmakers. 
Socioeconomic is a distinct supplemental usage that describes social economics as "a discipline studying the 
reciprocal relation between social legal ethics and economic development leading toward social reconstruction 
and improvement. 
3
 Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce 
Credit , (2nd ed., Princeton University Press (2015) 
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currency exchange markets, derivatives, securitised and non-securitised financial market 
products are also classified as investments, albeit they bear higher risk. The quality of risk 
those investments carry, should be identified by bankers to their clients.  
Financial markets and institutions are much more interconnected and characterized by ‘herd 
behaviour’ than any of the other sectors of the economy.4 When a bank or a financial 
institution faces trouble because the investments they hold on their balance sheet has 
worsened, the effect is not isolated to that specific bank. There are deposits within that bank 
that belong to other banks as well as the individual depositors. Moreover, the deposits 
belonging to other banks also belong to the depositors of those other banks.  
The chain reaction of one bank’s failure is endless and it has a negative repercussion on the 
entire financial market as well as on the social structure within a state and globally. Financial 
linkages between countries, in the form of interbank activities, have been singled out as a key 
channel of international crisis transmission. According to an International Monetary Fund 
study by Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), statistics show that since 1980 about 133 IMF 
member countries have experienced significant banking sector problems.5  
On the other hand, empirical evidences show that different forms of moral hazard in the 
financial sector are customary and prevalent. It occurs with individual clients as well as in 
transactions within the banks themselves. It takes various forms of information-asymmetry, 
mis-selling and adverse-selection in almost every depository or investment contractual 
agreement.6 These empirical results have important assertions on how some large banks and 
financial firms transacted with the outside world prior to 2008 financial crisis. It shows that 
certain firms and banks attempted to avoid their own bankruptcy by unloading bad assets 
onto other banks and financial institutions without clearly explaining the bad nature of such 
assets to the buyers. 
The adverse selection caused by such information asymmetry created an imbalance in world 
investment decisions taken by governments, central banks and financial institutions. In turn, 
this caused a chain reaction of financial failures leading to a kind of a global financial market 
failure. Bankruptcy of financial institutions spilled over to others in different countries and 
endangered the entire world financial system. The unmonitored presence of mis-selling and 
information asymmetry has proven to lead to almost total shut down of global financial 
markets as seen in the 2007/2008 crisis. 
The events of the recent financial crisis have signalled the importance of having a micro-
prudential7 view of the financial system instead of the earlier focus by policy makers and 
regulators on the entire financial and banking sectors.  
                                                 
4 Schnabl, P. (2011), Financial Globalization and The Transmission of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence From an 
Emerging Market, Journal of Finance, Volume 67, Issue 3, June 2012, p. 897–932 
5 Lindgren et al (1996); (Frydl, 1999) 
6 Alberto Martin, Adverse Selection, Credit and Efficiency: The Case of the Missing Market, JEL Classification 
D82, G20, D62 (2010) http://www.econ.upf.edu/~martin/missingmarket.pdf 
7 Microprudential regulation or microprudential supervision is firm-level oversight or financial regulation by 
regulators of financial institutions, "ensuring the balance sheets of individual institutions are robust to shocks”. 
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The research in Chapter One takes a micro-perspective of individual investors and their 
capabilities to raise issues with the banks when needed. It introduces the interconnectedness 
of banks and financial institutions with the tendency for problems to be hidden during boom 
and exposed during crisis. 
Such an approach proposes an effective system of dispute resolution through instant 
enforcement of arbitral awards. The mechanism will help to identify those financial 
institutions with large capacity to create high risk operations with financial market 
instruments and the ability to breakdown the entire financial system.  
A workable framework for identifying such institutions involves the use of a clearing 
mechanism that can grant international marketability (coinage) to arbitral awards. In banking 
disputes, the process can alert financial regulatory authorities to high risk activities taking 
place in the market. It also will have the effect of retribution to moral hazard and high-risk 
activities within certain financial institutions when investors are granted compensations that 
are instantly imposed. 
1. SETTING OUT THE FRAME OF THE DISCUSSION  
Arbitration in financial disputes is one of the most pervasive topics in arbitration law and 
practice. Despite extensive efforts and relevant literature, the issue is far from settled when it 
comes to the speed and enforcement of arbitration awards resulting from financial disputes.  
Normally such disputes involve large amounts of money where time and enforceability are 
indispensable for the world’s financial markets.  
The thesis examines the challenges prevalent to bank disputes and the current systemic 
processes available for disputants in the financial markets. There are numerous arbitral 
institutions specialised in financial disputes such as ICC and P.R.I.M.E. that are still unable 
accommodate the issues relating to the enforcement arbitral awards. The challenges are 
specifically focused on the enforceability of arbitral awards in bank and financial disputes. 
Those challenges arise when national courts overlook the differences in the nature and 
purpose of international awards’ enforceability and the application of public policies within 
their national laws. 
Issuing the award should indicate the finalisation of the arbitral process. However, the 
finalisation of the process does not necessarily mean the “finality” of the dispute resolution. 
In fact, the enforcement and payment of the award is the true final step in resolving an 
arbitral dispute. Clearly, finality is of the utmost importance to the parties on both sides of a 
dispute and more so for the successful party. 
The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is of fundamental importance in the 
arbitral process. Proper recognition followed by effective enforcement serves both as a means 
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of ensuring the effectiveness of the arbitral process and serve as a key factor favouring the 
use of arbitration.8 
There are theoretically legal differences between the recognition of an award and the 
enforcement of an award. The generally accepted principle in international arbitration is that 
recognition of an award in certain jurisdictions is an essential step that is required prior to the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards.9 
There are also theoretical differences between the “enforcement of an award” and “payment 
of an award”. Such differences consist in that the enforcement of an award is a pre-requisite 
legal requirement to the payment of awards. Any potential problems faced in the enforcement 
of arbitral awards can entail problems in the payment of awards. However, it is not the other 
way around. 
Unless parties can be relatively certain that the award will be paid at the end of arbitral 
proceedings, an award will be a mere peripheral process to litigation. To expect the award to 
be paid without undue delay is what the intention of the parties were when they agreed to go 
to arbitration at the outset of their trading agreement.  
Participants to financial markets look carefully at the process of resolving disputes and 
acquire confidence (or anxiety) from how consistent their disputes are resolved. The 
generally accepted rules underlying the enforcement of awards in international arbitration 
apply equally to the encashment (enforcement and payment) of awards. Put another way, 
there is no point in having arbitration friendly laws, well drafted arbitration rules and 
competent arbitrators if no effective mechanism of enforcement is available.10  
As defined in a World Bank study11, certainty in acquiring justifiable legal compensation can 
avert panic and bank runs amongst populations of investors on national and global scales.  On 
the other hand, as bankers start to believe they cannot avert retribution under a speedy 
arbitration process, moral hazard, actions of risk-taking and mis-selling will begin to decline. 
The thesis argues for a mechanism of encashment of arbitral awards specially designed for 
the needs of banks and financial disputes. The case is made for the application of an arbitral 
award clearing mechanism different both in terms of process and in terms of payment, but 
nevertheless conclusive.  
                                                 
8
 Lord Mustill, "The History of International Commercial Arbitration" in Newman and Hill (Ed.), The Arbitrators' 
Guide to International Arbitration (New York: Juris Publishing, 2004) at 12 
9
 N. Blackaby, C. Partasides, A. Redfern & M. Hunteredfern and Hunter, “Law and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration”, 4th Ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) 
10
 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, "Enforcement of Awards -A Few Introduction Thoughts" in Albert Jan van den 
Berg (Gen Ed.), ICCA Congress Series No 12 Beijing, May 2004: New Horizons in International Commercial 
Arbitration and Beyond (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004) 287 at 287. 
11
 Limao, Nuno; Saggi, Kamal. 2006. Tariff Retaliation Versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of 
International Trade Agreements. Policy, Research working paper series; no. WPS 3873. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/153561468315288  
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Finality in arbitration is key to confidence in the markets. A creditor of an award, in this case 
the winning party in a dispute who is holding an award in his favour, requires a speedy 
process to be able to cash his award and carry on with his business. The debtor of an award 
on the other hand may not be happy with the tribunal decision but will also prefer to see the 
dispute finalised and continue the commercial activity with the other party. 
It is also known that on-looking third party participants of the financial markets are interested 
in the outcome of banking disputes. Third parties are interested to observe that the process 
works and that disputes with banks are eventually finalised in a speedy manner. As a result, 
wider arbitral enforceability would compensate for the lack of certainty in financial markets 
at an earlier stage of a crisis.   
The emphasis here is dedicated to the subject of encashment of arbitral awards resulting from 
banking and financial agreement disputes. Such disputes and the effectiveness of how they 
are resolved, exemplifies restitution to claimants in bank disputes. The same effectiveness 
also can be effective as a tool of retribution to wrongdoers. The discussion pertains to three 
relative areas: 
- The effectiveness of the NY Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 
- The notion of the interference of national courts in the enforcement of international arbitral 
awards, 
- The impact of instant enforceability (or non-enforceability) of financial arbitral awards upon 
the markets and the moral behaviour of financial institutions.  
Empirical research shows that an enforceable and swift dispute resolution mechanism for 
banks and financial disputes can establish certainty and assist in combating imbedded acts of 
moral hazard within the financial sector. It can accelerate recovery from a financial crisis and 
alleviate the burden on state bailouts using taxpayers’ money. 
Investors are interested in outcomes of disputes involving financial services providers such as 
banks and stock market brokers. Investors are largely influenced in their reactions to the 
enforceability of compensations disputants succeed in getting against banks. It constitutes a 
form of restitution for their possible losses should they face the same dispute.  
Simply, restitution for one investor represents retribution against bankers as they are ordered 
to pay compensation to investors for their losses. The focus here is on the process of paying-
out the resulting arbitral awards and the speed by which claimants are paid and remedied. 
Similarly, efficacy and speed in paying investors will represent the swiftness by which 
faulting banks are penalised by suffering financial retribution. 
The study of the interrelation between arbitration awards and penalisation of financial 
services providers is an integral part of any discussion touching upon elements of financial 
arbitration. This has to do with the fact that any turbulences occurring in a financial sector of 
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one state can develop into a global economic crisis touching on other nations’ economies. 
The 2008 Financial Crisis is a proof to that. 
1.1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The basic methods employed are comparative research and qualitative analysis of academic 
papers, primary and secondary legal sources, including lex financiera, national and 
international laws and regulations, case law of national courts and arbitral tribunals. More 
specifically, as far as financial arbitration procedural rules are concerned, financial arbitration 
institutions with specific banking and finance arbitration mandates are examined.  
Attention, of course, is particularly focused on the United Nations Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (The New York 
Convention)12. The international arbitration treaty has been enjoying an unprecedented 
success and has been immensely influential to the development of arbitration doctrines and 
procedural rules. 
In terms of national jurisdictions, the research takes an international comparative viewpoint. 
The legislation and case law of different countries are reviewed, although emphasis is 
especially placed on England, the USA, France, and to a lesser extent on Switzerland, 
Germany and the European Union rules on enforcement of arbitral awards and bank 
regulations. 
The selection of the above jurisdictions was mainly made for two reasons. First, it provides 
equilibrium between common and civil law legal traditions. Second, it covers almost all the 
major arbitration centres with advanced arbitration laws and procedural systems. 
1.2. NOTES IN REGARD TO METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
First, as already indicated, even though the literature on the financial crisis, moral hazard and 
retribution against banks is extensive, the discussions are still largely open ended. 
Additionally, regulations on the topic are lacking at national, regional and international 
levels. Accordingly, the analysis performed here is policy orientated, whereas the final 
suggestions go beyond black letter law. That also raises questions about the practice of 
compensation claims in courts when it comes to disputes against banks. 
Second, the analysis on arbitration agreements draws to some extent on material regarding 
award enforcement and jurisdiction agreements. Arbitration agreements and choices of 
jurisdiction agreements are considered identical in nature and with the same objective. Both 
are of contractual nature and both serve the procedural party’s autonomy of choice of process 
and enforceability. 
Procedural party autonomy provides the parties with the ability to choose in advance the 
forum that suits them best, instead of having their disputes resolved by legislation or a default 
forum. This, in many cases has proven to be difficult to predict if substantive and procedural 
                                                 
12
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – aka The "New York" 
Convention  
The original convention in PDF http://www.newyorkconvention.org/11165/web/files/original/1/5/15432.pdf  
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legislations were not agreed upon at the outset. Arbitration and jurisdiction agreements give 
effect to procedural party autonomy, and thus constitute a fundamental legal tool for the 
payment of arbitral awards. 
Case law on jurisdictions and enforceability is used in this thesis to support suggestions 
regarding payment of arbitral awards through a banking network. Similarly, part of the 
research focuses on national and regional civil procedural systems. It is true that arbitration in 
many aspects is a different adjudicatory system from litigation.  
However, both arbitral tribunals and national courts are, in principal, equal adjudicatory fora 
vested with the same power: jurisdiction to determine the dispute. Both are empowered to 
issue an authoritative binding decision with substantive enforceability.13 
Therefore, in jurisdictional terms, national courts and arbitral tribunals perform a very similar 
function. Accordingly, the thesis makes an in-depth comparative analysis of national 
litigation systems about the participation of third parties being allocated the power to pay out 
the award. 
The aim of this comparative study is to reveal the rationale behind third-party award payment 
mechanisms in banking and finance disputes. The outcome of this analysis is used as a policy 
guideline for the thesis to determine the right impact of an award clearing system agreed 
upon in the arbitration agreement and set in the procedural rules of financial arbitration 
tribunals. 
1.3. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
- Chapter One starts by tracing the development of banking and financial arbitration from its 
early foundations to the well-established dispute resolution mechanism that it has become 
today. Emphasis is placed on the tumultuous relationship that has existed between national 
courts and the enforcement of arbitral awards under the auspices of the NY Convention.  
An arbitration process for financial disputes needs to remain innovative, as it is obliged to 
match the speed by which financial markets operate and structure their products. By the same 
token, the enforceability of awards acquires its strength from the NYC which is the most 
widely ratified treaty the world has come to agree upon today.  
The ratification of the NY Convention was intended to be fundamental to the workings of the 
international arbitration systems around the world regardless of jurisdictions or domestic 
litigation processes. However, certainty in the enforceability of awards under the auspices of 
the NY Convention has encountered some substantive procedural challenges in recent years. 
The Chapter includes analysis of reports on those challenges, which includes studies of the 
UNCITRAL “Guide to the New York Convention 2016”. Moreover, attention is drawn to the 
allegations against the banking sector, the aftermath of the financial crisis and the possible 
consequences of resolving banking disputes through arbitration versus litigation. 
                                                 
13
 S Sattar, ‘National Courts and International Arbitration: A Double-Edged Sword?’ Journal of International 
Arbitration, (2010) Vol. 27(1 ) 51. 
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Analysis is made of the extent to which arbitration can be assessed as a deterrent to 
embedded moral hazard within the banking sector. The term “moral hazard” here, refers in its 
wider meaning to undeterred practices in the banking world by bankers and their institutions. 
It refers to acts of mis-selling, misrepresentation, information asymmetry, excessive risk 
taking and misappropriation of funds. 
Chapter One then introduces the suggestion of an Award Clearing Forum formed by banks 
such as SWIFT or TARGET. The purpose is to achieve a speedy award payment mechanism 
in face of the procedural challenges facing the implementation of the NYC in front of 
national courts. 
- In Chapter Two, the thesis turns to moral hazard and financial regulations. First, it looks at 
the statutory history of financial regulations and the substantive changes that prompted new 
regulatory laws in certain countries or complete overhaul of substantive governance of 
financial institutions. The chapter includes explanations why financial rules and regulations 
are not enough alone to deter bankers and financial services firms from embedded moral 
hazard activities. Through the course of this comparison, a defined methodology is adopted 
with the following stages: 
1. A critical comparative analysis as to where the regulatory authorities may have erred. 
Next, a concluding analysis of the ineptness of imposing more financial and 
monitoring regulations as opposed to an effective and swiftly enforced arbitral 
process. The research initially provides an overview of the guiding philosophy of 
international regulatory governance of financial institutions. 
2. Tenets combining theoretical perspectives with international case law observations 
are presented to arrive at solutions to regulatory governance in the financial sector. 
The solutions demand special consideration geared towards a fast-retributive method 
against banks and their corporate executives. Remedies compensating investors for 
losses in the form of direct clients’ compensation and damages for the loss of income 
are individually explored 
3. The adequacy, flexibility and speed of resolving financial disputes in arbitration 
tribunals are presented as a solution, which offers individual investors the chance to 
govern their banks through a speedy process of an arbitration process with instant 
payment of arbitral awards 
It is worth mentioning here that orders of punitive damages in arbitration are touched upon 
briefly in Chapter Two. The reason being is that in most countries, such relief may only be 
granted in tort claims involving ‘exceptionally objectionable conduct’ on the part of the 
defendant. In those countries, punitive damages may not be awarded in arbitrated contract 
claims.14  
In the UK, for example, the unavailability of punitive damages in breach of contract actions 
was affirmed by the House of Lords as early as 1909 and was recently reiterated in a report of 
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 US Restatement (Second) on Contract, § 355 provides: ‘Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of 
contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.’ 
20 
 
the English Law Commission. The courts in Australia and New Zealand have followed the 
English example.  
- In Chapter Three, an objective and comparative analysis is conducted in respect of certain 
allegations and legal actions against financial institutions and inducements to actions of moral 
hazard. Financial regulatory provisions and the effectiveness of international regulatory 
authorities’ cooperation are examined, as actions of moral hazard continue to occur to this 
date.  
Accordingly, the chapter starts with an anatomy of financial disputes, going through financial 
transaction agreements including standardised arbitration clauses included in standardised 
generic agreements such as in the ISDA and ICC universal agreements. The agreements 
themselves are critically analysed in view of available remedies for investors and the legal 
restitution processes.  
Key areas in legal claims and case laws have been identified as offering the most substantial 
differences between legislative frameworks even within the same jurisdiction. Case studies of 
separate jurisdictions throughout the chapter lead the final part of the conclusions: a speedy 
arbitration process encompassing a mechanism for instant payment of awards can bring the 
same retribution effects of punitive damages in combating moral hazard.  
- Chapter Four contains an empirical inquiry into recent trends in international financial 
clearing systems. Reference is made to several international financial clearing systems using 
comparison assessments with the operating systems in the United States, UK and Japan. 
Of the empirical data cited, an analysis in terms of the thesis’ parameters is given as to the 
need and reasons for an Award Clearing Forum. Attention is drawn to the need for a swift 
process to pay arbitral awards for banking and financial sector disputes. The method does not 
require any changes in standard arbitration processes or agreements to operate. The criterion 
is that the process can be instantly applied through current interbank security clearing 
procedures where an award against a bank can be set-off against their assets within the 
banking network system similar to securities or financial notes.  
- Chapter Five is the conclusion of the thesis and draws these various strands together in the 
attempt to prove that in order to preserve financial institutions’ social role, a dispute 
resolution process is an appropriate solution. Financial arbitration in its current form may 
face special challenges, which go beyond mere contractual disputes.  
There is foremost the possibility of asset backed transactions which may raise important 
issues of award enforcement in terms of the nature, structure and operations of the banks 
involved,  particularly when these charges concern assets in different countries and funds that 
are moving from one country to another.   
In certain jurisdictions, there may be complications in terms of the determination of the 
applicable domestic laws and the full trans-national status in international finance such as 
foreign currency controls and the export of capital.  
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In view of the above, the final chapter leads to the recognition and development of a banking 
proprietary structure for the set-off and pay-out of financial awards where the enforcement of 
banking awards in different jurisdictions and transnational financial legal orders may have 
differing domestic public policy considerations. 
Finally, an objective analysis is conducted in respect of the proposed Award Clearing Forum 
and rapid payment of arbitral awards as a proposed process within the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and as a gauge for a generic legal process. 
1.4. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE THESIS – A SPEEDY COMPENSATION 
PROCESS RESULTS IN SWIFT PECUNIARY RETRIBUTION 
As typically described by analyses of tort damages, compensatory legal remedies are 
remedies designed to make victims whole.15 The goal of remedy is to rectify, as far as 
possible, the harmful consequences of legal wrongs. Ideally, victims of a financial wrong, 
when rectified, are supposed to be restored to their "rightful position," which they would have 
been in if no wrong had occurred.16 
Compensation protects entitlements, expresses society's respect for the victim and provides 
aid to those who have suffered harm. From an instrumental point of view, compensatory 
remedies provide incentives for efficient behaviour by forcing injurers to bear the costs of 
their activities and reducing future wasteful precautions by potential victims.17 
Compensatory remedies provide satisfaction to the victims of wrongs. Part of this satisfaction 
comes from a payment that makes up for measurable losses. Yet satisfaction also comes from 
retaliation against the injurer. In other words, the object of compensatory remedies is not 
simply to adjust the absolute position of the claimant, but also to adjust an outcome in which 
the relative positions of other possible claimants against a generic wrongdoer such as banks is 
clear with predictable results.  
This is theoretically a presupposition of any dispute resolution process even though the 
claimants may belong to the same sector by being a bank themselves. The element of 
compensation, which seeks to counterbalance the wrong done to the claimant, has a close 
affinity to revenge in societies and populations of similar affinities such as in cases of 
investors’ claims against banks.18  
According to theories of corrective justice and tort damages, compensation also enforces 
moral duty. Those who commit wrongs incur a moral obligation to alleviate the losses they 
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  I DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 3 (2d ed. 1993) ("The 
damages remedy is a money aimed at making well the plaintiffs losses."). 
16
  DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 15-16 (2d ed. 1994) 
(explaining that restoring the plaintiff to his "rightful position" is "the essence of compensatory damages"). 
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  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.10, at 192 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the incentive 
effects of tort damages). 
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 The term "compensation" is not necessarily limited to loss adjustment. To compensate means not only to 
"make amends for," but also to "counterbalance." 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 601 (J.A. Simpson & 
E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989). "Compensate" is derived from the Latin word "compensate," meaning "to 
weigh one thing against another." Id 
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have caused to others.19 Of course, some inaccuracy is to be expected in litigated 
compensations where Courts are restricted as to the amounts granted for compensations. Such 
amounts are circumscribed to schedules and depositions by which arbitration tribunals are not 
bound. Contrary to arbitration however, legal remedies sought in courts may have multiple 
functions, of which one is punitive damages.20 
2. AWARDS – ENFORCEABILITY AND PRESENTMENT 
The efficacy of financial or banking arbitration is determined, undermined or strengthened by 
the enforceability of its award. In fact, the real determination relies on which local courts 
grants leave to challenge arbitral awards and on what grounds.  
It is therefore important to note the extent to which national courts and legislations in certain 
jurisdictions may allow challenges to arbitral awards. Along with that, there are jurisdictions 
that facilitate affirmative attacks by losing parties through the expansion of judicial review 
over final awards, including through full-scale appeal of the facts or law of the award.21 
Unless parties can relatively ascertain that they will be able to enforce the award at the end of 
the arbitral proceedings, an award in their favour will be only a marginal victory. Such acts in 
certain jurisdictions would render the arbitral process largely meaningless.22 
The relative extensiveness and ease of enforceability of the arbitral award compared to 
foreign court judgments is a principal advantage of arbitration over litigation. This advantage 
of arbitration arises because of the success of treaties such as the NY Convention. The 
network of international and regional treaties providing for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign awards is more widespread and developed than any provisions relating to 
enforcement of foreign court judgments''.23 
In particular, the United Nation's Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitration Awards 1958 has been adopted by more than 159 countries worldwide. It has 
been described as "the single most important pillar on which the edifice of international 
arbitration rests''. 
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 JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 374-75 (1992); Stephen R. Perry, Loss, Agency, and Responsibility 
for Outcomes: Three Conceptions of Corrective Justice, in TORT THEORY 24, 25-26, 38-47 (Ken Cooper-
Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 421-24 
(1992). 
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  I DAN & B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY RESTITUTION. At 286-87 (identifying "[t]he 
role of compensation in damage remedies" as an important issue of remedies doctrine). 
21
 Goldman Sachs v. Unsecured Creditors Committee of Bayou Group, Nos. 10-5049-cv (Lead), 11-2446-cv 
(XAP), 2012 WL 2548927, at *1 (2d Cir. July 3, 2012); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Bobker, 808 
F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (manifest disregard of law ―clearly means more than error or misunderstanding 
with respect to law). 
22
 Ibid in. 3 
23
 Redfern and Hunter with Blackaby and Partasides, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 
4th Ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) ("Redfern and Hunter') at434- 435. 
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Treaties and conventions as such, form part of the legal framework for recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards which ensures effective and reliable enforcement. A sound 
legal framework is indispensable in ensuring the recognition and enforcement of awards. 
A meaningful arbitral award is conditional upon an effective and reliable enforcement 
mechanism.24 The "legal framework" of enforcement should include the black-letter law 
encapsulated in these treaties and various national laws.  
More importantly, it should encompass the underlying scheme and principles of the 
arbitration treaties, particularly the New York Convention. However, judicial understanding 
of such principles and the judicial attitude towards the enforcement and payment of arbitral 
awards are necessary ingredients for an effective procedural process.25 
Even so, while there is an international policy favouring the enforcement of international 
arbitral awards, exceptions will persist. In Asia, for example, there have been cases recently 
of non-enforcement that were regarded to be contrary to international standards and 
practices.26  
2.1. PAYMENT OF AWARDS – PRESENTMENT AND PAYMENT 
1- Arbitration awards are not self-executing.  If the losing party does not pay voluntarily, the 
award must be judicially enforced. In other words, the award must be converted into a court 
judgment and then the judgment is enforced, just like any other court judgment. 27 
2- Third party funding companies have become more active recently in the judgment 
enforcement space.  They offer many varied forms of financing, from funding the legal fees 
of enforcement proceedings to outright purchase of the Award. Furthermore, the third-party 
funding business has grown to the point that it is no longer used only by entities that cannot 
otherwise fund the payment of legal fees for their claims or their enforcement efforts.  
Especially in those situations in which significant sums will have to be spent on enforcement 
and the possibilities of collection are far from certain, it is an option worth considering. 
3- The NY Convention covers awards rendered in a New York Convention signatory state 
and its application does not depend on the nationality of the parties. National arbitration laws 
govern the procedure for recognition and execution of New York Convention awards.28 For 
example, in the Common Law of the U.S., the Convention is codified in the Federal 
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 Tao Jingzhou, Arbitration Law and Practice (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004) at 131. 
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 Albert Jan van den Berg, "Why Are Some Awards Not Enforceable?" in Albert Jan van den Berg (Gen Ed.), 
ICCA Congress Series No. 12, Beijing, May 2004: Neiv Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and 
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 This issue was addressed recently in Wicor Holding AG v Taizhou Haopu Investment Co., Ltd (Taizhou IPC 
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 Wetter, "The Present Status of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC: An Appraisal", (1990) 1 
American Review of International Arbitration 91 
28
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Arbitration Act. The Act provides for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
as well as awards made in the U.S. relating to arbitrations between foreign parties.  
In France, enforcement of international arbitral awards is integrated in the French Law, 
"Code de Procédure Civile” (French Code of Civil procedures) Article 1504. The 
confirmation proceedings in most jurisdictions are based on a petition to a national court to 
confirm the award.  
The U.S. and several other countries apply the New York Convention only for those awards 
rendered in the territory of another signatory state based on bilateral reciprocity, recognition, 
enforcement and payment. Due to the political nature of reciprocity, uncertainty can reign 
especially when it comes to certain countries and changes in the US leadership. 
4- The ability to initiate enforcement proceedings in various jurisdictions under the New 
York Convention matters greatly in cases against a sovereign state. This is because any 
attachable assets of the sovereign may be in jurisdictions other than the country of the 
arbitration.  
It is worth noting here that while most countries are supportive of international arbitration 
and provide for expeditious adjudication of enforcement proceedings, award confirmation 
and subsequent execution with pay-out are two different stages. Efforts for payment of 
awards against a local bank can have a few avenues to resist enforcement and can prove to be 
long, tedious and expensive. 
2.2. TRADING OF AWARDS 
A party winning an award (award creditor) against a bank faces the prospect of enforcing it at 
the place where the bank assets are located. The bank (award debtor) could be a sovereign 
state bank that refuses to pay for political or public policy reasons. As a result, winning 
parties may need to spend large sums of money and time on attempts to enforce their awards. 
The risk is that some of those attempts can potentially be without success. 
It is at this point that some award creditors would start to consider cutting their losses and 
“selling” their awards, even at a discount. 29 
The market for “trading” awards seems to exist in a limited number of cases and to some 
extent in pure commercial arbitration. In recent years, a handful of examples of assigned 
(traded) awards appear to have come to light, all of which concerned investment arbitration 
awards. For example, in FG Hemisphere v Democratic Republic of Congo two International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) awards were assigned (traded) by the award Creditor (Energo 
Invest, a Bosnian state company) to FG Hemisphere (a US Investment Fund). FG as the new 
holder then sought to enforce the awards in a few jurisdictions where it finally acquired court 
approval in Hong Kong.  
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 Democratic Republic of the Congo and Others v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC (Final appeal no. 5, 6 and 7 OF 
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It is interesting to note however, that in Hong Kong, the judge was initially “concerned” 
about “the assignment/trading of the awards”. However, the court subsequently accepted the 
enforcement of the assigned awards.30 
In Euler Hermes v PJSC Odessa Fat and Oil Plant,31 Euler Hermes (the assignee) sought to 
enforce a Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations (FOSFA) award in Ukraine. The 
application was refused on the basis that only the original party to the arbitration had the 
standing to seek enforcement of the award. Whilst the Ukrainian Cassation Court set aside 
the lower courts’ decisions, the case illustrates a potential hurdle in enforcing an award in 
certain jurisdictions. 
A similar point was raised, unsuccessfully, by Argentina before the US court in Blue Ridge 
Investments v Argentina32. That case concerned enforcement in the US of an International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) award in the CMS Gas v 
Argentina33 case. The benefit of the award had been assigned to Blue Ridge, the petitioner in 
the case.  
Argentina argued, amongst other things, that “as an assignee, Petitioner lacks authority to 
seek recognition and enforcement of the Award”, and “only a party to the underlying 
arbitration can seek recognition or enforcement of the award under Article 54(2) [of the 
ICSID Convention], a transferee or assignee cannot.” 
The judge carried out a detailed textual analysis of the use of the term “party” in the ICSID 
Convention and concluded that it “[did] not always refer to a ‘party to the arbitration’”. As 
New York law recognised assignment of judgments, the court found that “nothing in the 
ICSID Convention, in Congress’s legislation implementing ICSID, or in New York law 
prevents an assignee from seeking recognition and enforcement of an ICSID Convention 
award.” 
A further result of the Blue Ridge case is that Blue Ridge used non-judicial avenues to force 
Argentina to honour the award. Blue Ridge successfully petitioned the US Trade 
Representative to suspend Argentina from the US Generalized System of Preferences and 
lobbied the US government to block World Bank loans to Argentina. 
The CMS Gas/Blue Ridge award was eventually settled by Argentina in 2013, along with four 
other awards: Vivendi, 34 Azurix, 35 National Grid, 36 and Continental Casualty.37 The latter 
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two awards had also been assigned, reportedly to the US fund Gramercy. The assignment of 
those awards was part of a settlement structure. 
In October 2016, further ICSID awards against Argentina were settled: BG Group and El 
Paso. The awards were assigned to special purpose discounting entities. It is worth noting 
that the Argentine assignment value of the awards in 2013 and 2016 was reported to have had 
over a 25% discount to the nominal value of the awards.38 
This review gives an indication that the market for arbitral awards seems to be limited, with 
most of the publicly available information relating to ICSID investment arbitration awards. It 
also suggests the likely level of discount that the award party agreed with the assignees 
(buyers of the awards). Such deep discount is due to the fact that the awards were placed on 
the open market with no regulated mechanism, such as the one this thesis proposes for the 
banking and financial sector, in operation. 
Finally, it seems that the success in enforcing an assigned award may depend to a significant 
extent on the political leverage and financial clout of the assignees, as the Argentine 
settlements acutely demonstrated. This naturally limits the number of parties potentially 
interested in purchasing awards. 
In short, whilst the idea of selling an award might sound appealing in principle, it seems that 
in practice the opportunities to do so might be limited. Such a process can be expanded if 
related to a specific sector mechanism that can clear and pay awards at nominal discounts or 
none at all. This would be mainly a mechanism run by banks for the clearing of disputes 
relating to banks. 
3. SUGGESTIONS OF THE THESIS - THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
ON BANKS, MORAL HAZARD AND ARBITRATION  
Two recurrent aspects of banking and finance sector disputes are the subject matter of the 
dispute and the time constraint required to resolve the dispute entirely up to the payment of 
the award. Those are highly complex features of the financial sector. They represent a 
challenge for an efficient resolution of disputes in the banking and finance industry all over 
the world. 
The sanctity of contracts and redress for disputing investors are essential components of a 
financial system. Redress of grievances in banking disputes also encourages ethical behaviour 
in participants. This requires speedy judicial decisions on alleged breaches and for claimants 
to be able to assert their rights for redress of grievances. Financial compensation 
                                                                                                                                                        
awarding Azurix approximately US$165 Million for breach of Argentina’s obligations under the US-Argentina 
Bilateral Agreement. 
36
 National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/NGvArgentina.pdf  
37
 Continental Casualty Co. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 (Originally published in 2011 in 
International Investment Law and Sustainable Development) 
38
 The awards were “sold” at a deep discount. As noted above, the Argentina awards settled at over 25% to the 
nominal value, implying an even deeper discount on assignment. Thus, in FG Hemisphere, the underlying 
award for US $11.7 million was reportedly sold for US $2.6 million. 
27 
 
effectiveness is not just in the speed of the judicial decision. It lies more importantly in the 
dispensation of the value of the award and how fast the award holder is paid. 
To further study the nature of financial disputes, it is important to point out the core rule of 
financial arbitration where at least one party is a financial institution. The legal concept of 
binding compensation through arbitration is very much in the definition of arbitration as a 
consensual dispute resolution mechanism. It is in the binding contractual agreement of those 
persons who have consented to arbitration and agreed to be bound by its award. Those are the 
only parties who will be affected by the tribunal decision and upon whom the award for 
compensation will be enforced. 
The scope of the thesis is particularly focused on the process of enforcement and payment of 
international arbitral awards in financial disputes. The emphasis is on a mechanism of 
instantaneous payment of awards designed specifically for inter-bank and inter-financial 
institutions disputes. The mechanism proposed is to pay out awards through existing 
networks of international banking clearing systems such as SWIFT, European Standard Bank 
(ESB), or TARGET.  
The principal in this proposal is that an arbitration process is finalised only when the award is 
settled. The NY Convention is a treaty ratified by 159 to ensure that the finality of 
international arbitration is effectively finalised through the enforcement of the resulting 
awards. The need for this treaty illustrates that an arbitration process is only as effective as 
the swiftness by which its awards are paid. 
Empirical research demonstrates that a swift and effective dispute resolution mechanism can 
impede investors’ mass panics. It has shown that a consistent framework of dispute resolution 
that includes bankers facing the right framework of retribution is a missing key in financial 
institutions dispute resolution methods.  
Studies also demonstrate that expeditious dispute resolution processes in the banking sector 
can assist in deterring imbedded acts of moral hazard within the financial sector. They can 
also accelerate recovery from a crisis by alleviating the burden on states using their public 
funds to bail out banks. 
As mentioned earlier, the nature of bank disputes and the structure of financial securities are 
generic to the financial sector. Financial securities, regardless of their issuers or their 
geographical location, are formed of the same economic elements and structured within the 
same financial sector. The global population of investors will be interested in factual legal 
determinations in arbitral proceedings involving banks as it eventually touches on similarities 
in their legal position with their own banks. At the end of the day, they all are clients of the 
same “sector”. 
Hence, other investors and third parties who are not bound by a specific dispute may not be 
total strangers to arbitration proceedings and the outcome that follows.39 Gauging how 
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readily the award may be paid or enforced, investors' fears would be calmed when they see 
that they or other investors were granted instant restitution for their claims against banks.  
Classic psychology and economics studies argue that people who have been cheated view 
justice through a personal lens. Victims of mis-selling have been found to value prompt 
compensation over vengeance. They would rather be repaid for their losses than see their 
bankers punished.40 
What makes restitution a complex matter is the diversity of financial products and the 
banking corporate structures. Nowadays a typical form for a large bank organisation is that of 
a large corporation carrying out its affairs through overseas subsidiaries. Several company 
affiliates and subsidiaries with officers, directors, stockholders and members of that legal 
entity can be fully owned by the same group yet operate as two different legal persons. 
Transactions will often take form in the execution of a contract concluded by one branch of 
the group with another branch of other subsidiaries from another third-party group and often 
from another jurisdiction. Thus, cross-jurisdictional arbitration has become more frequented 
by banks and financial institutions than in previous years.41 
Accordingly, several bilateral substantive contracts between several parties will usually 
provide for bilateral dispute resolution arrangements. Some of the contracts might include a 
jurisdiction clause, certain others might provide for arbitration, while there are others which 
may not include any dispute resolution provisions. 
Even those contracts that include jurisdiction or arbitration clauses will usually fail to provide 
for the same national court or the same type of arbitration when it comes to the enforcement 
of the arbitral award.  
Thus, it often happens that several parties would make jurisdictional arrangements on a 
bilateral basis, against the backdrop of a multiparty financial product. In other words, the 
parties will opt for a scheme of several bilateral proceedings rather than a single set of 
multiparty proceedings. 
This practice leads to what is called "jurisdictional fragmentation of multiparty financial 
transactions" which leads the final party to be cut-off from the initiating parties in the 
transaction. This occurs when several parties get involved in the development of certain 
derivatives or the creation of specific securities in one jurisdiction. The securities are then 
bundled, marketed and sold to investors in other jurisdictions who are subject to different 
adjudicatory fora.  
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Thus, a dispute arising between a bank and its client involving a cross-jurisdictional 
arbitration agreement will have to be resolved entirely by the provisions of the existing 
arbitration agreement. The arbitration procedure will take place only between the disputing 
parties even if the dispute is in connection with a multiparty financial transaction.  
The process will be limited to the disputed transaction between those two parties and upon 
whom falls the genuine intention of the original arbitration agreement. More importantly, the 
enforceability and payment of the resulting award will be determined by the national courts 
of the jurisdiction where the assets of the losing party are bsed. 
3.1. ENFORCEABILITY OF BANKING DISPUTE AWARDS UNDER THE 
AUSPICES OF THE NY CONVENTION – PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN ENFORCING 
CROSS-JURISDICTION ARBITRAL AWARDS  
The contractual foundations of arbitration constitute the fundamental difference between 
arbitration and litigation. In litigation, the capacity to become a party to court proceedings is 
determined based on interest(s). If it is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the particular 
national court, a legal or a natural person is entitled to commence court proceedings, 
whenever it needs to protect its legal or financial interest. 
In the context of arbitration, it is generally accepted that the capacity to take part in 
proceedings is exclusively determined on a contractual basis. Entering into an arbitration 
agreement is the indispensable requirement for a party to participate in the arbitration 
proceedings and be bound by the resulting arbitral award. 
The focus here is on the wide group of investors with an interest in the enforceability of 
arbitral awards resulting from a failed financial agreement between a bank and its client. The 
assumed efficacy of arbitration is in resolving financial disputes efficiently and being able to 
globally enforce its awards. The speed and certainty by which a party in a financial dispute is 
able to enforce an arbitral award is of utmost priority due to the large amounts that may be 
involved as well as the sensitivity of the financial sector to results arising from bank disputes.  
The reality in bank disputes is often complex, so it sometimes can be difficult for a claimant 
to proceed in a claim of fraud or negligence against the bank. Regardless of the situations 
which may cause disputed transactions to arise, what may be derived from the evidence and 
research on banking disputes is that the population of investors will be watching in 
anticipation to see whether the client will be compensated. 
The principal is that an arbitration process is as effective as the swiftness by which its awards 
get paid. An arbitration process for financial disputes needs to remain innovative, as it is 
obliged to match the speed by which financial markets operate and structure their products. 
By the same token, the enforceability of awards acquires its strength from the New York 
Convention which is the most widely ratified treaty the world has come to agree upon today.  
The ratification of the NY Convention was intended to be fundamental to the workings of the 
international arbitration systems around the world regardless of jurisdictions or domestic 
litigation processes. It is meant to ensure that international arbitral awards are readily 
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recognizable and enforceable in all jurisdictions including the state in which the award was 
rendered.42 
However, certainty of the enforceability of awards under the auspices of the NY Convention 
seems to encounter some challenges. In a report prepared in 2016 by UNCITRAL, Guide to 
the New York Convention43, some uncertainties surround the NY Convention articles. To 
begin with, uncertainty surfaces in Article II and Article III of the NY Convention, which 
requires enforcement of arbitration agreements unless they are found to be “null, void, 
inoperative and incapable of being performed.” 
National reports in the UNCITRAL guide, express doubts surrounding the meaning of that 
phrase and determination of the law applicable to that issue, but also over doubts concerning 
the respective roles of courts and arbitrators in making the validity determination that Articles 
II and III contemplate.44 The guide confirmed that ambiguity exists for disputants of 
international arbitration in some of the NY Convention’s recognition and enforcement 
articles.  
By way of example, the Korean report45 among others, finds the public policy exception in 
Article V of the NY Convention related to recognition and enforcement to be particularly ill 
defined when it comes to the definition and understanding of what qualifies as public policy. 
For that, the report enquires as to what constitutes a sufficiently serious violation to justify a 
denial of recognition or enforcement by the national courts under Article II. 
The UNCITRAL guide refers to instances of “overuse” of public policy as grounds for 
refusal of enforcement at the national level. Other country reports claim inconsistency and 
lack of clarity in the definition of “public policy”.46 
3.2. ISSUES WITH THE WORDING OF THE ARTICLES IN THE NY 
CONVENTION ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARDS   
The NY Convention does not provide guidance in any of its articles as to what kinds of 
norms may be placed within the “procedural” category for national courts to follow nor for 
the awarded party to pursue to attain enforceability. The “UNCITRAL Guide to the New 
York Convention” (2016) has shed light on the differences in the practice of national courts 
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of the New York Convention in many jurisdictions and on the wide difference in 
interpretation of its process.  
According to the UNCITRAL report47, the Convention does not clearly address the context of 
enforcing foreign arbitration agreements and does not clearly identify the universe of 
arbitration agreements covered by Articles II and III. Article III authorizes national courts to 
follow local rules of procedure in connection with proceedings for the recognition and 
enforcement of awards. 
Article III of the New York Convention provides that:  
“Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce 
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award 
is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There 
shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or 
charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this 
Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition and enforcement of 
domestic arbitral awards.”48 
The first sentence of Article III provides that each Contracting State shall recognize and 
enforce foreign awards in accordance with its own national rules of procedure. However, 
Article III also contains two limitations on the application of national rules of procedure.  
First, Article III requires Contracting States to recognize and enforce foreign awards under 
the conditions set forth in the New York Convention.  
Second, Article III stipulates that Contracting States shall not impose substantially more 
onerous conditions or higher fees or charges for the recognition or enforcement of foreign 
awards than are imposed on the recognition and enforcement of domestic awards.  
3.3. LIMITATIONS AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE NY CONVENTION 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the New York Convention still leaves broad scope for the 
application of each Contracting State's own national rules of procedure for the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign awards. The central concern here is that Article III left the 
enforceability of the award, which is an integral procedural step, entirely to the convenience 
of national courts and their applicable domestic procedural laws. 49 
It is questionable, however, whether staying or dismissing enforcement actions on 
discretionary grounds with rooted notions of convenience is consistent with a State’s 
obligation under the NY Convention. After all, the purpose of the NY Convention is 
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essentially to ensure that national courts entertain the proper actions for the enforcement of 
foreign awards.   
Nevertheless, ambiguity in Articles II & III has given rise to risks that can in certain cases 
undermine the efficacy of the NY Convention itself.50  
Some national reports in the UNCITRAL guide suggest that the contours of Article III are 
quite broad and vague. It includes not only personal jurisdiction and statutes of limitation, but 
also potential immunity to sovereign and semi-governmental entities.   
Possible immunities to government entities can cause deep uncertainty surrounding financial 
disputes specifically. For it is worth noting that 80% of the entire number of banks of the 
world are “publicly owned banks” that are fully or partially owned by their states.51 This 
means that for financial disputes, the enforcement of cross-jurisdiction arbitral awards can 
prove problematic when faced with public policy or immunity for state owned banks. 
In cases such as the Chinese decision denying recognition and enforcement on public policy 
grounds, the court ruled that to enforce an award against a public entity that contradicted an 
earlier Chinese court decision would “amount to a violation of public interests and violates 
the judicial sovereignty of China.”52 Other Turkish cases have suggested that violations of 
mandatory rules governing public institutions necessarily constitute offenses to public 
policy.53 
Turning to the grounds for denying recognition and enforcement, the very use of the word 
“may”, for example in the introductory language to Articles V(1) and (2) of the NY 
Convention, has been criticized as ambiguous, leaving unclear just how permissive or 
mandatory are the defences to recognition and enforcement. 
Discussions of Articles II, III and V bring to mind a further question of whether reform to the 
NY Convention Articles should take place at the international level through consent of the 
entire 159 states. Another possibility is reform at the national level through domestic 
modifications of national legislations on a state by state basis.54 
The answer depends at least in part on the importance of the particular issue, its amenability 
to an international solution and the degree to which the issue touches closely on core aspects 
of national legal systems. It properly depends on whether the concern is viewed chiefly as 
one of random uncertainties, in which case clarification at the national level would suffice. 
However, if the case is of uniformity of specific concerns, then reforms to the NY 
Convention may be required.55 
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The Convention serves well the area of international trade law and represents the cornerstone 
of international arbitration processes across the world. The success of the New York 
convention since its adoption is renowned worldwide. 56 The UNCITRAL report and most 
other studies conclude that it is not realistic to attempt or suppose that the NY Convention 
could be reformed. That is probably as far as discussions could go on “NY Convention 
Reforms” and the possibility of getting the Articles of the Convention changed or amended to 
meet the enforcement needs of specific economic sectors.57 
However, it should be highlighted at this point that the analysis presented so far merely seeks 
guidance as to litigation procedural systems introduced by the NY Convention. The focus so 
far is on where the Convention might have fallen short to serve the needs of the financial 
sector. The intention primarily is to point the fundamental requirements for the financial 
sector to seek a swift payment process of awards arising from disputes involving banks and 
financial services providers. The emphasis of this thesis is not to criticize, amend or focus on 
the NY Convention.58  
3.4. ANCILLARY ENFORCEMENT IN VIEW OF NY CONVENTION 
LIMITATIONS   
The focus of this research is the concerns related to bank disputes and the enforcement of the 
resulting cross-jurisdictional arbitral awards. It is essential to point out that the NY 
Convention in its current form does not guarantee clarity and predictability for the financial 
sector disputes. In the absence of certainty in restitution, stability in financial markets will 
remain unstable at every sign of a crisis, unless there is a process, where successful claimants 
are seen to receive their rights promptly. 
The scheme of the research here is to study the possibility of an ancillary mechanism for the 
immediate payment of arbitral awards explicitly for bank disputes. The legality and judicial 
validity of enforcement of this mechanism will still derive its admissibility under the auspices 
of the NY Convention. 
The conceptualisation is on the contractual foundations of arbitration and the issue of 
enforcement in arbitration. This can be better addressed if the focus is shifted from the 
contractual nature of arbitration agreements under the NY Convention to the jurisdictional 
effect of enforcement of arbitral awards. 
The focus is shifted to whether arbitration agreements as ordinary contracts may allow 
nominated third party forums to enforce awards on contracted parties. Beneficiaries under the 
granted award may seek enforcement with ancillary forums other than judicial ones. In the 
jurisdictional context, the arbitration contract for the dispute pending before the tribunal and 
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the resulting award are the key factors to determine the boundaries of the ancillary 
enforcement.  
In light of this jurisdictional approach, the thesis focuses on financial disputes and the 
implications this enforcement process may have for disputants, rather than on the 
requirements of enforcement under the articles of the NY Convention alone. On this premise, 
the thesis examines whether bank clearing networks may assume the power to enforce or pay 
out arbitral awards for parties who are pre-bound by an arbitration agreement for the 
encashment of the resulting award. 59 
More specifically, the concept of effective arbitral award enforcement comes as a necessary 
corollary of the NY Convention enforcement perspective. According to the fundamental 
concept of the NY Convention, an effective ancillary third party may be able to assume 
procedural enforceability should the parties agree to such mechanism. 
Such a concept is valid provided such enforcement is to ultimately achieve the main 
contracted determination of the parties, which is to effectively resolve a pending dispute 
within the premise of the industry practice. In Lehman Bros. (Europe) 2018, the court based 
its decision on industry practice. In reaching its decision, the court first found that industry 
practice can be utilized in the execution of a financial contract.60 
On this premise, the forum may assume that enforcement will result in the paying out of 
awards by parties bound by the arbitration agreement. It is discussed here that for an ancillary 
forum to assert this jurisdiction, it should not only be able to examine the contractual scope of 
an arbitration agreement but it should also take into account the full implications of the 
pending dispute. The reactions of financial markets and the general public will depend upon 
the result of the dispute. 
The cornerstone here pivots on the legal concept that extra-contractual jurisdiction61 can be 
applied in bank disputes by allowing a third party clearing network to be assigned the power 
to enforce and pay out awards using its custodial authority over the assets of the debtor 
parties.  
One such valid example currently in practice is third party finance and the assignment of 
awards to third party beneficiaries.62 Award assignment represents a typical procedural means 
for an external party to assume rights over an arbitral award without the need to being in 
joinder, interpleading, or consolidation. 
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More recently, in October 2016, two claimants, BG Group 63and El Paso64, were awarded by 
ICSID against Argentina. Both claimants agreed not to seek enforcement of their awards 
through the courts. The awards were assigned to special purpose vehicles for pay-out at a 
discount. 
This gives an indication as to the possibility for assignors agreeing to present their awards for 
pay-out rather than going through the complexity of attempting enforcement through national 
courts. 
4. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question is whether an arbitration process deploying a mechanism that 
guarantees the immediate payment of arbitral awards can accelerate recovery from a crisis 
and alleviate the burden on state bailouts using taxpayers’ money? 
Empirical research show that enforceable and swift dispute resolution for financial disputes 
can establish certainty in the financial markets and assist in deterring imbedded acts of moral 
hazard within the financial sector.65 This in turn will impede the main ingredient for financial 
crises which is generated through high risk transacting within the financial sector.66 
It is against this background that this thesis is proposing the instant monetizing mechanism of 
arbitral awards that result from banking disputes. The purpose behind the choice of the 
financial sector as a pilot for such a proposal is the ready availability of interbank clearing 
networks. Such networks can play an important role re-injecting funds back into the market 
through the ease of monetizing the awards and instantly transferring funds to claimant 
investors. 
Applying this concept particularly in the financial sector will clear backlogs of investors’ 
funds that will unfailingly find their way back into the financial markets through the banks. 
Recycling the funds back into the markets will instantly speed the markets’ recovering cycle 
and avert deep crises. 
4.1. NOTION OF AWARD ENFORCEMENT PROCESSES IN LEX FINANCIERA  
In the field of international banking and finance, domestic laws are frequently inapt to 
provide workable and operable solutions for disputes arising in cross-jurisdictional 
transactions. Consequently, these areas are dominated by uniform "private" rules drafted by 
industry experts rather than domestic legislatures. Prominent examples are the Uniform 
Customs and Practices (UCP) for Documentary Credits published by the International 
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Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the ISDA Master Agreement drafted by the International 
Swaps & Derivatives Association.  
These agreements establish the rights and obligations between the parties in a comprehensive 
and exclusive manner. Even though they contain choices of law clauses, these master 
agreements are, as detached as possible from domestic laws. By using these standard contract 
documentations, the parties create their own rules to govern these complex and highly 
sophisticated financial transactions.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that particularly in the field of international banking and finance 
there exist private financial transnational legal rules and principles of ("lex financiera") that 
are frequently claimed and practiced.67 In fact, the Canton Court of Zurich, Switzerland, has 
qualified the lex financiera rules regarding the enforcement of bank guarantees on first 
demand as an institution subdivision of ‘the transnational Lex Mercatoria’.68 
Lex financiera, refers to a body of oral, customary financial rules and regulations which has 
been developed in the financial sector over many years. It has been administered quite 
uniformly across the world by merchant banks and court judges, adjudicating disputes 
between banks and their clients and between banks and each other. 
In addition, lex financiera extends to certain international conventions and even national laws 
pertaining to international economic relations. International commercial arbitration is 
frequently cited as a field in which the modern lex financiera is operative.69 
Within the same token, devising ancillary mechanisms as procedural tools for the 
enforcement and payment of arbitral awards within the international financial community can 
be associated to the substantive contractual permissive nature of interbank relations in lex 
financiera. The availability of clearing networks and exchange of funds on a daily basis 
makes such a process substantively feasible.  
The exploration of such a process takes place in the following chapters against a comparative 
background of several national litigation substantive and procedural systems. Again, here, it 
is emphasized that the arbitration agreement that exists between the disputant parties is the 
key element for an enforcement mechanism operated by an ancillary third party.  
In particular, the extent to which that third party may participate in the enforcement 
proceedings between two original parties is key. This is directly relevant to the degree of 
association between the third party and at least one of the original parties, in terms of the 
holding of assets or being members of the same bank clearing networks. 
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In legal terms, the enforcement of the award may be strongly associated in substantive terms 
with lex financiera and the NY Convention. It may also rely on permissive contractually 
interrelated agreements for the procedural mechanism of payment of funds out of a party's 
account even in situations when consent to enforcement proceedings is not disputed.70 This is 
the case with banks and financial institutions associated in contractually interrelated clearing 
networks.  
However, the issues of lex financiera and substantive laws are in the periphery of the 
conceptual boundaries of this work, and therefore, they will only be briefly mentioned.  
4.2. CONCEPT OF A SWIFT MECHANISM FOR BANK DISPUTES 
For many decades, the worldwide trade of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and structured 
finance agreements have been contracted upon in standard master agreements such as that 
used by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). In cases of syndicated 
loans, there are the master agreements of the London-based Loan Market Association (LMA) 
and the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) based in New York.71 
In those contracts, in light of the complexity and political considerations such as issues of 
state sovereignty, the parties would not submit themselves to the jurisdiction of foreign courts 
of the transacting banks. On the other hand, the transacting banks would also not subject 
themselves to the jurisdiction of other party’s national courts. Instead, the parties would agree 
to submit their disputes to international arbitral tribunals sitting in a neutral country. As a 
result, arbitral proceedings through those standardised contracts have played and will play an 
important role in the renegotiation of financial instruments and financing sovereign debt.72 
However, recourse to arbitration was not limited to financial loan contracts with local and 
international parties. In derivatives and structured financing transactions, and other financial 
agreements with commercial parties from "emerging markets", e.g. Africa or Asia, parties 
would also agree on arbitration instead of litigation before domestic courts. One reason for 
pursuing this approach is the interest of those parties to shield themselves from existing legal 
uncertainties in those countries and problems with the reliability, expertise and efficiency of 
the local courts there.  
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Another reason for resorting to international arbitration agreements is to benefit from the 
worldwide and highly efficient enforcement regime of the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, especially in scenarios when 
awards rendered in favour of an overseas claimant need to be enforced against assets in cross-
jurisdictional processes.  
As mentioned earlier, this may be the case when those parties have concluded a contract with 
a counterparty that has assets in multiple jurisdictions or a contract with multiple 
counterparties having assets in a variety of jurisdictions, e.g. in project finance scenarios. For 
the judgement of domestic courts only bilateral and regional enforcement systems exist, but 
no such worldwide system. 
4.3. FINANCIAL MARKET DISPUTES REQUIRE FINANCIAL EXPERT JUDGES 
The chapters that follow will demonstrate that it is possible for arbitration to interact with 
investors as a method of administering their bankers. At the same time, they will outline the 
main theoretical economic effects of a speedy process and enforcement of financial disputes 
with suggestions of a mechanism for immediate payment of financial awards. The 
mechanism is presented in analytical detail in the main part of the thesis with tests of the 
concurring boundaries of arbitration awards as assented to in the NY Convention. 
Examples from recent practice, both in commercial and investment banks’ arbitration show 
that there is no reason for banks and other financial institutions to avoid arbitration in favour 
of state court jurisdiction. In many instances, arbitration has shown itself as a superior 
method of dispute resolution in its speed and the expertise of the judicial panel. One of the 
many advantages of arbitration is the ability of parties to select an arbitrator with specialized 
legal know-how and market proficiency. 
Arbitrators with expert knowledge are fundamental to the efficient process of arbitration. The 
choice of specialized financial arbitrators in banking disputes will ensure that the 
documentations of complex financial transactions like the ISDA and LMA/LSTA master 
agreements are not interpreted the same way as in any other commercial disputes. A judicial 
decision from an arbitrator with thorough understanding of the banking and finance industry 
will strengthen the public confidence in the process and quell possible turmoil.   
This classical advantage of expertise in arbitration in financial disputes has become more 
evident after the 2008 crisis than at any other time. This is because it can be hardly possible 
to explain to most national court judges in a short time the market understanding and 
functioning of terms like “backstop facility”, “convertible preferred equity certificates”, 
“collateralized debt obligation”, “MAC-clause”, “parallel debt”, “senior facilities agreement”, 
“pari-passu clause”, “gun jumping” or “contractual subordination.73 
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The financial crisis and its aftermath have helped the financial sector to better understand the 
benefits which arbitration has to offer, rather than reflexively resorting to the decades-long 
established practice of dispute resolution by state courts, without considering alternatives and 
associated efficiency gains. Already today, a considerable percentage of the case load 
administered by some arbitral institutions involves international banking and finance disputes 
or disputes where such issues are in the background. It is not surprising that this increased 
acceptance of arbitration in the financial industry goes along with the increased complexity of 
disputes involving financial products.  
Three major reasons account for this increased use of arbitration in finance: 
1. Access to the legal and financial market expertise of highly qualified arbitrators 
selected by the parties; 
2. Confidentiality of the arbitral procedure, at least in commercial as opposed to 
investment arbitrations; and 
3. Worldwide enforceability of arbitral awards under the 1958 New York Convention. 
These, as well as other advantages of arbitration in finance are listed in the 2013 ISDA 
Arbitration Guide and have led ISDA to recommend to its members the use of arbitration 
clauses in the 2002 and 1992 ISDA Master Agreement. However, the significance of 
arbitration goes well beyond the area of derivatives transactions. It may even be relevant in 
cases that involve straightforward and undisputed claims for the payment of a sum of money, 
e.g. for the repayment of a loan. For such disputes, the parties may benefit from the rules for 
expedited proceedings ("fast track rules") which have been issued in recent years by a variety 
of arbitral institutions and which allow for a speedy resolution of disputes through arbitration. 
Some of these developments have been evaluated at the German Institute of Arbitration 
(GAR Live Frankfurt in 2018).74 Arbitrators and bankers came together to discuss the current 
state of arbitration in finance and pointed to areas and means of improvement. Amongst 
these, concerns about the delays facing the enforcement of arbitral awards surfaced as a 
serious worry for banks and investors alike. 
5. THE NECESSITY OF ARBITRATION – CASE LAW 
The financial crisis resulted in an increase of interbank disputes as well as between banks and 
their international correspondent banks. The following are some examples of case law to 
illustrate how arbitration has proven to be a necessary instrument in financial disputes. It may 
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also prove to be an indispensable instrument in resolving complicated bank disputes in the 
near future.75 
1- Disputes over derivative contracts that had been concluded between the bankrupt 
investment bank, Lehman Brothers, and their investors were resolved through a multi-step 
arbitration procedure. The process was ordered by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of New York under Section 105 (a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
2- In Hong Kong, thousands of claims from investors who had purchased bonds of Lehman 
Brothers investment banks were resolved through arbitration under the rules of the Hong 
Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC). Pursuant to the "Lehman Brothers-Related 
Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme Agreements", the decision was taken 
accordingly that those disputes are to be decided by arbitration tribunal and not by state 
courts. 
3- Disputes related to the corporate debt restructuring of the Dubai World Group (DWG), a 
restructuring made necessary by the financial crisis, were discretely removed from the state 
courts by decree of the ruler of Dubai and were instead decided by a special tribunal (Dubai 
World Tribunal) of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). 
4- In 2009, an arbitral tribunal in New York ordered the Swiss bank, Credit Suisse, to pay 
damages for the purchase of worthless securities. Pursuant to the arbitral award, it had to pay 
over USD $400 million (310 million euros) to the semi-conductor manufacturer ST 
Microelectronics in Geneva. 
5- On March 1, 2010 ISDA published a modified version of the Islamic Finance-Version of 
its 2002 Master Agreement (“ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement”), which was jointly 
developed by ISDA and the global standard organization of Islamic money and financial 
market operations "International Islamic Financial Market" (IIFM). 
Section 13 (c) of the Master Agreement now offers parties the opportunity to have disputes 
arising out of this Tahawwut Master Agreement be decided not by a state court, but rather by 
a tribunal that operates under the ICC or any other arbitration rules agreed by the parties. 
6- In an award dated August 4, 2011, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the rules of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) declared itself competent 
to rule on the claims of nearly 60,000 Italian bondholders against the Argentinean Republic. 
The claims were brought in connection with Argentina’s default and the related partial 
rescheduling of its debt in the context of the international financial crisis. 
7- Solymar Investments, Ltd. v. Santander, was a case regarding the improper direction of 
customer funds into the fund of convicted fraudster Bernard L. Madoff. In its decision, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in its decision on 28th Feb. 2012, referred the 
damages claim against the Spanish bank, Santander, to an arbitral tribunal constituted under 
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the Rules of the ICC. The reason for the US Court of Appeals’ decision was that the parties 
had agreed to ICC arbitration at the outset of their contractual agreement. 
8- Ping An Life Insurance Company v Kingdom of Belgium (2012) - In September 2012, Ping 
An, sued before an ICSID tribunal for damages in the amount of USD $2.28 billion. The case 
began in 2007 when Ping An had acquired an interest in the Belgian bank, Fortis. The bank 
was subsequently nationalized by the Belgian Government due to the difficulties it faced 
during the financial crisis.  Ping An was forced to discontinue with the plans to acquire Fortis 
Bank and had to write off its investment in the amount of the claim.76 
9- In October 2012, an ICSID Tribunal ruled on Deutsche Bank’s claim against the Republic 
of Sri Lanka. The claim concerned the possible violation of an investment treaty between 
Germany and Sri Lanka. The dispute involved a "Hedging Agreement" regarding oil 
transactions between Deutsche Bank and the state oil company. The tribunal found a 
violation of the investment treaty and awarded Deutsche Bank damages amounting to 
approximately USD $60 million, plus interest and attorney’s fees. 77 
10- In an award dated February 8, 2013, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the rules of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) declared itself competent 
to rule on the claims of 74 Italian bondholders against the Argentinean Republic. The claims 
were brought in connection with Argentina’s default and the related partial rescheduling of its 
debt in the context of the international financial crisis. 
11- On May 20, 2013 the Slovak banks Postova Banka a.s. and its shareholder Istrokapital 
S.E. filed a claim for damages against the Hellenic Republic in relation to Greece's sovereign 
debt restructuring. Postova argued that it purchased Greek Government Bonds in 2010. 
Postova and Istrokapital alleged that Greece unilaterally amended the terms of the 
outstanding bonds by inserting a “collective action clause through the Greek Bondholder Act 
in 2012. 
Postova claimed that being a holder of the Greek Government Bonds when they were 
forcibly restructured by Greece caused them and Istrokapital significant losses. The claimants 
alleged that Greece destroyed their investment by taking measures that were never taken 
before in debt restructuring. Those extreme measures included the Greek legislation to 
retroactively and unilaterally amend the terms of the bonds. 
However, the tribunal dismissed all of Istrokapital’s claims for lack of jurisdiction 
considering that the claimant had sought jurisdiction on its indirect investment, but failed to 
establish that it had any rights to Poštová bank assets that were protected by the BIT.78 The 
point is that the claimant may have had a better chance claiming directly in a commercial 
arbitration dispute. 
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12- In August 2013, the Iranian Bank Mellat looked at settling a 780 million USD claim 
against the Government of Great Britain before an ad hoc arbitral tribunal instead of domestic 
courts. This was after the UK Supreme Court had ruled in a judgement of June 19, 2013 that 
the decision of the British Treasury of October 2009 to ban the bank from business in the 
British financial markets was unlawful. The decision by The UK Treasury Secretary was 
taken for alleged connections of the Mellat Bank with the Iranian nuclear programme. 
13- Marfin, an Athens-based Investment Group and twenty other Greek investors filed a 
claim on September 6th, 2013 against Cyprus.79 The collective action was for claims for 
damages in the amount of 1.05 billion Euros. These claims arose out of the issuance of a 
decree that increased the Cypriot Government's participation in the Cyprus Popular Bank in 
which the claimants had invested. Allegedly then, the Cypriot Government take-over of the 
bank’s management control and the subsequent insolvency of the bank was caused by the 
financial crisis. The Tribunal dismissed all claims against the Cypriot Government including 
expropriation, and arbitrary and discriminatory measures, including denial of justice claims 80 
14- On September 9, 2013, the International Swaps & Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
published its "2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide" in which it recommended the use of a number 
of alternative model arbitration clauses for its 2002 and 1992 ISDA Master Agreements for 
OTC derivatives in lieu of the choice of forum clause, which was used exclusively in these 
Agreements. 
15- In April 2015, Capital Financial Holdings Luxembourg (CFHL) filed a claim for 
damages of over €100 million against Cameroon under the Luxembourg-Cameroon Bilateral 
Investment Treaty. The claim was based on an alleged expropriation of its 47% stake in the 
Commercial Bank of Cameroon following a state-imposed capital restructuring of the bank. 
CFHL claimed that such a restructure was against their will and that of other shareholders. 
CFHL then argued that because the bank was placed under a regime of “provisional 
administration” in 2009, CFHL and other shareholders lost control over the management of 
the bank, with a provisional administrator exercising executive powers instead of the bank’s 
CEO and board of directors. CFHL maintained that the imposition of the provisional 
administration regime amounted to an expropriation leading to the loss of its shares in the 
bank. 81 
It is worth noting that almost all of the above cases involved a standardised ISDA Master 
Agreement. 
6. CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL AWARDS  
No harmonisation of state law exists so far on challenging international arbitral awards in 
general. It is thus difficult to gauge how certain jurisdictions will proceed in any given case 
as to a challenge to a bank dispute arbitral award. Legal practitioners and parties engaged in 
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banking transactions in particular countries or regions frequently assess possible jurisdictions 
in order to determine which jurisdiction is most appropriate as a seat for their arbitration.  
This determination is not based upon the ratification of the NY Convention. Unfortunately it 
is based in large part on the attitude of local courts towards set aside proceedings. Apart from 
the ICSID Convention, no multilateral convention provides uniformity as to challenges.  
That is to say, that while the enforcement of international arbitral awards is governed by 
international conventions (The NY Convention), the extent of a state's exercise of judicial 
control over the challenge to awards of arbitral tribunals is not. The result is wide variations 
of standards, and the extent to which judicial control is permissible thus varies from state to 
state.  
In the absence of treaty-induced harmonisation of approaches, it is believed that in certain 
jurisdictions, it is incumbent on the parties to go through cumbersome processes that may still 
end fruitlessly. Arbitration practitioners appreciate how and when transnational issues may 
influence enforceability especially when it comes to Article V of the NY Convention. 
National courts usually use the public policy issue to deny enforceability.82 
It can be argued however, that an award can be challenged in courts to hinder the process of 
the proposed mechanism of instant payment.  The general rule is that award challenges do not 
automatically suspend enforcement. For example in France, award challenges do not suspend 
enforcement proceedings (Article 1526 section 1)83.  
The courts can exceptionally suspend enforcement proceedings, in cases where the rights of 
any of the parties can be seriously jeopardized (Article 1526 section 2). The applied rule in 
other jurisdictions is that an award challenge shall not hinder the prevailing party from 
seeking enforcement of the award. It is understood that the automatic suspension resulting 
from the initiation of an action to set aside the award in the court of the originating 
jurisdiction does not meet the requirement of the NY Convention Article V(1) (e).84 
Abstracts of empirical and academic research point out that if the term “suspension” were to 
refer to the automatic suspension of an award pending an action to set aside, this would 
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defeat the whole system of the NY Convention.85  In the case of Company X SA v. Y 
Federation, in Switzerland, a party challenged the enforcement of an award pursuant to 
article V(1)(e) of the NY Convention. The Swiss Federal Tribunal held that the correct 
interpretation of the Convention should be that the suspension of the award in the originating 
jurisdiction would only constitute a ground for challenge if it were granted by a judicial 
decision. It would not however, constitute such grounds when it simply arose from an action 
brought against the award.86 
 In AB Götaverken, the Swedish Supreme Court confirmed that the reference to a 
“suspended” award under article V(1) (e) refers to “a situation where, after specific 
consideration of the matter, the foreign authority orders the setting aside of a binding and 
enforceable award or the suspension of its enforcement”. 87 
As a result, the court rejected the respondent’s contention that enforcement should be denied 
on the ground that recourse to set aside had been initiated in France, the country where the 
award was issued. The same principle led a US court to deny the enforcement of an award. 
The court affirmed the rule that “article V(1) (e) of the Convention require[s] a ‘competent 
authority’ to suspend the award, not just a statutory stay”.  
The court held that the stay ordered by the Argentinean courts was not merely an “automatic” 
stay resulting from the initiation of setting aside proceedings or a “pre-ordered” formality. On 
that basis the US Court dismissed exceptionally the request to enforce the award.88 
7. CONCLUSION 
The case for a specialized award paying mechanism on an international basis in the banking 
world is a compelling and a sound one. Such a process will be well positioned to address 
many issues that arise in financial disputes and to fill the international void of delayed 
settlement of enormous inter-bank disputes. 
However, national courts still have an important role to play in arbitration procedures, mostly 
in the enforcement process of the awards. Nevertheless, inconsistent interpretation of the NY 
Convention by national courts has resulted in conflicting decisions in recent years on the 
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enforcement of arbitral awards in different jurisdictions. This was witnessed by the 
UNCITRAL Report89 which stands as good example of the difficulties and complexities that 
exist globally today in the resolution of banking and financial sector disputes.  
These cases are also examples of how courts can struggle with the complex issues that 
financial market participants have as normal operative rules of their daily transactions from a 
legal as well as a practical market perspective. Banking and finance disputes face two 
recurrent challenges: highly complex transactions and time constraints for resolving the 
dispute.  
The arbitration process can be and has been proven to be expeditious in certain dedicated 
arbitral institutions. However, when it comes to payment of the award with respect to asserted 
gaps in the NY Convention, time constraints may well vary as numerous factors come into 
play when seeking enforcement through national courts.  
Markets and market participants acknowledge that banking disputes will continue to occur if 
not increase. Markets and market participants need legal clarity, certainty and predictability 
that their disputes will be concluded in a definitive manner. Regardless of who loses or wins, 
financial markets require certainties in outcomes in order to be able to plan for the following 
day. 
They also need confidence in the outcomes of the resolutions of their disputes, as well as in 
the disputes in other markets and of other market participants. Financial markets participants 
operate on indications and predictabilities. If markets are deprived of investors’ confidence, 
panic waves and bank runs are the eminent result. 
The questions that may arise if arbitration is a confidential process are how the public will 
and regulatory authorities become aware of the outcome? In answer to the confidentiality of 
arbitration and its procedures, banks are required by standard accountancy rules to form a 
provision on their balance sheet for every dispute they are involved in.  
Arbitration processes and cases may be confidential from the public but it will not be hidden 
from the banking regulatory authorities.90 Should a certain bank be disputed by a number of 
its clients, it is easy for the regulatory authorities to look into the pattern of those disputes and 
intervene should there be an indication of high risk transactions. The resulting awards will 
also have to be included in the banks’ financial statements, which investors follow on regular 
basis.91 
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A mechanism that guarantees instant payment of dispute awards would be well positioned to 
assist in the provision of that confidence. That said, the case for such a process would need a 
banks forum similar to the funds clearing forums SWIFT or TARGET. Consent by members 
for awards to be debited to their accounts is provided quid pro quo. On the other hand, 
consent by non-members can provide their consent at the outset of an arbitral agreement with 
a clause providing for awards to be debited directly to the account of the losing party through 
the Award Clearing Forum. This is not necessarily a new practice in the financial sector. 
Large volumes of derivatives and complicated financial transactions (CFT’s) are habitually 
documented under standardised contractual agreement forms with a standard arbitration 
clause.  
The amenability of an international uniform solution for the expeditious enforceability of 
arbitral awards in banking disputes will depend initially on the degree to which the issue of 
enforceability touches core aspects of the financial world and the willingness of banks to 
resort to arbitration. Market sponsor entities which have sponsored and published several 
forms of financial dispute agreements such as the European Master Agreements by ISDA for 
OTC derivatives have shown flexibility in endorsing new clauses in their standard forms. 
That was also seen with P.R.I.M.E. Finance and the local language ISDA master agreements 
by the French and German banking associations. 
In the international trade and finance arena, as mentioned earlier, the speed by which 
financial disputes are completely settled has serious effects on world economies and the 
stability of financial markets. This does not necessarily mean that disputants in banking and 
financial agreements should limit themselves to the detriments of national legal systems with 
uncertainty as to the New York Convention’s interpretation. 
Although disputed for some time, it is generally accepted that arbitration awards can be 
transferred by way of assignment.92 Thus, after the assignment of the main contract including 
the arbitration agreement is completed, the assignee is entitled to enforce the arbitration 
agreement on its own name and in its own right. 
This is the view taken by the courts in several countries. Under the English Arbitration Act, 
(s. 82(2) the assignee is considered a person "claiming under or through the assignor to the 
agreement". In essence, the assignee claims instead of the party.93 Similar cases in the USA 
include Asset Allocation and Management v Western Employer,94 Banque Worms v Bellot in 
France95, Clear Star v Centromor, (1991) in Switzerland.96 
Such flexibility will allow financial dispute awards drawn on banks to be traded and 
discounted freely on the open market which will grant liquidity to the award debtor as well as 
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the markets. However, unlike with the assignment of the arbitration agreement, the assignee 
remains a genuine party to the arbitration agreement after the assignment of the arbitration 
award agreement is completed. In the case of American Renaissance Lines v Saxis 97 in the 
US, it was held that the assignor can still enforce the arbitration agreement against the other 
party with the assignee remaining to be entitled to the rights arising out of the award.  
In fact, it could be argued that the extent to which the assignor remains bound by the 
arbitration agreement or its award is primarily an issue of interpretation of the substantive 
contract containing the arbitration agreement. 
With such a view, the same can apply to award clearing forums. In an award assignment 
agreement, the clearing network becomes an assignee. According to the prevailing view, the 
network is considered as a custodian agent of the party holding the award.98 Accordingly, the 
assignee by holding the award becomes a party to the award agreement incorporated thereto 
in the original arbitration agreement. 99 
This brief overview suggests a few conclusions. First, global financial organisations seem to 
be yearning for an expeditious process relating to instant encashment of arbitration awards 
and consistent with the fundamental policies upon which the NY Convention was 
established.100  
Secondly, it seems that the success in enforcing an assigned award may depend to a 
significant extent on the political leverage and financial strength of the clearing network. For 
that purpose, the proposal is for a mechanism that operates from within an existing and 
globally recognised operating network such as TARGET, European Settlement Bank, 
SWIFT. This is further researched and analysed in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
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     CHAPTER TWO 
  ARBITRATION IN BANKING DISPUTES 
Chapter Two includes predominantly the view on the mobility and enforceability of arbitral 
awards.  The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, commonly known as the New York Convention is recognized as the foundation of 
international commercial arbitration. It imposes on local courts in the ratifying states a Public 
International Law obligation to recognize and enforce awards issued in other States.  
However, subject to specific limited exceptions such as public policy issues, courts in such 
states can render an international award non-enforceable in their jurisdiction. In industries 
such as the financial sector, it is of great importance that arbitral awards be acknowledged as 
an instrument capable of immediate recognition and enforcement. Currently, the arbitrating 
parties and the tribunal may regard the award as nothing but an instrument recording a 
tribunal’s decision provisionally or finally determining claims of the parties. 
An award deals with legal or factual differences between the parties; it will involve 
interpretations of the contract terms and finally determine the respective rights and 
obligations of the parties under the contract. Ultimately, it is the finality and indeed the 
enforcement of the award that gives credence to the entire arbitration process and justifies the 
cost and time that the parties to a dispute have invested in the resolution process. 
The pressures of high-speed development in the financial markets and the effect of rapid 
globalization have increased the need for more than purely national systems of law and 
dispute resolution techniques to apply to complicated financial disputes. Societies are 
primarily reacting to what occurs in the financial sector between bankers and business 
professionals. The problems that may arise between banks amongst themselves and/or other 
financial institutions touch instantly onto the public and social welfare. The Chapter provides 
that a conclusive arbitration process with expeditious award payment that speedily redress 
interbank disputes will in turn curb public panic and encourage ethical morals within the 
financial sector. 
1. SECURITIES TRADING, DEALING AND ORIGINATION 
The financial crisis in 2007 occurred from within the securities market makers such as banks 
and non-bank financial brokers. Securities investment and trading were and still are among 
the most publicized activities in the financial services industry.  In line with earlier discussion 
of the financial system, securities are not only a means of transferring savings to investors. It 
is essential for the day-to-day financing of international global trade. Third world countries as 
much as large economies rely on the financial markets in order to secure liquidity for running 
their economy. 
Banks have developed today into financial institutions with newly sophisticated forms of 
activities amongst which can be banking. Creation and trading of securities and their 
derivatives stemming from macroeconomic and social needs have placed banks and financial 
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institutions in a category of importance that is “too big to fail”.101 
The emphasis is on the value added by securities trading, market making, and securities 
origination to the economy and the society.  These basic financial services of securities 
markets have grown in importance as the world economies have grown.  
The extent of such growth has been fueled by the rapid increase in technology sophistication 
and institutional complexity. Securities markets represent a development agent in world 
economies far beyond the simple operations of raising funds in the form of credit, and are 
expected to grow ever more around the world.  
1.1. FIRMS ACTIVE IN SECURITIES MARKETS  
Brokerage and investment-banking firms like Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs represent 
the traditional concept of a securities firm.  These and other firms involved in securities 
markets perform the established functions of brokerage, which are buying and selling 
securities as well as advising clients on how to originate new securities through investment 
banking to raise funds.  
Traditional firms can be providers of the full range of securities markets services or can be 
more specialized.  "Full line" firms like Merrill Lynch offer retail brokerage services and 
corporate securities advice. On the other hand, narrowly focused firms like Jeffries Securities 
concentrate on trading for institutional clients. 
In recent years, non-financial firms tried providing securities market services: Sears Roebuck, 
the retail giant and owner of Allstate Insurance, acquired the full-line broker Dean Witter, 
and then spun it off in 1993.  General Electric, maker of refrigerators and jet engines, bought 
the investment banking concern Kidder-Peabody, and sold it to PaineWebber in 1995. 
A development of even broader potential significance has been the entrance of non-securities 
related financial service firms, such as commercial banks and thrift institutions, into securities 
businesses through expansion of their authorized powers.  Other financial service firms have 
entered securities business through acquisitions. For example, Travelers Insurance 
(Primerica) bought Smith-Barney and Prudential Insurance acquired Bache. 
There are four key factors influencing the future of the industry:   
(1) possible synergies realized within financial markets between large banks and non-
securities financial service firms (non-regulated) offering securities market services;  
(2) market share gained by non-financial firms from offering securities market services;  
(3) technological change; and  
(4) structural changes in the flow of savings into investment. 
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Non-securities financial firms, principally commercial banks, have a number of synergistic 
connections to securities market services.  Banks are portfolio lenders to non-financial firms 
and are involved in open-market short-term financing to global markets. 
Banks increasingly arrange credit for their customers.  On the other hand, banks will trade 
those assets back in the market through non-financial firms and make markets in a variety of 
money market securities. This is a natural process for banks to expand their working capital 
through the corporate securities markets.   
Therefore, historically it seemed a natural extension of bank functions to arrange funding in 
the form of public securities issues.  Banks in Germany and Japan already have these 
authorities. Even non-bank, large manufacturing corporations such as General Motors and 
General Electric have already entered the financial services industry through their finance 
company subsidiaries.  The principal, other than profitability, was to offer securities to the 
public at a lower cost of funds.   
The enormous size of those corporations, their equity capital and top credit ratings, meant 
that they could commit large amounts of capital to securities business.  Their reputation could 
be of enormous value in competition for securities market services.  Furthermore, non-banks 
were not hampered by the regulations limiting traditional securities and deposit-taking 
financial institutions such as capital-to-assets ratios. 
The vast development in the IT technology and speed processing of data information allowed 
access to the applying of complex analytical tools. Banks were not the only market 
participants able to plug into related financial service functions. 
Services such as clearing networks, securities issues and technical information meant that 
many smaller boiler room firms and new entrants can quickly enter as participant to the 
securities markets.  These firms are now able to compete on a relatively even footing with 
established banks and firms for the securities business. 
Finally, the institutional changes in the flow of funds have dramatically altered the markets 
within which securities markets service firms operate.  Globalization integrates world capital 
markets.  American securities firms are active around the world but must compete in the 
United States with securities firms from Europe and Asia.   
Political and demographic trends fostered the emergence of locally important securities 
markets. Investment opportunities in these markets attracted investors’ funds from around the 
world.  On the other hand, as the world’s aging population has continued to accumulate 
savings in institutional investors such as pension funds and money management firms, the 
market for trading securities and target markets for new securities issues has become more 
sophisticated. 
To appreciate developments in the securities related financial services industry, it is essential 
to understand the role of securities markets and the economic functions performed by 
financial services firms. Resolving disputes within this vital sector amounts to resolving 
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global economic crises.  
1.2. TRADING OF SECURITIES AND POSSIBLE MORAL HAZARD 
Securities are standardized financial claims that can be readily transferred between parties 
and therefore traded on securities markets.  Typical individuals acquire or dispose of 
securities in the retail markets for securities services. Although this thesis is fundamentally 
concerned with disputes arising out of transactions involving trading between banks, various 
types of large firms and investors operate in the market for institutional securities market 
services may be classified as contributing parties to financial disputes. 
Closed and open-ended funds transactions are limited to tailored contractual provisions that 
may be designed for each fund on its own. There are many reasons why individual and 
institutional investors prefer securities to portfolio investments:  
 Securities have desirable attributes relative to portfolio investments.  They are liquid, 
meaning they can be exchanged for cash easily because there are markets where the 
securities are traded. 
 Securities markets produce technical information including prices for the same or 
similar investments, unlike portfolio investments which are often difficult to price.  
Trading volume reflects the depth of the market for securities and investors' ability to 
convert investments into cash at predictable transaction prices.   
 Securities of large corporations can be publicly traded in many countries and are 
accompanied by a wealth of information in the form of disclosures.  The investment 
community provides ongoing analysis of securities when they are issued or as they 
subsequently trade.  
 Securities markets offer timely information as well as established firms and 
institutions with reputations for providing technical data on the quality and ratings of 
traded papers.  Rules and regulations govern securities issuance and trading which can 
be a source of confidence or basis for litigation for investors investing in securities. 
The fundamental reason why investors give their money to financial service providers is 
because of the trust in the information provided by those intermediaries. Should the published 
information on prices and returns associated with such investments suffer from asymmetry, 
investors will fall into adverse selection.  
That is to say, if an investor is provided with asymmetric information about a product, their 
choice of investment will be distorted. It is of utmost importance for the public’s confidence 
to provide the markets with accurate feedback on associated risk to their investments. This 
includes opportunity costs, ratings and possible decline in future return on funds to investors. 
As an example, a trader knows something that the rest of the markets do not know. This 
information may be that a lawsuit has been filed against an issuer of certain securities or that 
a bankruptcy could be imminent. Without disclosing this knowledge, the trader will attempt 
to convince other investors to buy the stock of securities off his hands. The trader will shift 
the risk to his clients by withholding essential information from them.  
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Information traders expect to profit because they buy securities at prices which are low 
relative to their possible future values. Later, they will sell those securities at prices which are 
high relative to what they will sell for when the advert information the trader possesses 
becomes available to the market. 
Some of the principal problems between investors and bankers may be less severe if firms are 
willing to disclose information not necessary required by law but morally necessary. Firms 
issuing publicly traded securities can take advantage of competition in securities markets to 
reduce issue costs relative to costs implicit in negotiated deals with portfolio investors.   
In the case of some large firms, like Enron, open market auctions of securities issues may 
eliminate the need for financial intermediaries and their fees altogether.  These considerations 
can also lead investors to prefer investing in securities with well reputable banks. 
1.3. FUNCTIONS OF SECURITIES FIRMS AND TRADERS  
A securities broker finds a buyer for a seller.  Because most securities traders are not 
continuously buying and selling securities, they turn to professional brokerage firms to 
complete their trades.  Often, a buyer or seller wants to trade sooner than would be required 
by waiting for a counterpart seller or buyer to show up in the market.   
Financial institutions, which trade by buying or selling securities on their own accounts, are 
called “market makers”.  When offering new securities to investors, firms raising funds 
require guidance as how to design and price newly issued securities in order to make them 
attractive to investors.  This guidance is one of the functions performed by financial service 
firms assisting borrowing entities with securities origination. 
Brokers and dealers of securities buy and sell a wide range of financial instruments to offer 
flexibility for investors or issuers in the composition of their portfolios.  The variety of 
securities makes it possible to fine-tune investments or fund raising to particular investor or 
borrower needs. 
Stocks represent ownership in the capital of firms. On the other hand, bonds are debt claims 
against the earnings or underlying income of a borrower.  These traditional securities are the 
lifeblood of world economies and represent a significant part of trading volume in the 
financial markets.  
Stocks and bonds in their simple forms are important but relatively simple securities.  To 
achieve an optimal combination of risks and returns against a variety of future economic 
scenarios, investment banks and traders often look for innovative re-designed securities. 
Marketability and profit are the main drive for the creation of such derived securities.  
Bankers found that if derivative securities achieve a combination of much better return but 
with higher risk in terms of possible future values then they will be more marketable. Classic 
examples were convertible bonds, preferred stocks, and warrants. Nowadays, examples 
include collateralized mortgage obligations and index options.   
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The vital role of banks in keeping the flow of converting securities to liquidity and vice versa 
is immeasurable. The banks buy simple securities from the market thus furnishing the market 
with liquidity. They then batch the same securities in marketable derivatives with attractive 
returns and re-sell them on the international markets.  
There is unlimited number of possible risks investors or borrowers may be concerned about.  
For example, a financial instrument which pays higher returns with higher inflation would 
offer protection against inflation risks.  A security which pays off more if automobile demand 
drops might be useful to some particular investors. 
Conceptually there are an infinite number of possible future outcomes, which could be of 
concern to individual investors and borrowers. Creating financial instruments that pay future 
cash flows under specific economic conditions can offer protection to market participants 
who have certain views towards the market.  
With aggressive brokers and traders active in selling securities, there are always opportunities 
for inventing new high income securities for which sufficient demand exists. All customers 
are attracted by the security high yield payoffs. But not all customers, if informed, will be 
willing to accept the risk associated with such high yield.102 The list of features is endless and 
growing with innovations in securities becoming more complex.  
In legal claims, securities are classified by type of issuer: sovereign governments, foreign or 
domestic corporations.  The categorization follows the nature of the claim.  Bonds provide 
the buyer a fixed claim on the income and assets of the issuer.  Equity represents a residual 
claim against income and assets of the firm after other claims are met.   
1.4. RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING SECURITIES TRADING 
Securities markets around the world take wide and varied forms.  There are two dimensions 
to describing market structures. The first is the physical and institutional organization of the 
market, determining whether trading occurs in one place and how exclusive it is for those 
who wish to trade.  The second dimension concerns the rules by which the prices at which 
trades occur.  
The physical and institutional aspects of markets’ concerns are whether trading locations or 
systems are exclusive or open.  One structure is for trading to take place in a single location 
where access is limited to members such as the stock exchange. A famous example is the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
A second market structure is that traders are connected by communication links like 
telephones and wire systems. These are often with computer screens or other display devices 
with the system allowing open communication to all buyers and sellers.  These markets are 
called over-the-counter-markets, since anyone who is authorized, inscribed or allowed to plug 
into the information network can buy or sell securities. 
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The second dimension of securities markets concerns are the rules governing trading 
activities.  The most important rules govern how prices for traded securities are established.  
Brokers and other market makers trading in markets with frequent activity agree on rules in 
order to prevent chaotic trading and disagreements.  Those rules “Lex Financiera” are 
industry implemented akin to lex mercatoria and intended to ensure that possible disputes 
about transactions are minimized and orderly settled usually in arbitral processes.  
Trading rules establishing prices can be described in terms of “Members” of organized 
markets agreeing on rules covering members. Rules in over-the-counter markets can be bank 
trading conventions, regulations, or laws. The two attributes of trading rules concern mainly 
trading, commitment, settlement and the nature of the traders, whether they are, for example, 
banks, individuals or corporations. 
Another aspect of price setting rules concerns the way trades are conducted and how traders 
close transactions. Traders or their broker representatives find out what prices are being 
offered and conclude transactions with any other traders or brokers on the other end of the 
line.  In dealer markets, brokers or traders contact securities market participants who 
specialize or who are designated to quote prices for the immediate purchase or sale of the 
securities. 
1.5. BROKERAGE AND BANKING SERVICES 
Brokerage firms offering trading services and advice are called full-line brokers. They 
typically price their services on a per transaction basis and price their services to cover costs 
and earn a reasonable risk-adjusted return. Costs mostly consist of the operating expenses and 
the locating of buyers or sellers in the market.   
Services offered by brokers in addition to finding buyers for sellers include: 
1.  information services in the form of securities research or advising; 
2. market making services which we discuss in the following section 
3. safekeeping and clearing services, which we discuss in the next chapter.   
The point here is that pricing in the brokerage business is bundled with prices for other 
services. 
Many brokerage firms, like Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Smith Barney, double as 
investment banks and brokers. They have research departments, which make "buy" or "sell," 
recommendations to their clients. This stock and bond research constitutes information and 
advisory services investment banks offer their clients, and is open to the public in general. 
When Merrill Lynch recommends buying certain securities, they base their recommendation 
on the quality of the security, the expected return and risk associated with it.  
It is also essential to point out here that, being an investment bank, Merrill Lynch also deals 
as a market maker. Being a market maker means that they can own and create securities on 
their books and sell them to their clients. In essence, there is nothing to stop a broker bank 
from offloading certain securities onto their clients should it start to decline in value or the 
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market shifts unfavorably.103 
That represents clear conflict of interest, and asymmetric information was an important factor 
in the wide spread of the crisis in 2008. Asymmetric information is a type of moral hazard 
that leads to adverse selection by investors. In fact this is what happened in 2008. Banks in 
the US started to free their balance sheets from bad assets by selling them to clients and other 
banks in the US and worldwide. This action turned a classic credit crisis into a financial and 
banking crisis of vast proportions, reaching a global systemic dimension. 104 
Trading rules dictate that the best possible prices should be reasonably assured by brokers.105  
However, the term “reasonably” is found to be quite flexible. Violations of the rules are 
punishable by sanctions including expulsion from the exchange or broker organization. 
Even so, it does not mandate compensation or damages to mislead clients. Most securities 
trade agreements, however, allow customers to seek relief through litigation or arbitration. 
Twelve years after the outburst of the crisis, it is still impossible to measure the losses and 
damage distribution of the banks’ actions. To date, that lack of clarity is aggravating the lack 
of confidence that fueled the spread of the crisis in the first place.106 
2. LITIGATION AND ADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION  
2.1. LEGAL RISK 
When it comes to litigating complex financial disputes, the banking and financial sector 
world is subject to an immense black hole of legal uncertainty.107 Legal risk in complex 
financial transactions (CFT’s) has lingered over the financial markets since the Great 
Depression.108 Legal uncertainty is partly due to a lack of case law and concerns over the 
quality of what case law there is. On the other hand, while arbitration is increasingly gaining 
ground in financial arbitration, there is the major concern by financial market participants 
about the ability of state and national courts to render decisive enforceability on complex 
arbitration awards under the auspices of the NY Convention. The award should in theory be 
easily enforced by the national courts in any of the ratifying states. However, some states 
have a better reputation than others for complying with the NY Convention.  In essence, as 
long as the NY Convention remains the sole authority for the international enforcement of 
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arbitral awards109, the disquieting matter for financial markets will mostly be the efficacy of 
enforcing arbitral awards.  
2.2. STANDARDISED AGREEMENTS NOT SYSTEMISED DISPUTES  
A generation of standardized agreements, largely sponsored by financial market 
organisations, were systematically developed internationally and in multiple languages to 
cover a range of global financial markets. Many CFTs are documented by way of these 
standardized agreements with the most prominent being the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association. ISDA has sponsored a wide range of documents for over-the counter 
(OTC) derivatives, including various editions of its master agreements (the ISDA Master 
Agreement). The ISDA Master Agreement is ‘one of the most accepted and widely used 
forms of agreement and is considered the most important standard market agreement used in 
the global financial market.110 
As mentioned earlier in Ch1. (ss7.1), the ISDA Master Agreement is not the only standard 
agreement. However, standardisation of contractual agreements has led to a ‘form of 
globalisation by contract’ but not a ’global law of contract’.111 In other words, so far there has 
not been a unified law dealing with the most essential ingredient of any financial arbitration 
process which is the contractual agreement. Nevertheless, what this thesis propose is that the 
unifying of the process of settlement of financial awards can bring the world of financial 
disputes closer at the final step when the award is due for payment. 
The resolution of disputes arising out of these standardized agreements is neither 
standardized nor globalized. Market participants rely on state and national dispute resolution 
fora. Because so many CFTs agreements are entered into on standardized or at least market 
understood terms, a ‘wrong’ decision in one state or national court may and likely will have 
systemic consequences somewhere else in the world. Some judicial decisions are uncertain, 
some are unpredictable, many are not reached in a timely manner but instead only after a too 
lengthy adjudication process. Many others are too needlessly costly in terms of resources, 
time and expense. Parties typically and largely want straightforward, cost-effective and 
timely resolution of their disputes.112 
2.3. DEVIOUSNESS IN CFT LEGAL STRUCTURE  
Legal uncertainty is also a result of the complex nature of many CFTs and of the 
mathematical innovation that is so much a feature of CFTs. Results of investigating what 
happened in the crisis of 2007 show that some CFTs were sufficiently complex that only a 
limited few in the bank or other financial institutions that structured the CFT in the first place 
understood how it functioned and the true financial risk involved. When disputes arose, those 
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responsible for the structuring of many CFTs were no longer available and the bank or 
financial intermediary did not possess the background or the knowledge to deal with the 
financial calamity.113 
It is not just courts or the investors who may not understand the technical structure of those 
transactions and products or the legal issues involved in dealing with them. Collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs), for example, were marketed and sold to investors on the basis of the 
credit rating assigned by a reputable credit rating agency such as Moody or Standard & 
POOR. Some of those ratings were found to be influenced or badly misguided by the issuers 
and, in some cases, those rating agencies themselves did not fully understand what they were 
rating.114 
2.4. DISPUTES FOLLOW TRANSACTIONS IN LEGAL COMPLEXITY  
The judges in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham115 pointed that it was considered that ’one 
or more of the parties lacked a fuller appreciation of the products or the nature of the markets 
involved in the transaction’. Such a remark may also indicate the legal fact that the nature of 
the judicial function is that judges in courts are necessarily generalists, as are the courts.116 It 
is easy to be critical of judges in the often difficult circumstances they find themselves in 
when faced with a complex case beyond their experience. 117 
Just as CFT’s and markets have become more complex, so have the disputes. CFT disputes 
today raise a range of issues, such as the effect and consequence of complex financial and 
valuation models, not to mention the complexity of CFT documentation and the consequent 
jargon. Although concern is often expressed that CFT disputes take too long to come before 
the courts, the opposite can be true: some CFT disputes are brought too quickly before a court 
because the parties think that the issues require urgent resolution. 
In these circumstances, courts are rushed into decisions on the likely basis the issues will only 
be properly examined on appeal, or in subsequent cases dealing with the same issue. This 
view was taken in Marine Trade SA v Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd [2009] EWHC 2656 
(Comm). The more subtle and sophisticated, or wider, ‘commercial’ context and arguments, 
as well as a more sophisticated analysis of the ISDA Master Agreement itself, were 
considered in the ensuing S 2(a) (iii) ISDA Master Agreement cases.118 This is hardly 
satisfactory as CFT disputes are global, multi-jurisdictional, common and civil law and 
language issues.119 
                                                 
113
 LB Re Financing No 3 (in administration) v Excalibur Funding No. 1 PLC and others [2011] EWHC 2111 
(Comm) 
114
 Anthracite Rated Investments (Jersey) Limited and others v Lehman Brothers Finance SA in liquidation [2011] 
EWHC 1822 CH 
115
 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] AC 1 
116
 Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767 (1997). 
117
 Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council [1992] AC 1  
118
 Marine Trade SA v Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd [2009] EWHC 2656 (Comm). The S 2(a) (iii) ISDA Master 
Agreement cases’, were not all put to Flaux J in the Marine Trade case. 
119
 S. Firth, Derivatives Law and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell 2011 reprint) (Firth) at para 11–012. 
58 
 
The great majority of CFT cases presented for disputes have their documentation in English. 
Moreover, because English and New York law are frequently the governing law, many CFTs 
are subject to common law court practice. However, many parties to CFT documentation are 
domiciled in jurisdictions where English is not the common language and where the common 
law is not the law of that jurisdiction. So, while many CFTs are documented in English and 
governed by English written laws, there are others that are documented in English but are to 
be heard before courts whose first language is not English. 
Some state and national courts are perceived to show a local bias towards parties and/or 
applicable laws. Even if they do not in fact suffer from local bias, courts in different 
jurisdictions can be expected to prefer different interpretations of the same CFT agreements. 
This is something which has no place in the banking world, where markets, regulatory 
authorities and institutions are interconnected and interdependent. Disputes in front of courts 
in such circumstances are not likely to lead to a settled, global, body of law. 
In a global financial marketplace, therefore, the significance of disputes that arise beyond the 
traditional London and New York axis cannot be underestimated. Local and national 
disputes, courts and decisions beyond that axis cannot be ignored. The wider market has an 
interest in the outcome of many cases, possibly more so than the actual parties involved. 
Resolution of a dispute that has an international consequence or effect requires a judge to 
focus on more than his or her own narrow domestic focus.120 
Standardisation may be cost- and time-effective, but it carries its own systemic risks121, 
including greater vulnerability to financial markets. Standardisation also carries possible 
systemic legal shocks, as a mistake in or a mistaken judgment involving the interpretation of 
standardised agreements will have far reaching implications in case law. 
2.5. SPECIALISED PARTIES RATHER THAN SPECIALISED JUDGES  
Banks and financial institutions have become rapidly more adverse in complicated financial 
products, and transactions in those products have become more legally complex. However, 
judges involved in the resolution of CFT disputes are not specialized financials or 
mathematicians. To some extent, judges must necessarily educate themselves while on the 
case. However, many judges cannot be expected to understand fully the formulation of 
complex products let alone the contractual agreement the transaction is built upon.  
 Judges with the necessary commercial or financial background are available, particularly in 
emerging markets. That said, the English, EU and New York courts generally inspire a 
relatively impressive level of confidence in their ability to resolve CFT disputes adequately in 
comparison to other state and national courts in the wider world. This wider world does not 
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have the benefit nor the resources to acquire deeper experience in complex legal issues 
related to financial CFTs. 
2.6. ENFORCEABILITY IN LITIGATED DISPUTES  
In London and New York, law firms have lawyers and departments specialised in complex 
financial legal issues and knowledge of CFTs. Financial institutions and dealers have those 
firms and counsels acting for them and against other large financial institutions and 
individual clients on a consent basis. This means that large law firms will not or cannot 
obtain consent to act against a bank or a financial institution in CFTs litigation. There are 
issues of conflict of interest as well as matters of revenue at stake for a law firm to sacrifice.  
A consequence of this is that some parties, particularly individual clients and customers of 
banks and financial institutions are not adequately represented in courts, even in jurisdictions 
where major CFTs specialised law firms exist such as in England and New York. Another 
issue that adds to dilemmas in financial disputes litigation is the matter of expert witnesses. In 
some jurisdictions, a suitable expert witness can be hard to find, for the same broad conflict 
of interest reasons.  
As well as proper representation, parties also want effective enforceability of judgments and 
awards against banks. However, enforceability of foreign judgments in a range of 
jurisdictions remains difficult if not impossible.122 Case law and evidence suggests that 
increased arbitration of financial disputes is inevitable, as banks and financial institutions 
increasingly begin to realise the benefits of international arbitration and the enforceability of 
foreign awards.123  
3. FINANCIAL ARBITRATION 
What is arbitration? At its simplest, international arbitration is an alternative to national court 
litigation as a means of resolving disputes; in choosing arbitration parties are opting to have 
their dispute resolved privately instead of going to a national court. 
Key characteristics of international arbitration include: 
 It is consensual. In some circumstances national courts may assert jurisdiction over a 
dispute even in the absence of an agreement between the parties to this effect. By 
contrast, an arbitration tribunal only has jurisdiction if all parties have agreed to 
submit their dispute to arbitration. This is commonly dealt with by inserting an 
arbitration clause in the relevant contract. Once agreed to, a party cannot unilaterally 
withdraw from arbitration. 
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 It is neutral. Hearings can take place in a neutral country where none of the parties is 
based, and the parties can agree the procedural rules that govern the arbitration, rather 
than being bound to follow a national court procedure. Usually they choose the 
procedural rules of one of the well-known international arbitral institutions such as the 
ICC, LCIA or SIAC. They can also choose the language that the arbitration will be 
conducted in, rather than being bound to use the language of the national court. 
 The process is less formal than national court litigation. For example, arbitration can 
take place in a meeting room, which could be anywhere, rather than a court-room. 
Typically, hearings will be held in a conference room at a hotel, a law firm's meeting-
room or a specialist suite of rooms run by an arbitration institution. 
 Instead of a judge, the decision-making is by arbitrators who are usually appointed by 
the parties. Typically, a sole arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators is appointed, 
referred to as the "tribunal". 
 Decisions of an arbitral tribunal, the arbitration award, are usually final and subject to 
limited rights of challenge, unlike the judgments of national courts, which typically 
can be appealed through several further rounds of litigation. 
3.1. ARBITRABILITY 
Non-performance of contracts by certain banks and fund managers in some countries such as 
Russia, and in Africa and the Far East, is one of the most worrisome problems at the moment. 
This is true especially after the 2007/2008 crisis and the responsibility the world places on 
US banks for being the sole culprit behind the largest financial crash in history.  
Other banks around the world are allowing themselves flexibilities when it comes to moral 
commitments as a follow-up to US financial firms. This renders the enforceability of arbitral 
awards against some banks and fund managers a central issue even in the western 
hemisphere.124 
Another issue for financial arbitration is in the fact that few judges in state and national courts 
are familiar with the complicated nature of financial transactions125 let alone public 
confidence in their knowledge and trust in their resolution of complicated banking disputes. 
In broad terms, there are many jurisdictions that have several specialized courts and tribunals 
for commercial disputes in general. However, banking financial disputes are cases that can 
only be settled efficiently in specialised tribunals. 
3.2. ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS’ FAMILIARITY WITH CFTS 
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Complicated financial transactions (CFTs) are documented by way of familiar market 
standard agreements, in which a large number of provisions are considered “boilerplate”.126 It 
is inevitable in these situations that a broad market understanding or consensus can be built 
regarding the meaning or interpretation of these agreements and these provisions. This 
understanding or consensus is partly a result of repeated familiarity and usage in a large 
number of transactions and context.  
It is also partly a matter of drafting and refinement by many hands, over a considerable 
period of time. Documents and individual provisions were analysed in detail by specialist 
lawyers, leading counsel and market experts in many jurisdictions. However, those 
documents and provisions have not been substantially tested in state or national courts.127 
Furthermore, in spite of the lack of testing, standard agreements were entered into by parties 
in a wide range of jurisdictions and markets without even being modified or adapted from 
one transaction to another. This is due to common practices occurring in financial institutions 
where agreements for financial transactions are compiled from relatively standardized 
agreements with almost identical provisions and documentary building blocks. 
In further investigations and disputes, it was found that there are numerous CFTs documented 
on standardised generic agreements which caused the parties not to appreciate as to what 
terms they are to adhere to.128 Agreements and provisions used in one CFT in one jurisdiction 
are commonly borrowed for use in other CFTs structured in another jurisdiction. It is found 
that a suite of securitization agreements in New South Wales is not thoroughly different from 
those used in Hong Kong or New York.129  
Much of the legal work is often done by teams of in-house lawyers at banks and financial 
institutions who were told to do what they are told. Moreover, many CFTs are entered into by 
parties who did not seek to have any input into the drafting or negotiation of any of the 
market agreements.  
This may be understandable from the profitability point of view. When a premium is placed 
on efficient and cost-effective completion of transactions, those responsible for completing 
the transaction are naturally looking to the nearest or latest legal precedent. Bankers may be 
responsible for considerable innovation in CFTs, but it is the lawyers working for those 
institutions who reach for the legality and precedent. This occurs to the extent that it does not 
matter whether those lawyers are familiar with the complexity of the transaction or not. 
Naturally, this creates further complications when disputes arise and someone has to argue 
for or against the transaction. 
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Those transactions included counter-parties who may not speak English, being the language 
in which the CFTs are documented. Such asymmetry of knowledge of the true risk, the 
sophistication of the transaction and language has meant that there is no real negotiation of 
risk on the part of at least one of the parties to the agreement. In State Street Bank v Sompo 
Japan Ins.130, ‘something had gone wrong with the language’ and it was clear that a mistake 
had been made in an applicable definition and a correction required to give effect to the 
parties’ intention was also not clear. The court in this case made a declaration regarding the 
true interpretation of the relevant provisions. 
For all of the above reasons, Financial Arbitration Tribunals that are familiar with the 
complexity of financial transactions can surpass such non-clarities in order to arrive to a 
speedy and efficient decision (award). 
4. PARTIES TO FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS  
In view of the discussion in section 1.2, this section will examine the interests of parties to 
arbitration proceedings regardless of the substantive status of the individual parties. Financial 
transactions entail the involvement of various parties from multiple jurisdictions in multi-
cross-border string-trade transactions. Some parties in such complex financial transactions 
(CFTs) may benefit from the presence of a third-party claimant in the arbitration procedures. 
A bank or a person in Pakistan, for example in the case of a dispute will be interested in 
having the seller (a bank) of a mortgage backed bond from the UK join the procedures 
against the securitising bank in US. That person will establish the case against the securitising 
firm as well as binding the seller in the UK by the determination of the final award. 
The essential point here is whether arbitration laws and regulations will allow multiparty 
proceedings without the consent of all the relevant main parties to the agreement. The 
arbitrability of multiparty disputes in certain jurisdictions restricts the material scope of 
arbitration and may render the whole system ineffective. 
An example is highlighted in Belmont Investments v BNY & Lehman. The paradox in this 
case lies within the context that the claimants acted on the basis that the Lehman Brothers 
entity was subject to insolvency proceedings in England, when in fact it was not. In this case, 
The Supreme Court handed down its judgment on 29 February 2012 in relation to the clients’ 
money application relating to Lehman Brothers International (Europe).  
The judgment had several implications for firms and banks which hold clients’ money. The 
majority of the Lords dismissed the appeal and held that: 
“Clients’ money is held on “statutory trust” by the receiving firm or bank. The 
statutory status is imposed by the FSA's Client Assets Sourcebook ("CASS") from the 
time of receipt of funds by a bank and not upon segregation of clients’ money 
internally. Provided it is identifiable, clients’ money which yet is not segregated by the 
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firm from its own accounts will nonetheless form part of the clients’ money pool 
available for distribution to clients on insolvency.” 131   
It is worth noting, however, that the insolvency of Lehman would not, as a rule, have 
intervened with any arbitration procedures if the arbitral procedures would have already 
started. The emphasis is on the status of the parties where a direct relevance can exist 
between jurisdictional and substantive standing of several ‘persons’ in a multiparty 
commercial transaction. The closer the association between the parties in substantive terms, 
the less likely it is for them to be separated in terms of jurisdiction. Whenever several persons 
constitute a substantive unit, they also are regarded as a unit jurisdictionally and as such are 
subject to the jurisdiction of a single adjudicatory medium. 
The findings on this point, and the association of officers, directors and SPVs132 of banks, 
provide the conceptual base for regarding the rights of savers and investors in arbitration 
action against banks and financial institutions: this depends on how closely officers and 
directors are associated with the bank and the SPV. The association is focused specifically on 
the terms of benefits, interests and liabilities. Depositors and investors will have concurrent 
rights in a pending dispute in terms of contractual arbitration agreements. Officers and 
directors of financial institutions and SPVs will usually be co-liable or co-holders of duties in 
community of rights and liability. 
There are cases where banks claimed confidentiality of such association. However, in 
Solomon v Solomon133 parliament intervened to enable courts to pierce the “corporate veil”. 
Such authority allowed the courts to look at the incorporation of subordinate companies in 
order to decide whether to hold directors personally liable.134 
Although contractually associated, the degree of association in terms of liability is relevant to 
arbitration laws. That may be a consequence of the fact that financial disputes are little more 
than just the collection of a debt where summary proceedings in a state or national court can 
be effective and straightforward.  
Examples include international treaties such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, where common obligations are given effect by state laws, 
and the World Trade Organization agreements, imposing common obligations to subjects in 
common dispute resolution systems. Very often, parties in their financial transactions arrange 
for the security of the performance or the expected cash flow for the transaction in hand. The 
security traded may have originated in a separate agreement with a third party that may be a 
bank, an insurance company or SPV for a completely different financial institution.  
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Naturally here, the arrangement leads to a multiparty situation and interwoven contractual 
agreements.  
The intertwined nature of financial contracts may hold no substantive relationship to certain 
investors who may be considered as third parties. Courts in general have tendencies to protect 
the interests of third parties in disputes going to arbitration.  
On several occasions courts extended the scope of arbitration agreements to include third 
parties and non-signatories based upon doctrines such as the doctrine of group-of-companies 
and incorporation by reference, thus piercing the corporate veil and agency in cases such as 
banks and their SPVs. 
4.1. FINANCIAL TRANSACTION AGREEMENTS  
Given the broad nature of the banking and finance sector, there are wide arrays of disputes 
that may arise out of transactions that cover a large number of underlying asset classes and 
immense sums of money. Nevertheless, till today large volumes of derivatives and CFTs are 
habitually documented under standardised contractual agreement forms. 
Financial industry associations have systematically developed generic agreement forms. Such 
was the case in general financial transactions that the majority of the subprime notes and 
derivatives prior to and during 2007 were documented by way of those agreements.135 
Various market sponsor entities have sponsored and published several other forms of 
documentation for OTC derivatives including: 
 The European Master Agreement by ISDA 
 Local language ISDA master agreements by the French and German banking 
associations.  
 In China, the NAFMII Master Agreement by the National Association of Financial 
Markets Institutional Investors 
 In Australia, the AFMA schedules and documentation by the Australian Financial 
Markets Association.  
In the case of foreign exchange transactions, the New York Federal Reserve, together with 
the British Bankers’ Association, the Canadian Foreign Exchange Committee and the Tokyo 
Foreign Exchange Markets Committee, have sponsored and published:  
 The International Foreign Exchange Markets Agreement,  
 The International FX and Currency Option Agreement, the Foreign Exchange and 
Options Master Agreement and the International Currency Option Master Agreement.  
In the case of repos136 and stock lending transactions, the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA) has drafted and sponsored various versions of its global master 
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repurchase agreements (the GMRA), as has the Securities Industry Financial Markets 
Association. The International Securities Lending Association (ISLA) has drafted and 
sponsored various editions of its securities lending agreements and The Futures and Options 
Association has sponsored and published its FOA master netting agreements.  
Many documents in the bond and credit or loan markets are similarly standardized. For 
example, the Loan Market Association has sponsored and published its Multicurrency Term 
and Revolving Facilities Agreement. A French translation of this agreement has also been 
published. 
4.1.1.. ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Master Agreement is 
an agreement form which is designed to govern multiple derivatives transactions. It is in the 
form of a single agreement consisting of three different components:  
1- A printed form for standard provisions  
2- A schedule to the agreement in which certain variables and elections are to be agreed upon 
by the parties 
3- Confirmations related to any further individual transactions where financial and economic 
terms of the transactions are to be set out 
The Bank of International Settlement estimates the current size of the derivatives market 
alone managed solely by ISDA Master Agreements in 2014 to exceed $600 trillion. However, 
homogeneous forms of agreements are no match to complicated financial disputes that are 
neither standardised nor uniformed.137 Contracts as such may lead to forms for a globalised 
set of procedures, but not of law.138 Investors in financial transactions and depositors cannot 
rely only on a one-size-fits-all set of documents when almost all financial transactions are 
entered into internationally and within a global network of intra-banking. 
Consequently, a judicial decision in one state will have worldwide systemic consequences 
that may be interpreted differently. With the continuous innovative nature of financial 
products, legal uncertainty will be a natural resultant and uncertainty will dawn on judicial 
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decisions.139 English courts for example have taken a sceptical approach, holding investors to 
their contractual agreement regardless of how aggrieved they might be. 140 
In a case against HSBC, when the client relied on the bank officer’s advice about a fund 
investment, the court ruled that the bank officer’s advice may have been negligibly presented 
to an unsuitable client and the bank was liable in contract and in tort. However, the ensuing 
client’s losses were not recoverable since the loss was not caused by the negligent advice. 
Moreover, the loss which occurred as a result of the collapse of Lehman Brothers was not 
reasonably foreseeable in 2005 when the investment was made with HSBC and the client was 
accordingly entitled only to nominal damages.141  
This case involved the same and exact sort of standardised uniform contracts sponsored by 
associations such as ISDA. It is worth noting that as a standard provision in all those 
standardised contracts, banks’ liability for misrepresentation is excluded and banks do not 
owe advisory duty to their investors. 142 Parties’ Autonomy - Despite what may appear in 
such provision as clear denial of the duty of care owed by banks to their clients, courts have 
still given priority to commercial reality. Courts have held parties to what they have agreed 
upon at the outset and banks were able to avoid liability under advisory duty.143  
However, the importance of maintaining consistent interpretations of the critical terms of the 
agreements in jurisdictions around the world can save the market participants from 
conflicting cases with unexpected results. In particular such as: 
Investigations led by US Congress and other financial market authorities revealed that very 
few individuals in banks or financial firms that structure CFTs are able to actually understand 
how those financial instruments are created or what is the structured risk to be borne by the 
bank or the investors.144 In other words, bank executives owe a duty of advice on a product 
that they do not understand themselves. 145 Bank officers will present to investors standard 
documentation in conjunction with complicated financial transactions without the full 
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understanding of the financial structure of the instrument or the extent of the underlying legal 
issues within the documentation.146 
4.1.2. HYBRID DISPUTE RESOLUTION AGREEMENTS 
Asymmetric jurisdiction clauses or hybrid dispute resolution agreements are those which 
restrict one party to a contract to where it can bring court proceedings, but not the other party. 
This practice considers complex dispute resolution clauses and examines the different forms 
that are so called "hybrid" or "carve-out". It focuses on the issues that may arise in using 
complex clauses, and highlights the potential pitfalls in drafting financial agreements. It 
offers an avenue of recourse for investors who purchase faulty investment products through a 
bank or an investment institution. 
The agreement permits one party to follow a different dispute resolution procedure from the 
other party. Naturally, this often results in parties not being of equal bargaining power. The 
most common agreement in these situations is when the bank can impose its discretion as to 
the forum and form for which it wishes to bring claims. The enforceability of hybrid 
arbitration clauses has recently been the subject of much judicial debate worldwide, the result 
of which varies markedly between jurisdictions. 147  
The English courts have proven more willing to enforce hybrid dispute resolution clauses.  
For example, in Mauritius Commercial Bank, the High Court held that a one-way jurisdiction 
clause permitting the claimant, a Mauritius-incorporated bank, to litigate wherever it chose, 
was valid. This is particularly striking considering the factual similarities with the case of 
Banque de Rothchild 148decided by the French Supreme Court.  
In the case of Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd v Hestia Holdings149, Popplewell J. held that 
the parties to a loan agreement were able to amend the governing law of an asymmetric 
jurisdiction clause from Mauritian to English law. Popplewell J. robustly confirmed the 
enforceability of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses as a matter of English common law. 
In doing so, he commented on the controversial decision on the enforceability of such clauses 
as a matter of EU law handed down by the French Court de Cassation in Banque Privée 
Edmond de Rothschild Europe v X. The decision is a helpful one for parties seeking to rely on 
such clauses in the future.150 
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For such an agreement to take effect, a hybrid clause must be inserted into banks’ sales and 
purchase agreements, which requires the intervention of local monetary and governmental 
authorities. The focus of such a clause is to target mis-selling and moral hazard techniques 
employed by banks and investment firms. 
4.2. FINANCIAL AGREEMENT INTERPRETATION  
Part of the problem in the matter regarding agreements is in the market unfamiliarity and 
non-understanding of the agreement documentations or the structure of the financial 
transaction itself. This is quite common in cases involving standard agreements such as the 
ISDA Master Agreements, whose brevity meant they proved ineffective in a range of 
jurisdictions.151  
Financial markets have reached a point where there is great need for a theory and practice of 
contract interpretation of standard agreements. The best proof of this is the fallout after the 
financial crisis of 2008. CFTs are complex and require drafting contracts created specifically 
for financial agreements involving complicated derivatives and multiple mathematical 
formula transactions. The risk of courts misinterpreting an agreement is quite likely and with 
it comes everlasting disputable jurisprudence as a result.  
A digression into the market usage of preformatted “use-for-all” standard agreements shows 
that those formats are entered into by parties on a global scale without truly appreciating fully 
their contents. Standard universal agreements are substantially used across a wide range of 
jurisdictions without the necessary modifications to adapt to those markets.  
Clauses and provisions used in subprime mortgage transactions in the US are copied without 
adjustments for the use in a Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO) in Hong Kong or 
Singapore. A textual interpretation of a financial contract is an orthodox method and is the 
default position adopted by almost all courts and tribunals in face of the complexity with the 
transaction itself. 152 
Litigation in courts can be like arbitration tribunals except that arbitrators in arbitration 
tribunals allow the parties to introduce their understanding at the time they concluded the 
contract. They require an interpretation of the science behind the words of a transaction in a 
financial agreement. Parties in arbitrable disputes have the right to make the tribunal reach an 
understanding of the matter in dispute.153 
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4.3. MIS-SELLING CLAIMS IN UNIVERSAL AGREEMENTS 
Following the financial crisis, investors and clients of banks made claims of mis-selling of 
financial instruments. Claims were mostly made by institutions or professionals and hence 
included sophisticated clients, pension funds, municipalities and other banks. Fewer claims 
were made by retail clients while most of those disputes included a common transactional 
theme. They almost all included structured financial products and derivatives.  
Claims were brought on broad bases alleging mis-selling or solicited trades from the part of 
the financial services firms. Claims included breach of advisory, negligent or fraudulent 
misrepresentation, mis-selling and deceit, ultra-vires or lack of capacity on the part of the 
investor and the most common was contractual terms signed in implied representation.  
The banks argued that the investors “their clients” are contractually estopped by reason of 
applicable disclaimers and non-reliance clauses that exclude all fiduciary or advisory duties 
on the side of the bank, as clearly agreed upon in the contractual agreement. 154 
Most court decisions took the side of the bank and held the investors to their contractual 
obligations which release the banks from misrepresentation and mis-selling. Typically, 
dispute cases as such, involve claims by aggrieved investors who may have placed their 
grievances in front of courts expecting a completely different result. However, in view of 
documentation releasing the banks from their liability, the courts were compelled to follow 
the law. 155 
4.5. EXPLOITATION OF CONTRACTUAL ESTOPPEL  
Contractual estoppel has been developed in the context of the exclusion of liability for 
misrepresentation. It provides a legal explanation for the validity of ‘no representation’ and 
‘no reliance’ clauses as to advice provided by banks to their clients. This however may 
contradict the truth where banks approach their clients with investment ideas, yet the estoppel 
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may prevent a claim for misrepresentation or mis-selling. The importance of contractual 
estoppel does not stop at consumer investors. During the Financial Crisis, banks responsible 
for issuing and selling subprime notes were mostly transacting with other overseas banks, 
financial institutions and semi government entities in many countries. 156 
There are however, two central points that courts do not find easy to decide, most commonly 
when a claim is based upon alleged mis-selling of restructured investment products: 
(1) The nature of the contractual estoppel;  
(2) No-representation and no-reliance clauses included in the investment agreement subject to 
the test of reasonableness set out in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, as extended to 
contractual terms which may exclude liability under the Misrepresentation Act.157  
For contractual estoppel to arise there is a standard burden of proof that falls on the claimant.  
Unquestionably, such a burden is now one of the most significant defensive tools for banks 
and financial institutions in cases of claims of mis-selling and/or misrepresentation. Although 
the estoppel doctrine is not limited to financial and banking disputes, almost all the leading 
cases on contractual estoppel have arisen in this sector.158 This in part may be explained by 
the widespread use of industry standard documentation, including the ISDA Master 
Agreement. 
As mentioned earlier, those agreements incorporate clauses (such as the “non-reliance”, 
“assessment and understanding” and “status of parties” clauses commonly incorporated into 
the schedule to, and confirmations under, the ISDA Master Agreement). They set out the 
basis upon which the parties are dealing and which the courts have found, are capable of 
giving rise to this type of estoppel. Similar provisions are also commonly found in banks’ 
terms of business. 
There are many examples of the complexities that exist in resolving banking and financial 
disputes. Those cases are an example of how courts can struggle in interpreting conflicting 
documents and complex transactions. This is illustrated by the decision in Peekay Intermark v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, where the claimant was an investor who had 
purchased from the defendant bank a structured product linked to Russian Treasury bills.159 
Prior to the purchase, the aggrieved party had signed a “Risk Disclosure Statement” which 
stated that the bank assumed that investors were aware of the risks involved at the time of the 
deal and that they had determined for themselves that the product was suitable for them. 
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Moore-Bick LJ in his ruling in 2006 summarised the essence of contractual estoppel, which 
he found that it arose from the contract, in the following terms: 160 
- There is no reason in principle why parties to a contract should not agree that a certain 
estoppel should form the basis for the transaction, where it be the case or not. 
- Where parties express an agreement in a contractual document neither can subsequently 
deny the existence of the facts and matters upon which they have agreed, at least so far as 
those aspects of their relationship to which the agreement was directed. 
- The contract itself will give rise to an estoppel. 
Furthermore, in 2010 the Court of Appeal held in JP Morgan v Springwell161 that contractual 
estoppel was a separate doctrine from estoppel by convention, and that there was no 
requirement on the part of the bank to show that it would be unconscionable to recoil from 
the representations made.  Financial transaction agreements are complex and there is a 
premium on the knowledge and expertise of those using them. Those agreements are 
transaction oriented and worded accordingly. Legally underpinning what may go wrong, or 
foreseeing upcoming disputes due to non-performance of a mathematical financial formula 
goes beyond a standard agreement and requires the knowhow of those who use them.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the decision in Lomas v Firth Rixson (2010) recognised 
that the ISDA Master agreement used by the parties left significant matters without 
clarification concerning parties’ commitments and payment obligations. The decision of J 
Briggs in Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch) gave rise to several important 
considerations for market participants in relation to the interpretation and construction of 
Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement. It also addresses whether this provision 
offends the anti-deprivation principle or could be classified as a penalty. 
The facts varied between the individual appeals, but the common theme in each of them was 
that an event of default had occurred under an ISDA Master Agreement, but the defaulting 
party was "in the money". In the sense that if the open positions were all to be terminated, the 
non-defaulting party would have had to pay over considerable sums to the defaulting party to 
close out the various positions. 
However, in each case the relevant master agreements had not provided for automatic early 
termination upon an event of default. Accordingly, each non-defaulting party could simply 
elect not to terminate based on the event of default and avoid paying the sums otherwise due 
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to the defaulting party. This problem was then compounded by the drafting of the ISDA 
Master Agreement which stated that non-occurrence of an event of default was a "condition 
precedent" to any payment obligation. In the cases before the court the event of default was 
continuing up until the time when the financial contracts would naturally have come due for 
payment. The non-defaulting parties argued that they never had to pay the sums due because 
the condition precedent was not satisfied.  
They were entitled to a windfall and could avoid their liabilities under the relevant derivative 
contracts because of the other party's default.162 The need for a comprehensive statement of 
the law by the Court of Appeal had been driven in part by a decision in Marine Trade v 
Pioneer Freight163 where the court had taken a position contrary to the orthodox market view 
in relation to the close-out provisions. The different appeals had different derivative contracts 
under consideration, but most of the legal issues which arose were capable of being dealt with 
on a conjoined basis.164. 
In Barclays Bank v Svizera Holdings, the court held, with regard to the issue of contractual 
estoppels that are in a bank's standard terms text, the non-reliance and “none acting as 
advisor" clauses are satisfactory to prevent an aggrieved investor from pursuing a 
misrepresentation claim. This decision will give some further rise to moral hazard risks and 
banks will get some comfort from the way that their standard "no reliance" and "no advice" 
clauses will generally be effective in excluding liability on their parts and counter claims on 
the part of the clients of misrepresentation and breach of a duty of care.165 
However, following Cassa di Risparmio166, two potential issues should still be borne in mind. 
A misrepresentation as to the effect of the contractual documents which are claimed to give 
rise to the contractual estoppel may prevent the estoppel from arising. In addition, the scope 
of the estoppel is a matter of construction of the contract so that (in less straightforward 
circumstances than those in this case) a court will analyse whether the representations made 
by the bank fall outside the terms of the specific clause which is claimed to give rise to the 
estoppel. 
In CRSM v Barclays Bank167 J. Hamblen found that the standard ISDA “non-reliance clause” 
does not permit a customer from claiming that they had relied upon communications from the 
bank as investment advice or as constituting a recommendation. However, the decision did 
not necessarily preclude the customer from claiming that they had been persuaded by a “mis-
description” of the risks of the investment vehicle, or a distinct claim from being advised, or 
recommended a risky product. 
Second, the application of contractual estoppel has been somewhat tentatively described by 
the Court of Appeal as “arguably misplaced” (and at least unsuitable for summary 
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determination) where it is claimed that the contracts containing the clauses were induced by 
fraud.168 
Contractual estoppels have featured prominently in the current wave of litigation concerning 
interest rate hedging products and a recent important decision in Crestsign v NatWest.169 
Crestsign concerned a property development company which had entered into an interest rate 
swap with the National Westminster Bank. The court factually found that the bank had given 
advice to Crestsign during a meeting, followed by various documents, including a risk 
management paper, two sets of terms of business and a swap confirmation, all of which 
contained clauses which clearly defined the relationship between the client and the bank as 
“non-advisory”. The documents were presented and signed by Crestsign. 
The judge found that, although negligent advice had been given, the terms of the contracts 
were clear and unambiguous and were effective enough to preclude Crestsign from claiming 
that it was being advised and solicited into the transaction. In the opinion of the court, the 
bank had gone out of its way to bring all facts to the customer’s attention during the 
negotiations phase.  
The judge rejected the suggestion that, applying the “re-writing history” test from 
Raiffeisen170, the clauses operated as exclusion clauses. The case illustrates the power of 
contractual estoppel. Where a disclaimer is construed as a “basis clause”, it may be effective 
notwithstanding its unreasonableness under UCTA. (Andrew Mitchell QC, 2015). 
5. ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL DISPUTES  
This section is to construe the many layers and different causes which come together in a 
financial dispute. It begins by analysing the various international dispute resolution processes 
that have been attempted in financial arbitration. Financial disputes are examined in terms of 
the participants, claims, situations, strategies, social objectives and outcomes. For the sake of 
clarity and fuller analysis disputes are stripped down to separate components bearing in mind 
the continual intersecting and wider impact of financial banking disputes. 
The first task is to determine who should be represented in banking and financial dispute 
resolution processes and whose interests should be considered. If any participants' interests 
are ignored or underestimated, the dispute is not likely to be resolved. Securities and financial 
disputes generally present themselves with investors claiming that their monies were lost 
because of misleading statements on the part of the financial adviser.  
The banker will of course reply that the customer was aware of the risks. The core of those 
claims is financial misbehaviour. Financial transgressions include actions such as 
unauthorised trading, unsuitable advice, misrepresentation and misappropriation. The latter is 
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a euphemism for theft.171 The socioeconomic outcome of such behaviours has a profound 
effect on social development, economic reconstruction and improvement.172  
This statist perspective is, however, overly narrow and selective. Private and public banks 
committing international offenses and their victims range from state owned banks to domestic 
and international financial institutions. Individuals and corporate, national and multinational 
organizations, governmental and non-governmental authorities, global and regional 
organizations are all possible victims to misguided investment advice from bankers and all 
could be participants in financial disputes collectively or separately against a bank.173 Hence, 
as mentioned in Chapters One and Two above, contractual process and formation of contracts 
at the outset is of utmost importance. 174 
Looking at the anatomy of financial disputes and the layers of causation including 
directorship yearn for profit can be the main drive for starting a dispute. In the case of 
Goldman Sachs which is one of the largest investment banks in the world, it was involved in 
risky securitisation and whiles the directors saw the subprime bust coming earlier than others, 
its survival from the crisis had little to do with analytical trading. It specifically had to do 
with its traders, whom Goldman directors gave direct orders to sell the entire stock of 
subprime notes to their own clients without informing them of the expected crash in the value 
of such securities. When the crash ensued, those same banks such as Goldman Sachs, Merrill 
Lynch, Citi and others were bailed out by the US Federal Government through the “lender-
of-last- resort” funds.175  
Investment Bankers were saved during the bailout of AIG, netting a $16.8 trillion from 
taxpayers. The Fed guaranteed the senior unsecured debt of banks and bank holding 
companies by purchasing US$ 1.8 trillion in treasury debt, mortgage-backed securities and 
other instruments to halt the fall in stock prices of the ailing banks and indirectly help the 
"too-big to fail" investment bankers from falling. However, investors and other banks around 
the world who suffered the loss of their capitals did not benefit of such bailout nor did the 
banks that caused their losses compensate them for it.176 
                                                 
171
 D.E. Robins, Seven Deadly Sins that Lead to Arbitration Disaster, 820 PLI/Corp 489, Practising Law Institute, 
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series (July-August 1993). 
172
 The term “socioeconomics” refers broadly to the "use of economics in the study of society". Contemporary 
practice considers behavioural interactions of individuals and groups through social capital and social 
"markets" and the formation of social norms. In the latter, it studies the relation of economics to social values 
and legislations imposed by the society's lawmakers. 
Socioeconomic is a distinct supplemental usage that describes social economics as "a discipline studying the 
reciprocal relation between social legal ethics and economic development leading toward social reconstruction 
and improvement. 
173
 Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and 
Scarce Credit , (2nd ed., Princeton University Press (2015) 
174
 Ch1 s7.1.1 – 2 & Ch2 s2.1.3. 
175
 Jennifer G. Hill & R.S Thomas, Research Handbook on Shareholder Power [2015], Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd., 1st Ed., Cheltenham, UK  
176
 The Special Inspector General for TARP summary of the bailout said in his July 2015 report that the total 
commitment to-date of government funds to banks bailout of the 2008 crisis is $16.8 trillion dollars with the 
$4.6 trillion already paid out. 'Troubled Asset Relief Program - TARP' The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
75 
 
In April 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused Goldman Sachs of 
fraud.177 The charge was that, in “certain transactions” the selection of the bonds which 
formed the asset base of a CDO was influenced by hedge fund managers who correctly bet on 
the turn in the housing market and profited in a big way as a result. The US financial 
regulator charged Goldman Sachs in 2010 with securities fraud, accusing them of misleading 
investors, omitting crucial information and misrepresenting the product.  
The lawsuit charged Goldman Sachs’ traders with encouraging unwitting investors to buy a 
product that they knew was eminent to crash. Investors in what is known as the ABACUS 
2007-AC1 case lost over $1 billion. By contrast, Goldman was ordered to pay a fine of $20 
million by way of retribution and there was no redress ordered for the investors. 
However, a distinction must be drawn between the direct protagonist financial institutions 
playing the central role with their innermost interests in sight and the others who become 
involved through their peripheral role in attempting to manage other people's funds for the 
best returns they can achieve. Even participation in a clear-cut international dispute, such as 
those arising out of the 2008 crisis and the sinking of worldwide financial markets, can be 
wider than just plain bank-to-bank or investor-to-bank disputes. The main disputants in that 
crisis were states and central banks struggling to save their national economies and bailout 
their local banks from bankruptcy. 
5.1. ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AWARD ENFORCEMENT  
5.1.1 Hurdles in front of Domestic Courts 
The labelling of various factors as participants in the international financial dispute is 
relevant to determining the appropriate arena and mechanisms for the payment and settlement 
of an award. More importantly, it is pertinent to the methods of payment (enforceability) 
sought. With the usual customary settlement of claims and often partial reparation banks offer 
to their disputants, the continuing disputes can be narrowed down, leaving the large and 
complicated bank-to-bank disputes and the peripheral domestic procedures of dispute 
settlement or restitution. 
It may be problematic or inaccurate to define the situation caused by the attempts of seeking 
payments under litigation for international financial disputes as being similar to getting 
international awards to be paid instantly under arbitration as proposed by this thesis. There 
are recurring hurdles facing the enforcement of international arbitration awards.  
Domestic courts' responses to enforcing arbitration awards are usually slow, partially because 
of the possible influence of locally residing financial institutions. The usual protagonist in 
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those disputes is generally governmental or large financial institutions operating within a 
statist protective jurisdiction.178  
It is worth noting that statist political intervention in critical financial disputes does not occur 
only in developing countries or authoritarian jurisdictions. In fact, it occurs in countries such 
as the US, Canada and Mexico.179  
5.1.2 Manifest Disregard of the Law 
Those concerns were expressed upon the ground that the “manifest disregard of the law” 
doctrine renders international awards especially in financial disputes, vulnerable to being set 
aside in the US jurisdiction.180 Given what the International Commercial Disputes Committee 
recorded in their final report where it likens the “manifest disregard of the law” doctrine to 
other domestic standards of award reviews in third world countries as well as in Canadian 
and Mexican courts.181 
Manifest Disregard of the Law ― means an error or misunderstanding with respect to law by 
the Arbitration tribunal that a court may set aside an arbitral award because of an error of law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that182 ―the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in 
contrast to manifest disregard can be subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error 
in interpretation.  In the years since the Wilko case in 1953, the federal courts, particularly 
the Second Circuit in New York, have repeatedly held that awards may be set aside for mere 
errors of law by the arbitrators.183 The two statutory grounds for the vacating of an award on 
the basis of Manifest Disregard of the Law rely on the words contained in the Federal 
Arbitration Act §§ 10(a)(3) (the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct) and 10(a)(4) (the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers).  
While neither of these grounds appears as such in the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards as a basis for refusing to recognise 
or enforce a foreign award, the NY Convention does not purport to impose restrictions on 
signatories with respect to the grounds on which awards rendered within their territory may 
be set aside.  The New York Convention‘s drafters elected to address only the minimum 
permissible grounds for refusing enforcement or recognition of a foreign arbitral award, and 
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did not seek to establish a uniform international standard for setting aside awards in the 
jurisdiction where the arbitration occurred. 184 
In Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch,185 the NY 2nd Circle Court did not confirm awards due to 
serious reservations about the soundness of the arbitrator‘s reading of the financial 
transaction contract while in Goldman Sachs v. Unsecured Creditors Committee,186 an award 
was not enforced despite a court‘s disagreement with the tribunal on the merits of the case.  
The International Commercial Disputes Committee expressed their concern that those 
decisions create uncertainty with awards’ enforceability which will compromise the finality 
and viability of the international arbitration process.187 Local courts should ignore the explicit 
statist restrictions within their own jurisdictions and give wider interpretations to the statutory 
standards for the enforceability of international arbitral awards.  
Taken together, these decisions limit the courts’ usefulness as an enforceable authority forum 
for financial arbitration awards when participants are not exclusively states; however they 
may have exceeding powers over the governments that run the state.188  The situation that 
arguably exercises the greatest impact upon the development and resolution of financial 
disputes is the interdependence between financial institutions in interbank deposits relations.  
5.2. ISSUES IN FINANCIAL ARBITRATION AWARD ENFORCEMENT  
Consideration regarding whether the disputants are private or public banks and ties between 
states usually are a major factor to consider in a financial dispute. Another factor that cannot 
be ignored, but is difficult to weigh, is the sociological one. One aspect of this sociological 
factor is the type of people normally involved in disputes on behalf of their banks: traders, 
fund managers, brokers, and lawyers. Most of these tend to be relatively senior and stand to 
lose a good deal of money should they lose the case. Their behaviour is moulded by their 
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profession and greed. They pay no attention to any social expectations of their roles as 
bankers. This steers them toward certain established patterns of conduct.  
At this professional level, institutional decision-making tends to be interconnected and 
personalised. However, the importance of financial reward and profitability is especially 
visible in contemporary financial disputes. It is merely a continuation of a more general trend 
spanning the centuries. International financial institutions have always pursued access to 
wealth and profitability. In a world of shrinking borders and expanding communications, 
corporate and private wealth and disputes about their allocation and distribution will continue 
to increase and in a faster and more complicated manner. This historical trend explains the 
importance of the attempted prescriptive processes for the resolution of disputes between 
banks that are renowned as the holders of the world's wealth. Pre-empting disputes and 
providing legal basis for timely resolutions to financial disputes is as essential as the timely 
allocation of the disputed funds to the winning party (Swift Clearance of Financial Arbitral 
Awards). 
It is worth noting that financial arbitration awards currently may face special challenges 
which go beyond mere contractual disputes even outside financial crises. There are, above all,  
the possibility of important issues of property law in terms of the nature, structure and 
operation of disputed investment tools and floating charges (in respect of placed deposits and 
liquid assets), particularly when these charges concern assets in different countries and assets 
that are moving from country to country.  
Also, when assets must be re-delivered to other countries, there may be further complications 
in terms of the determination of the applicable property laws in those jurisdictions short of 
their full transnational status in international finance.  More problems may arise if there is a 
declared bankruptcy and the relevant assets are or may have to be surrendered to or retained 
by bankruptcy trustees.  
Those cases are common especially if bankruptcy is intentionally declared in a country of 
their choice where international recognition of arbitral awards affecting the bankrupt estate 
may even be less probable. Practically, those circumstances can limit substantially the power 
of award enforceability in certain countries. However, the real concern is in the disturbances 
the legal powers of domestic courts can impose on the enforcement of arbitral awards as per 
the NY Convention. 
It may in practical process concern in particular the arbitral institutional status and powers of 
international arbitration tribunals. In property matters within a pending dispute there are 
deeper questions in arbitration concerning the effect erga omnes (the effect on third parties). 
It was already mentioned that in the nature of property rights protection, third parties who are 
affected as much as the losing party may wish to challenge the award. Their rights to do so 
may be pre-empted when an Officially Designated Award Clearing Forum can be formed and 
security interests are reaffirmed. 
5.3. AWARD CLEARING FORUM  
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An award of an international arbitration tribunal is binding on all parties to the proceeding 
and each party must comply with it pursuant to the terms of their contracts. If a party fails to 
comply with the award, the other party can seek to have the pecuniary obligations recognized 
and enforced in the courts of any NY Convention member state as though it were a final 
judgment of that state’s courts. The same fundamental policies motivating courts in a certain 
jurisdiction to enforce arbitral awards also motivate courts to recognize and enforce domestic 
and foreign arbitral awards in another jurisdiction. For example, adoption and 
implementation of the New York Convention by the United States is found at 9 U.S.C. § 201 
(1982). 189 
A party seeking recognition or enforcement must provide a certified copy of the award to the 
competent domestic court (or other authority which the state has designated for the purpose 
of enforcement of foreign awards within its jurisdictions). However, although member states 
of the NY Convention are required to recognize and enforce the award, each state’s laws 
relating to enforceability of international awards differ in the process upon which an award 
may be enforced.  
An essential element in a successful international or national system of effective commercial 
arbitration is the ease and efficiency with which awards are enforced and paid out. The thesis 
proposes the Award Clearance Forum whose role will be in the settling and paying-out of 
recognized and enforceable awards against banks and financial institutions. That is to say, a 
party holding an award against a bank that is enforceable and satisfies all requirements of the 
place of recognition will provide the Forum with the award. Upon presentation, the award 
will be paid out immediately just like a cheque or a payment order and the proceeds will be 
cleared (setoff) against the other party’s (the bank’s) assets held within the banking network 
of which the Forum is composed. 
In practicality, the majority of arbitral awards are satisfied through the voluntary compliance 
of the parties involved. However, on some occasions the winning party finds itself obliged to 
resort to an external authority to enforce the award on the losing party and collect the 
damages awarded. Such external authority to enforce an arbitral award can be in the form of 
national courts located where the losing party resides. This usually leads to enormous delays 
especially if the losing party is a local bank or large financial institution with vested interests 
in the region. In this case of non-compliance or refusal to pay, the party holding the award 
can inform the Forum of the other party’s non-compliance. It is then, the Forum’s role to 
contact the non-complying bank to inform it of the steps that will be taken to progress the 
payment of the award and set-off the monies paid against their assets held within the inter-
banking network. 
5.4. RETRIBUTION v. RESTITUTION  
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Investors normally seek restitution for their losses rather than retribution for bankers’ reckless 
behaviour. Nevertheless, the imposition of retribution and restitution in a legal process such 
as arbitration should help pre-empt actions in financial moral hazard such as recklessness and 
mis-selling. Arbitration processes can only impose monetary awards on the defendant. 
Retribution will be in the quantum and speed of the enforcement of such award. Arbitration 
in financial matters delineates characteristics such as speed, confidentiality, expert handling 
and enforceability. The understanding of the socioeconomic effects of a swift acting process 
in financial disputes is that it will reinforce social confidence in the banking system as much 
as it is in the resolution process itself.  
For regulatory authorities, individual arbitration cases will function as early collective micro- 
warning systems useful for prudential regulatory intervention. In spite of the fact that 
arbitration proceedings are confidential, regulatory authorities in different jurisdictions can 
still identify banks with troubled liquidity and inadequate capital buffers through monitoring 
the results of arbitration awards that will be enforced publicly. Arbitration can also act as a 
complement to the judiciary by filling in for some of the recognized jurisdictional 
shortcomings. Judicial organizations in the majority of countries in the world today that deal 
with financial cases experience lack of knowhow and training, time limitations, contradictive 
domestic legislations and challenging choices of law.190 
Arbitration, with its rich and almost unlimited resources can offer public confidence by 
providing answers (resolutions) in almost any dispute comprising complicated financial 
transactions. 191 Those are essential minimal qualifications to address the social needs of the 
world’s societies in the face of gigantic investment banking conglomerates. The requirements 
of resolving international financial trade disputes, investment and finance are not satisfied in 
a very large number of countries around the world due to the delaying techniques devised by 
those same financial conglomerates that are standing defiant even against states and 
governments.  
Reinstating and reinforcing personal and professional responsibility in the financial sector 
will require a blend of different strategies. For instance, the promotion of retribution through 
the medium of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) can be a cost-effective way to push for 
more responsibility in decision-making. But the key focus of this part falls upon the 
examination of two types of personal liability: monetary and non-monetary, including 
disqualification, wrongful trading and criminal strict liability, which can only be applied 
through the medium of regulatory authority.  
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Those types of retribution are considered as means to better the current accountability system 
in financial institutions. The monetary liability of executives was promoted through the 
wrongful trading provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, as well as the role the Banking Act 
2009 can play in the sharpening of bankers’ accountability. Refining this area will enable the 
closure of the loophole that existed and may still exist in law, where almost all directors of 
nearly all failed banks were able to escape not paying for their actions.192 
In relation to non-monetary liability, the effectiveness of disqualification (promoted through 
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986), as well as the new criminal sanctions 
proposed by the government to tackle the managerial misconduct witnessed during the past 
few years, do not seem to have been effective to a notable degree. 193 In fact, directors have 
continued to reward themselves rather excessively and the public keep questioning the 
current levels of bank executives pay. The earlier comparative analyses are especially useful; 
particularly regarding the issue of corrective measures adopted hitherto dealing with 
monetary remuneration in the financial sector. So far, conclusions show that those measures 
are not strong enough to deal with the complicated aspects of monetary incentives for traders 
and executives. It may be also concluded that those corrective methods are not sufficiently 
corrective. This is clearly identified through controversies surrounding “remunerations for 
risk” structure in financial institutions and current laws related to executives’ remuneration. 
6. IMPACT OF FINANCIAL DISPUTES ON SOCIETIES  
Societies are primarily reacting to what occurs in the financial sector between bankers and 
business professionals. The problems that may arise between banks amongst themselves or 
other local and overseas financial institutions touch instantly onto the public and social 
welfare. Consequently, financial arbitration increasingly began to play an active role in 
resolving cross borders bank disputes, as a mean for establishing confidence in the financial 
sectors in many countries around the world.194 The demand for further efficiency in financial 
dispute resolutions developed as the pressures of high speed interbank transactions gained 
higher volumes and societies came to rely fully on high speed financial trading. The effect of 
such rapid globalization has increased a further need for more than purely national systems of 
law and standard dispute resolution techniques. 
Many questions arise regarding the role of arbitration in society and the importance of 
arbitration beyond individual cases. That is also the effect of set-off and netting within the 
interbank-payment system. The question already raised before is in how far an arbitral award 
that in principle can have no third party effect, may nevertheless still have a social effect. At 
the most fundamental level, arbitration is an important relief from the gigantic pressures of 
backlogs of cases in the great majority of courts all over the world. In many developing 
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countries, even if there is a functioning and reputable judicial branch, courts may experience 
significant backlogs, which can add to lengthy delays in resolving disputes. For example, one 
commentator has noted that there are “habitual delays of up to 15 years” in litigating 
commercial disputes in India.195  
At a meeting of The Law Asia Conference in Manila in 1997, one of the vice-presidents of 
the People's Supreme Court in China reported that China had around 360 million cases 
pending in the courts.196  In India, the number of cases pending is estimated at around forty-
five million. And in other countries, even though the numbers in the whole system are not so 
impressive, the backlog is concentrated in some particular courts, which damages the 
performance of the overall system. So, the first role for arbitration in society is to act as an 
auxiliary to judicial systems to help them to deal with heavy loads of cases.197 
Subject-matter diversification has already been an effective strategy for institutions. Banking 
and financial arbitration remain the archetype of successful specialized centres such as 
P.R.I.M.E. Finance in the Netherland. Investment arbitration, on the other hand, started 
earlier due to the increasing volume of bilateral investment agreements and began with the 
creation of The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1965. 
The market nowadays is being dominated by two major international organisations, mostly 
ICSID and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provide other successful 
examples of such strategy. ICSID and the PCA exemplify the fact that, in certain of their 
functions, international organizations themselves can act as service providers with respect to 
international arbitration. 
The third and most important role and impact of arbitration in society is not as a nemesis of 
judicial systems. To the contrary, the true value of arbitration is its role as a complementing 
process serving within the judicial system. Lest we forget, current international commercial 
arbitration cannot function without the assistance of national courts. The New York 
Convention is built upon this principle. It can even be said that the New York Convention 
effectively derives its authority from the national courts. The manner in which they interpret 
and apply the Convention is the main source of its effectiveness. In almost all legislations, 
arbitration relies on the judiciary for enforceability and assistance.  
The emergence, however, of arbitration in the field of conflict resolution responds to the 
shortcomings of judges’ lack of time and specialised field of experience in some complicated 
cases. Progress and the increase in demand for arbitration, highlights the fact that case 
processing is being done too slowly in the judicial systems due to the increase in demand for 
litigation related to demographical variation rather than the lack of competence in judiciary 
circles. The situation is similar to how courts of equity developed during the Middle Ages in 
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England except that in this case, the response has not come from another office of the 
kingdom, but from ordinary citizens in the form of merchants, bankers, scientists, 
professional businessmen, etc.  
Arbitral institutions have also grown exponentially, both in numbers of players and in size. 
They have embraced diversified strategies to differentiate themselves. While some actors 
have positioned themselves as global such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), The International Centre for Dispute 
Resolution (ICDR), Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), . . . ), others have promoted 
themselves as regional players, notably The China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), The Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), 
The Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC), and the Cairo Regional Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA), among many others). 
There are also other national, more specialized types of institutions in the United States that 
sponsor arbitration in more circumscribed fields, such as the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the Securities Industry Conference on 
Arbitration. Other institutions deal with arbitration not in one particular country or in a 
particular field like commerce, securities or investments, but can cover all type of cases: 
examples include the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the Centre for Public 
Resources (CPR), the Institute for Dispute Resolution, the London Court of International 
Arbitration, and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre.  Arbitration can also be 
sponsored by individual corporations or entities that carry on business with large numbers of 
persons, like banks, insurance companies or energy and oil companies, which can include in 
their contracts an arbitration clause. 
6.1. NATURE OF ARBITRATION AND ITS EFFECT ON SOCIETY  
Arbitration helps parties avoid many of the problems that have to do with procedural matters 
in international commercial and financial disputes which may otherwise be faced in a court of 
law:  
1. The malady of "forum shopping" is eliminated if the jurisdiction is established by 
mutual agreement, as is usually the case in arbitration. 
2. The problem of assignment of cases to a particular judge, the source of many 
irregularities, is also eliminated. 
3. Arbitrators are more "service conscious" toward the parties than judges are, simply 
because the jurisdiction of arbitrators is not compulsory like that of litigation and is 
only the result of the agreement of the parties. As Judge Roger Warren, President of 
the National Centre for State Courts in the United States, said once, “[H]e[ would like 
to infuse in every judge the idea that there is a court a hundred yards away offering 
exactly the same service that the judge offers”.198  
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4. Submission and assessment of evidence does not take as long in arbitrations as in 
courts of law. 
5. Arbitrators can be much less formalistic than judges in the procedure, with the result 
that in many cases it is easier to reach a settlement in arbitration than in a court of 
law, especially in countries without discovery. 
6. As decisions of arbitrators are not binding on future cases, there is more flexibility for 
arbitrators than for judges if circumstances change, especially in common-law 
countries. 
7. And most importantly, International Arbitration awards are final and enforceable, 
deriving their potency from the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958. 
Arbitration is a process that cannot be indifferent to the environment in which it operates and 
this applies even more in cases of international disputes. Arbitration tribunals will make 
adjustments when issuing awards to be in line with the social structure and public policy 
measures that remain in essence subject to the domestic laws of the seat chosen by the 
parties.199 
6.2. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LOCAL SOCIETIES 
International arbitration structures the manner in which social actors are expected to behave 
in the field of international disputes. It has evolved into being a cohesive dispute resolution 
process in which a variety of actors share different sets of social values and beliefs.   
In the process of evolution, a number of social agents and academic institutions developed 
the ambition to provide guidance as to the way international financial arbitration should 
progress and how arbitral social actors should behave when resolving banking disputes. 
Having the ability to develop socially over time, rules of law susceptible of being applied by 
arbitrators at various degrees of legitimacy are recognized as having the social ability to 
provide future guidance to legislators and state courts.  
States also have both the legitimacy and the ability to influence the manner in which 
arbitration develops. They do so directly within the limits of their territory by legislating 
arbitration laws and regulating hearing processes taking place in that jurisdiction. However, 
what counts mostly is the recognizing of awards which satisfy territorial social tradition and 
meet public policy requirements.  
By including state influence and social disposition, arbitration has and can be a tool of 
reducing public anxiety about resolving banking disputes, and avoiding runs on banks. This 
can only occur if a mechanism of arbitrating and swiftly paying arbitral awards is in place.200 
Academic institutions are also becoming more specialized in international arbitration and 
generally focusing on international arbitration research and teaching, such as in Queen Mary 
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School of International Arbitration (UK), the Geneva MIDS Programme (Switzerland) and 
The International Academy for Arbitration Law. Those institutions are also social value 
providers as they shape the manner in which arbitration is perceived by the public through 
scholarly articles, conferences and teaching. 
6.3. IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL CRISES ON SOCIETIES  
The centre of attention so far in most studies on the 2008 Financial Crisis has focused on the 
impact of investment banks that have failed to meet investors’ financial expectations, rather 
than those that have failed to meet investors’ social expectations. The social financial 
performance of a financial enterprise is to attract investors' funds for the purpose of creating 
social benefits. Nevertheless, investment disputes will arise when certain financial institutions 
“over perform”. That occurs when monetary rewards can overwhelm or "distract" managers 
of those institutions from achieving their designated social task. The crisis that started in the 
summer of 2007 exposed the individual ignorance and ultimately the weaknesses of 
executives to properly calculate and stick to a degree of risk suitable to the circumstances of 
their institutions.  
When a bank or a financial institution faces trouble, the effect is not isolated within that 
specific bank. There are deposits within that bank that belong to individual depositors. 
Moreover, there are deposits of other banks that belong to the depositors of those other banks. 
The social chain reaction of one bank’s failure is endless and it has a negative repercussion 
on the entire social structure within a state. 
The social impact of the “subprime notes” started on a positive note with The Community 
Reinvestment Act (1997). It had a clear and noble objective of using the provision of cheap 
credit as a cure for growing income inequality. Such a deal had the apparent advantage of 
helping to offset the stagnation of median incomes and growing inequality in American 
society as the earnings gap got wider. Instead of taxes and subsidies to redistribute income, 
the idea was that those on lower incomes (subprime borrowers) would be able to acquire 
mortgages to get on the housing ladder so that with time and house price appreciation, they 
could extract equity to increase consumption.  
Banks appeared to be truly involved in a socially beneficial product and shadow banks 
‘joined the party’ with sophisticated products such as CDOs and MBSs that would help re-
create liquidity in the market and keep the lending machine working. Under the Clinton and 
Bush administrations, the mandate on government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) for low 
income housing steadily increased, from 42% of assets in 1995 to 56% in 2004. Indeed, it has 
been estimated that: by 2008, the mortgage giants, the FHA and various other government 
programs were exposed to about $2.7 trillion in subprime and Alt-A loans, approximately 
59% of total loans in these categories. As money from the government-sponsored agencies 
flooded into financing or supporting low income housing, the private sector joined the party. 
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Unfortunately, the private sector, aided and abetted by agency money, converted the good 
intentions behind the affordable housing mandate into a financial disaster.201 
Subprime mortgages bundles were converted into high yield security papers and sold by US 
investment bankers to worldwide institutions and banks such as Deutche Bank, BNP Paribas, 
National Bank of Egypt and to charity and Pension Funds such as the Salvation Army and the 
Indian Pension Retirement Fund. They were ALL sold as lucrative low risk investment 
vehicles to governmental and semi-governmental institutions worldwide. The risk was truly 
converted into a universal financial epidemic. This crisis is indicative of how the involvement 
of banks and financial intermediaries to socially alleviate the burden of financing new home 
buyers within a specific sector of the society became greedy and offered too much money to 
feed the demand for Mortgage-Backed-Securities rather than to feed the demand for housing. 
Crucially, this reinforces the need to have appropriate monetary behavioural retribution in 
place that can potentially diminish cognitive social perception limitations towards disputing 
bankers’ actions. People still regard “banks” as unapproachable and the current law has not 
proven to be an effective constraint against banks’ recklessness.  For example, in the US, 
there is no general federal law which provides for the common law grounds of contractual 
recoverability.202  
6.4. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE, IN DISPUTES  
The easy flow of efficient facilitation of international finance in a global society requires the 
social efficiency of both the legal and the judicial systems to be a reality-not only in certain 
parts of the globe but in substantial parts of it. In Egypt, the battle to obtain payment does not 
end with the receipt of court’s "final" judgment. It takes months of chasing and pursuing 
debtors in order to get them to pay. In Indonesia, the reduced percentage of debts that can be 
effectively collected after a court judgment is a mere small percentage of the original amount. 
In Poland, the debt collection process is so long, costly, and cumbersome that the government 
has had to exonerate banks from the need to resort to a judge to collect privileged debts. In 
order to prevent the collapse of its banking system, banks demand directly from the debtor 
through the sheriff of the court.  
In Russia, a number of bank insolvencies during the early nineties created chaos in the courts 
with long lines of complainants waiting all night for several weeks to present their 
complaints. In some cases, mobsters and gangsters were used to act as debt collectors and 
court enforcers on behalf of the winning party. In Albania, the collapse of the pyramid system 
in some financial institutions created havoc that required intervention from abroad to calm 
the riots that followed. In all such instances the societies and the public in general looked for 
alternatives to settling financial disputes promptly. 
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6.5. SOCIAL EFFICIENCY IN RESORTING TO ARBITRATION 
The social efficiency of international arbitration in solving financial disputes depends on 
more than just good laws. Of course, laws provide the adequate social and legal framework 
within which a dispute is legally resolved. Laws are necessary but not sufficient alone 
because arbitration requires other external elements in order to fulfil its true role in society. 
Countries as diverse as Russia, Egypt, Indonesia, Guatemala, or Peru have reasonably good 
arbitration laws and institutions, yet they are far from successful. While it may be true that a 
good arbitration can take place in those countries, arbitration is not socially, politically, or 
economically significant there.  
Arbitration cannot fulfil its important social role for the citizens of those countries partly due 
to the current stereotype of arbitration, especially those sponsored by business associations 
such as banks and insurances.  The ombudsman type of dispute resolutions processes are 
perceived by the public, even in the Western Hemisphere as biased against customers, and 
arbitration awards tend to be nominal and slow to realise.203  
Thus, the need to look for alternatives remains. In many countries the general public distrusts 
the judicial system when looking for justice in their legal claims. But in most of these 
countries, there is more a culture of authority than a culture of service. Instinctively, when 
people look for an alternative they look for an option with authority and power. In 
Guatemala, for example, many farmers would resort to the mayor of the town, or even to the 
military head of the local regiment instead of local courts.204   
In Albania, the elders of the towns in the mountains exercise a natural and effective authority 
in their communities. But that is of little consequence as far as financial disputes are 
concerned. As a result, the public lacked a valid alternative for justice when faced with a 
financial crisis that the courts were not able to handle, and the outcome was an eruption of 
violence. Panic erupted as people found no alternative to resort to when seeking recuperation 
of their rights.205 In Peru, Indonesia, Egypt, and the Philippines, large sectors of the 
population trust neither the official system nor the ombudsman style offered by other local 
institutions. 
Other alternatives include compulsory arbitration by law. This can take place by forcing 
parties to submit to arbitration or conciliation before going to court, so that actually going to 
court would be the last resort when all other venues are exhausted. However this enforceable 
step however, could, if applied well, be converted into a mere formality rather than an 
alternative to an official proceeding. This happened earlier this century in Latin America 
when new procedural codes were enacted that called for a conciliatory hearing at the 
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beginning of the procedure. A legal culture of lawyers and judges converted it, in a few years, 
into one more step in a procedure already too long.206 
6.6. PARTICIPATION OF THE COMMUNITY. 
One of the features of conflict resolution systems, especially arbitration, is the involvement of 
the community in the solution process. Arbitration systems have neither their own economic 
sources nor their own armed forces. Their true authority resides in the backing they receive 
from the community and public opinion. The true force of alternative resolution systems is in 
the power of persuasion and in moving public opinion.207  In Peru, in a survey made under 
the auspices of the United Nations Development Program, three out of four crime victims 
thought that the system was corrupt. The general perception in Jakarta, Indonesia, is that 
"justice" belongs to the highest bidder, and the system in Russia is run by politicians. In all of 
these countries, participation by the community is almost non-existent.208 
The difference with arbitration is that it is based on voluntary participation and cannot exist 
without public participation. The growing importance of arbitration in international finance, 
and its shortcomings have to be measured mainly by the participation of the community. This 
is an aspect in which arbitration could be more successful with a much larger capacity to 
grow. However, for all of its impressive achievements, arbitration remains elitist to a certain 
group of the society. There is a whole new field to cultivate and there the need to be more 
approachable in developing new methods to gain social approval in a complicated market 
such as banking and finance. 209 
7. ANTICIPATED SOCIAL EFFECT OF PROPOSAL IN THESIS  
As described in Chapter One, compensatory legal remedies are remedies designed to make 
victims whole.210 According to theories of corrective justice, compensation also enforces 
moral duty. Those who commit wrongs incur a moral obligation to alleviate the losses they 
have caused.211 The goal of remedies in law is to rectify, as far as possible, the harmful 
consequences of legal wrongs. Ideally, victims are restored to their "rightful position," 
meaning the position they would have been in if no mistake had been made by another 
party.212  
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Nevertheless, there is a problem of fit between the stated goal of compensation and the details 
of compensatory remedies that raises questions about the practice of compensation in 
courts.213 The results of this limited focus in courts are often at odds with the stated goal of an 
equitable ruling in arbitration. That is reconstructing the position of the claimant as it would 
have been if no breach had occurred. 
It is hard to object to compensation, so described. Compensation protects entitlements, 
expresses society's respect for the victim, and provides aid to those who have suffered harm. 
From an instrumental point of view, compensatory remedies provide incentives for efficient 
behaviour by forcing injurers to internalize the costs of their activities and by reducing the 
need for potential victims to take wasteful precautions. 214 
There are parallels here to Émile Durkheim’s argument that compensation should be 
considered as punishment which in turn should be considered a moral phenomenon. While 
crime violates the moral order in society, compensation serves an expressive role of 
reaffirming social bonds and defining the boundaries of social groups against those who 
break their moral commitments.215 
According to theories of corrective justice, compensation also enforces moral duty. Those 
who commit wrongs incur a moral obligation to alleviate the losses they have caused. Banks 
and financial intermediaries play important roles in bridging information asymmetries and 
monitoring entrepreneurs on behalf of their investors.  When an investor raises doubts about 
the authenticity of a transaction, a large corporation or bank initially challenges that claim. It 
makes the task heavy for the investor to litigate their claim in the local courts where that 
corporation resides. An effective dispute resolution system is therefore imperative in the 
financial services industry if social rights are to be upheld and public order to be maintained. 
However, the question of enforceability of the award (paying out the winning party) remains 
the ultimate objective of an effectual arbitration process. 
The social effect of the proposed instantaneous payment of awards mechanism materialises in 
the perception of security the public will acquire towards their banks and financial 
institutions. The public and tax payers will be spared the anxiety of seeing these financial 
titans disputing while their own monies held by those institutions are at stake depending on 
the outcome of those disputes. An arbitration process with a model method of settling awards 
through the proposed “bank network clearing forum” will keep matters between banks.  
Moreover, a mechanism that allows holders of awards to receive their money instantly within 
the same network of banks will give an added value to markets’ liquidity. If a bank is facing 
difficulties to pay-out the awards due to liquidity squeeze, it can have the awards against 
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them discounted through the “clearing forum” network. Public confidence in the bank will 
remain, which in turn can relieve public tension and avoid panic runs.  Social and 
institutional confidence in a mechanism that delivers instant justice can have a deterring 
effect on the risk taking factor which is the main cause of financial crises. 
7.1. CONFIDENCE IN BANKS DERIVED FROM RESOLVING THEIR INNER 
DISPUTES 
Financial arbitration has frequently dealt with disputes involving special complicated 
transactions or interbank contractual problems. Nevertheless, recognition and pay-out of 
arbitral awards remain two separate stages. Local courts under the rules of the NY 
Convention can still deny enforcement, vacate or refuse validation of international awards 
subject to public policy or domestic procedural laws. Such authority of domestic courts still 
causes uncertainty in the financial markets which reflects on social scepticism. 
This thesis is proposing, a forum of banking and financial institutions for award settlement, 
developed within the already existing network of the security and fund clearing international 
financial market place. This can be a solution to hurdles facing the recognition, enforcement 
and pay-out of financial awards. 216 
Financial arbitration has frequently dealt with disputes involving special problems, perhaps 
more visible if there is an intervening bankruptcy which could have been the case, as with 
Lehman Bros. In a research led by The American Economic Association and European 
Monetary Union (EMU), it was found that EU banks' default rates on subordinated bond 
spreads and market fluctuations have proven to be true indicators as to the fragility of a bank.  
Both indicators were demonstrated to be complete indicators of bank fragility. 217 
The research used two different econometric models on EU Banks. The findings supported 
the view that both the distance-to-default and spread are leading indicators of bank fragility, 
regardless of econometric indicators. In other words, the research found that in cases where 
investors claiming earlier disputes, they presented earlier signals as to the possible default 
events of the disputant bank. The research shows that such disputes significantly improve the 
analysis and expectations of public bailout. 218 
In essence, what this empirical research confirms is that a dispute resolution method that 
encourages investors to come forward at the first sign of banks faulting, can serve as a 
significant indicator for a regulatory authority and the state to investigate. Actions of moral 
hazard and risk taking can be deterred early and crises resulting from failing banks 
circumvented.219 
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7.2. THE CONCEPT OF SPEEDY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The term “moral hazard” within the financial sector refers to undeterred practices of reckless 
misconduct, mis-selling and sequestration of depositors’ funds. It refers to actions in the 
wake of the 2008 bank bailouts after the global financial crisis. Scandals were showing in 
different countries such as the “Libor” rigging scandal and mis-selling of protection 
insurances, such as Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) in the UK, and the Mortgage 
Financial Protection Policy in France. 220 
Financial institutions’ actions of mis-selling, misrepresentation, information asymmetry and 
excessive risk taking created international public demand for alternatives to powerless 
financial regulatory authorities.  A study by the IMF221 on 687 banks and corporations from 
eight crisis countries has empirically shown that a consistent framework of dispute resolution 
that includes bankers facing the right framework of retribution is a missing key in financial 
institutions dispute resolution methods. 
It is, therefore, deemed necessary to examine trends in disputes in financial transaction 
structures and the agreements upon which dispute resolution is decided. The following step is 
to then distinguish financial disputes from other forms of commercial disputes. From this 
point, challenges that arise in disputes on failing investments can, in view of economic and 
social effects, be segregated and examined to find the suitable method of resolving them.222 
In the process, consideration is given here as to how investors reacted to dispute problems 
raised during and after the 2008 global financial crisis. This relates to the types of disputes in 
investment transactions solicited by banks and investment brokers. Disputes mostly relate to 
investments in securitised notes with contracted predefined dispute resolution processes 
regarding agreed promised income and allocated risk rating. 
On the other hand, as this thesis is proposing, a patented clearing and award clearing 
framework developed within a network in the international financial market can be another 
solution to hurdles facing the enforcement and pay-out of financial awards. An instant 
financial dispute resolution process can help accelerate the recovery from a crisis and reduce 
acts of systematic moral hazard actions. An arbitration process is as efficient as the 
enforceability of its awards can be.  The instantaneous payment element can therefore begin 
to function through any of the existing payment clearing systems used currently by banks in 
daily transactions such as SWIFT, European Standard Bank (ESB), TARGET, etc. The 
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enforceability of such mechanism will derive its substantive enforceability from the New 
York Convention 1958.223 
Another aspect of this framework is that instantaneous clearance of arbitral awards will allow 
awards to be traded as short-term debt securities. It will present ex ante burden sharing 
arrangements within financial institutions in a crisis, without placing stress on the state in 
bail-out efforts.  Banks having liquidity problems will have available funds to pay the awards. 
The mechanism will aid in liquidity creation in the financial markets. This will permit banks 
to use the awards as short term financing tools to support each other without deleterious 
impact on their balance sheets. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Moral hazard in the financial sector was one of the major contributors to the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. However, moral hazard within the financial services and financial 
intermediaries sector is not an issue relevant only to the design features of deposit insurance 
schemes.  
A foundational premise of market discipline is that investors, individually or collectively will 
signal elevated bank risk through some sort of disputing action. Investors and creditors can 
efficiently overlook their banks’ risk taking individually through self-interest actions. In total, 
individual surveillance can represent collective public supervision.224 This has been a central 
pillar of banking regulation since the late 1980s. However, during the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis, millions of investors ended with worthless securities and investment agreements.   
The initial units of analysis are the contractual rights of the parties in asset management 
agreements. The notion of forging financial agreements with a financial service provider such 
as a bank or stockbroker is the basic point of an investor’s right to dispute the actions of the 
service provider. On the other hand, the consent of the financial institution to be bound by an 
arbitration process that will expedite compensations to disputing clients into instant 
payments, will have a positive effect on combating moral hazard activities in the banking and 
financial sectors.225 
At that point, the intention of the parties at the outset is what gives the parties the right of 
instigating the dispute process. The analysis here is built upon the premise that:  
(i) should award enforcement become an instant process in financial disputes, investors will 
be motivated to survey their bankers closely and report unaccepted actions through dispute;  
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(ii) as was witnessed in the 2007/2008 crisis, standard financial rules and regulations 
currently in place are constricted when it comes to granting immediate remedy to investors; 
and  
(iii) Bankers will be discouraged from acting in hazardous and immoral ways as they see that 
penalisation is instantaneous and will affect them personally as well as their institutions. 
The framework will be comparable to clearing of payment orders. Such a process can start 
operating immediately because interbank payment networks are in place and functioning.  
The award debtor party such as a bank or financial services provider that attempts to avoid 
payment under an award can face immediate capture of its funds held with other 
correspondent banks within the global banking network. The enforceability of such capture 
will derive its legality from the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
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      CHAPTER THREE 
 
  MORAL HAZARD IN FINANCIAL DISPUTES 
Moral hazard in its multi-faceted forms within the financial sector does not owe its existence 
to deposit insurance schemes only. It has developed due to none existence of clear retributive 
forums in face of fraud, mis-selling, `self-dealings, information asymmetry, irregularities in 
business cycle fluctuations, and insufficient asset diversification.226 
This chapter explores moral hazard in general and determines which dispute resolution 
method can act as a punitive mechanism for acts of moral hazard especially in relation to the 
Financial Crisis. It explores the views on acts of recklessness and mis-selling in the banking 
and financial sector. Analysis is made of the moral hazard actions leading to the crisis of 
2007/2008 and building upon the way in which the financial authorities reacted to signs of 
high-risk transactions at the onset of the financial crisis.  
In earlier chapters, we considered the different approaches to understanding financial and 
banking disputes and to come to the reality that although the damage done during the 
financial crisis 2007/2008 cannot be overturned, the sharpening of bankers’ accountability 
can make it less likely for the recurrence of similar calamities. Chapter Three leads to the 
conclusion that an arbitration process with expeditious award payment will impede moral 
hazard in banks and speedily redress interbank disputes which can curb public panic and 
encourage ethical morals within the financial sector. 
1. THE NATURE OF MORAL HAZARD AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  
It can be observed all over the world that more attention is being given for the financial sector 
than any other sector in the economic systems in all countries around the world.227  There are 
two main reasons for this:  
- First: it is held by almost every country that special depository protection has to be 
provided to their citizens due to the fiduciary nature of financial institutions receiving, 
accepting and managing public wealth in the form of deposits, loans, mortgages and various 
forms of investment contracts. 
Fluctuations and instability in financial markets, however, have proven historically that the 
public have to be protected from high risk transactions that financial institutions may get into 
with the possibility of any opportunistic behaviour. 
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1.1 REGULATORY AUTHORITIES 
There are many forms of investment transactions with some bearing higher risk than others. 
Placing a deposit with a bank is a form of investment. However, other forms of complex 
investment contracts such as futures currency exchange markets, derivatives, and securitised 
and non-securitised financial market products are also classified as investments, albeit high 
risk investments. 
To be able to perform their supervisory role, complex systems of regulatory interventions are 
being set up by financial regulatory authorities specifically to supervise banks and financial 
institutions for the protection of investors including depositors. In short, governments believe 
that they should protect the economy from financial institutions and protect financial 
institutions from themselves. 
- Second: money and liquidity constitute the core of a country’s financial system. With 
transactions involving corporate and individual investors, the protection of investors, whether 
individual or corporate, is instrumental in the containment of and recovery from a crisis.228 
Financial markets and institutions are much more interconnected and characterized by ‘herd 
behaviour’ than any of the other sectors of the economy.229 Financial linkages between 
countries, in the form of interbank activities, have been singled out as a key channel of 
international crisis transmission. According to an International Monetary Fund study by 
Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), statistics show that since 1980 about 133 IMF member 
countries have experienced significant banking sector problems.230  
On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that different forms of moral hazard in the 
financial sector are customary and prevalent. It occurs with individual clients and within 
interbank transactions. It takes various forms of information-asymmetry, mis-selling and 
adverse-selection in almost every depository or investment contractual agreement.231 
These empirical results have important particulars of how some large banks and financial 
firms transacted with the outside world prior to 2008 financial crisis. They show that certain 
firms and banks attempted to avoid their own bankruptcy by unloading bad assets onto other 
banks and financial institutions without clearly explaining the bad nature of such assets to the 
buyers. 
The adverse selection caused by such information asymmetry created an imbalance in 
investment decisions taken by governments as well as financial institutions. In turn, this 
caused a chain reaction of financial failures leading to a kind of a global financial market 
failure.  
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Bankruptcy of financial institutions spilled over to others in different countries and 
endangered the entire world financial system. The unmonitored presence of mis-selling and 
information asymmetry has proven to lead in certain cases to almost total shut down of 
financial markets, as happened in 2008. 
1.2. MORAL SENTIMENT AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR  
Much of the focus of the resulting moral outrage has been on the remuneration of bankers. 
Regulators’ focus was on the structure of remuneration which incentivised undue risk-taking 
and the general public’s focus has been on the pay-offs to senior executives of failed banks. 
Large bonuses were paid to bankers whose activities were most closely involved in the run-
up to the crisis. Much of the concern was about the perversity of apparent rewards for a 
highly imposed cost on society. This outcome seems to fly in the face of the principle of 
natural justice that society expects. 
The mainstream analysis of moral hazard assumes behaviour to be rational with respect to 
opportunistic self-interest. It is opportunistic in the sense that a party takes advantage of an 
opportunity for “personal benefit” even if it is at the expense of others. The term “personal”’ 
here refers to a more general meaning of the word, where the opportunistic party can be an 
individual or an entity.232 
Moral hazard in the financial sector has been analysed in relation both to investment contracts 
and to state support for banks in the form of deposit insurance schemes. As far as investment 
contracts are concerned, it relates to the relationship between an investor trusting in a product 
sold to them by a financial service provider. 
Opportunistic behaviour on the part of the service provider in this case can be the act of 
concealing the actual risk exposure the investor will be taking. Banks were able to stipulate 
contracts to cover all the risk behaviours so they could increase their sales and true interest in 
rewards. 
The presumption that risk was knowable to both parties continues to underlie analyses of the 
crisis as resulting from information asymmetry.233 Understanding moral hazard is 
fundamental to understanding how the economy works. Moral hazard can be defined in 
incidents when one party is responsible for the interests of others but has an incentive to put 
their own interests first. 
Moral hazard actions such as these are pervasive and inevitable features of the banking 
industry and of the financial sector in general terms. Dealing with them by keeping them 
under reasonable control is one of the principle tasks of financial regulatory authorities 
worldwide. The significance of the concept that moral hazard itself exists in so many forms, 
is not in identifying what actions qualify as morally hazardous. Instead, it is in the identifying 
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of the undesirable results of such actions on the mass and the ascertainment of delivering the 
correct process to control the reactions of the mass.234 
There is no denying that the 2008 financial crisis delivered a major seismic shock to the 
policy landscape. In country after country, we saw governments panicked into bailouts and 
nationalizations of banks and large financial corporations on an unprecedented scale. Stories 
took hold between the public and in societies around the world of the excesses of greedy 
bankers walking away with hundreds of millions in bonuses whilst taxpayers bail their 
institutions. Bankers used bailout money to pay excessive bonuses and the moral of risk 
practices remained.235 
It is beyond dispute that the 2008 crisis was due to a failure of the financial and economic 
model of governing financial institutions and banks. The IMF Global Asset Report (2016) 
estimates the total global size of assets under management at $74 Trillion by the end of 2015, 
down from $102 Trillion in 2008. 236 
During the crisis, markets witnessed massive unloading of bad assets from failing banks onto 
other banks and investors through mis-selling. Fundamental concerns about universally 
embedded moral hazard in the financial sectors were brought to surface. This stimulated 
further debates that banks were concentrating purely on better financial returns and ignored 
the societal cost of their flawed investment decisions. 237   
Whether as a cause or an effect, universal moral hazard in the banking and financial corporate 
sectors is often an element of a major global crisis.238 The containment of a financial crisis 
involves many economic strategy choices ranging from macro to micro economic monetary 
and fiscal policies.239 However, attempts of containment through legal channels are rarely 
exercised except in situations of bankruptcy and resolution of struggling banks.240 
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2. SYMPTOMATIC MORAL HAZARD 
Moral hazard in banking and financial institutions is defined when one party is responsible 
for the interests of investors’ assets but has no deterrent from placing their own financial gain 
as a priority. 241 
Examples include transactions where: 
 Asymmetric information leading to adverse selection - Banks sell financial products 
such as mortgages or loans, knowing that they are not suitable for the investor242 
 Acquiring large disproportionate bonuses out of managed funds - Executives pay 
themselves excessive bonuses out of funds that they manage on behalf of their 
depositors 
 Subsidised risk: if clients gain the banker will gain, if the client loses the banker will 
still gain. Taking unwarranted risks that clients or the state will ultimately bear - 
Officers and directors knowingly take high-risk decisions, which their clients will 
have to bear. 
2.1. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Information is an imperishable and accumulating tool in the financial world. Entities and 
investors base their decisions on information gathered from their financial services provider. 
It is in this sense, as mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, asymmetric information takes the 
form in acts of mis-selling financial products while hiding the fact that they are not suitable 
for the buyer.243 
Information asymmetry in contract theory and economics deals with the study of decisions in 
transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. This creates an 
imbalance of power in transactions, which can sometimes cause the transactions to go awry. 
This creates an imbalance of power and a kind of market failure in the worst case. Results of 
such practices are adverse selection by the other party in the transaction and information 
monopoly on the part of the bankers.244 As discussed earlier, the narrowest definition of 
asymmetric information is that a financial institution hides the true risk concerning certain 
securities and will not credibly reveal its intrinsic value to a potential buyer. 245  
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Asymmetric information problems call for public intervention in financial markets. The errs 
in regulation and supervision of financial institutions, as well as other instruments such as 
depositors and investors disputes are fundamental factors in financial market failures. It 
provides grounds for moral hazard on the part of financial intermediaries and the adverse 
selection suffered by investors. 246 
2.2. LARGE BONUSES 
Profitability and bonuses are endemic moral hazards within banks and financial institutions 
and lie at the core of institutional functions. Some of these are: 
- Self-preservation through corporate capital preserving  
- Maximising profits 
- Financial compensations and bonuses 
However, the mainstay of moral hazard is in the lack of alignment of third party investors’ 
interests with the interests of the financial institution. This occurs even if that third party is 
another bank or the state itself. There are misalignments of services granted by financial 
companies and banks, which provide the incentive for such actions. 
Fees, incentives and bonuses for traders and financial managers are paid out upfront with no 
penalties for deferred losses or poor performance. Again, the problem is that agents and 
traders are working for the creation of profits for their firms and bonuses for themselves and 
not primarily for the interests of their investors. 
3. MORAL HAZARD IN CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS  
At the core of financial crises lie failed financial contracts. Moral hazard actions such as 
those mentioned above are persistent practices of the industry as a whole and a customary 
characteristic of the banking sector. Dealing with them requires fundamental institutional 
restructuring of the types of contracts used in banking and financial transactions. The aim is 
to hold financial institutions and their executives as party to the contract and personally 
responsible. 
As mentioned earlier, moral hazard can be defined as when a party responsible for the 
interests of other parties, decides to put their own interests above those of the others. The 
significance of the concept itself is not in identifying what may qualify as hazardous actions, 
but instead it is in the undesirable results of such actions to be controlled. 
However, market requirements may require parties to enter into agreements that are more 
specific.  This should, in principal focus on arbitrable issues related to moral hazard disputes 
rather than contract law. For example, in financial transactions, it is common for parties such 
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as banks and investment firms to insert clauses into contracts, which affirm the restriction of 
the other parties’ right to claim for extra-contractual allegations.  
Those contracts are expressly formulated to acknowledge the clients’ declaration that they 
chose to enter the contract out of their own free will and they have not been induced by any 
representation or solicitation. Such clauses are inserted to eliminate possible future 
allegations of mis-selling. 
However, those contracts are being phased out gradually for two main reasons: 
1- Banks began to realise post crisis that they also were victims of mis-selling and were 
estopped from claiming damages because of those contracts. 
2- Should the dispute arrive to arbitration, arbitration tribunals adjudicate on the merits of the 
dispute and on the interpretation of contracts. The tribunal can use its discretion to look at the 
nature of the transaction and the possibility of it being transacted without solicitation on the 
part of the bank. 
3- The arbitration tribunals can also look beyond such standardised agreements to reach the 
parties’ intention at the time of entering the agreement. The approach of arbitration tribunals 
to contract interpretation has important implications for the success of arbitration as a means 
for the resolution of international financial disputes.  
Arbitrators are more likely to apply a more equitable commercial attitude, unlike courts and 
presiding judges who are bound by governing laws and strictly defined financial rules and 
regulations within the judicial system. 
Substantive contract law and fundamental contractual agreements in dispute resolution 
systems have developed over time in no small part of the industry. Such developments came 
in response to global acts of mishandling of savers’ funds. In general, contractual provisions 
determine formal financial transaction agreements and the process of resolving arising 
disputes. 
4. GOVERNANCE OF MORAL HAZARD IN BANKS  
As mentioned at the onset of the chapter, the ingredients of moral hazard in the financial 
industry are not only affiliated to risks taken under deposit insurance schemes. Moral hazard 
is widely associated with acts of misselling, misrepresentation, self-dealings, information 
asymmetry, irregularities in business cycle fluctuations, and insufficient asset diversification. 
However, it is important to evaluate moral hazard in general and determine which dispute 
resolution method can act as a retributive mechanism for acts of immorality such as 
information asymmetry and mis-selling.  
Traders and executives of a financial institution have an incentive to be engaged in high risk 
transactions to secure higher compensation and bonus pay-outs. When such institutions start 
to face trouble because of the actions of their traders, depositors will mistakenly start running 
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on other banks that may have not even been engaged in high risk transactions or moral 
hazard. 
However, questions are raised by the public concerning the support given to financial 
institutions in trouble. The questioning focuses on the expansion of the financial safety net 
through extended reliance on government resources and taxpayer’s money and it is centred 
upon the following points: 
(I) whether any government finances can be adequate to support the promises of existing 
insurance schemes in other future crises of stress 
(II) how to balance the objectives of preventing bank runs with the potentially negative 
effects of deposit insurance schemes and other forms of moral hazard 
(III) the threat to financial stability from incentives and awards given to traders for aggressive 
risk-taking 
In the opinion of Reinhart and Rogoff,247 financial institutions’ failures involve two 
interacting factors: 
1. The inability of financial authorities to prevent financial service providers from 
unwise usage of investors’ money in excessive risk transactions. 
2. How can financial institutions be compelled to repay misled clients the money they 
have lost through risky transactions, and who can do this?  
The argument is that bankers can commit to not engaging in moral hazard if they anticipate 
that clients can trace unauthorised transactions and successfully force bankers through some 
sort of judicial process to repay back what they have lost. The thought behind this is that 
regulators are limited when it comes to compensating injured investors. 
This is because the power of the regulatory authority to issue and publish legal rules and put 
them into practice is always limited by the licensing rule of the law. What regulators can 
impose on banks and financial sector institutions can either be by a statutory instrument duly 
passed by the legislature or at ad hoc where the judiciary accept certain regulatory practices 
as legally enforceable.248  
Quantitative measures imposed by financial regulators were not able to capture qualitative 
problems such as poor management even where asset impairment had been properly 
measured. For example, prudential deficiencies and lack of confidence in the financial 
conditions of banks had a different impact on financial institutions than it had on securities 
intermediaries such as brokerage firms, investment banks and insurance companies.  
Furthermore, the primary emphasis for financial regulators is on investor protection and 
market efficiency considerations. They rely on disclosures coming from financial institutions 
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and on assumed market discipline and an effective accounting framework. In the banking and 
insurance sectors, regulators focused primarily on an institution’s ability to meet its 
obligations to depositors and policyholders, with some attention to systemic stability in 
banking. So far, none of those legislative authorities has produced the process for 
compensating investors for losses caused by irresponsible financial services providers. 249 
5. HIDDEN MORAL HAZARD 
To fully understand the role of moral hazard in the global financial meltdown of 2008, it is 
important to understand the subprime mortgage structure. Why was it considered by many 
experts to be the main reason for the global financial crisis? 
There is little doubt that the collapse in the subprime market led to the crippling of key 
financial institutions in 2007 which in turn led to the crisis.250 Mammoth firms like AIG, 
Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns collapsed and liquidity around the world was drained. 251 
The bonds were assets backed by high risk mortgage loan contracts bundled together with 
other highly rated securities. They derived their value from high credit ratings by Moody and 
S&P and the expected elevated cash flows generated by repayments on the bundled 
mortgages.252 
However, for diversification purposes, banks which generated such securities simultaneously 
bought other securitised bonds generated by other banks. This meant that banks selling 
subprime notes from one end, were buying it back from the other end knowing or unknowing 
of the true associated risk. 
5.1. DERIVATIVES 
A derivative is a financial instrument that derives its value from the expected future value of 
an underlying asset or commodity. In other words, it is an agreement between two speculators 
that an asset is actually worth something in the future, other than its current market price. 
Derivatives are a known tradition in monetary economics and financial markets that go back 
to the 19th century. They are known as financial market security derivatives”. Many of the 
instruments presented by financial institutions caught up in the crisis were part of the 
centuries’ old phenomenon of financial innovation. New derivative instruments are often 
devised to avoid regulations. 
The rise and fall of financial institutions and instruments occur as part of a long-standing 
pattern of booms and busts in the securities markets. Securities include equities, land, 
commodities, foreign exchange and other assets. Those cycles are financed through margin 
credit to enable speculators to use non existing funds to gamble on the movement of the 
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markets. Booms and busts of credit cycles are also related to the business cycle of the 
economy. 
The underlying assets for those transactions can be virtually anything. Derivatives can be 
traded on stocks, oil prices, oranges or even the weather. A very important principle and point 
to make is that derivatives allow speculating investors to make money from assets that they 
do not actually own. 
As such, they also are gambling with money that they do not own.  When losses occur, 
speculators and banks have to cover the cost of the transaction plus the losses attached to it. 
This is where the true risk of derivatives to the overall financial system lies and this is what 
happened during the course of 2007-2008 when banks gambled on the property markets 
boom. 
Conversely, by purchasing the debt obligation to the mortgage, investment banks became 
liable for covering the unpaid debt if the mortgage defaulted. This meant that the sooner they 
turned around and sold the notes to their investors, the sooner they could realise their 
profitability and most importantly, reduce the acidity on their balance sheets.  
Investors in turn held all the risk. Lenders themselves were able to create subprime mortgages 
without taking on the risky long-term debt. They were able to do so because they would sell 
the debt obligations to the investment banks immediately upon inception of the mortgage. 
This way they passed on the liability to the packaging bank that ultimately passed it to the 
market. 
However, as explained earlier, for a lender who generates a mortgage agreement with a view 
to passing it on to a third party through securitisation, the incentive to take higher risk and 
hide the true nature of the credibility of the loan is seriously heightened.253 In this case, the 
lender sells on the open market securitised mortgages, bundled with other over-rated loans 
and has no further concern whether the borrowers default or not. 
The only concern for those brokers was to carry on generating loans, regardless of the credit 
status of the borrower and receiving the loan arrangement fees. The fact that the borrowers 
were incapable of making payments on the mortgages was priced into the mortgage 
securitization process. That meant that mortgage brokers were paid overwhelmingly high fees 
by the financing banks.  Those mortgages were then bundled by the banks together with other 
mortgages originated by a similarly lenient process and sold to unsuspecting investors. 
Investors were banks such as the German Landesbank or Icelandic Kaupthing Bank and many 
others all over the world who were attracted by the promised high yield but unaware of the 
hidden risk. That was when mortgage defaults on mortgage repayments became frequent and 
interest rates were hiked. The system that perpetuated itself began to stall as more and more 
subprime mortgages began to default and profitability did not last.  
                                                 
253
 Securitisation is the process of taking an illiquid asset, or group of assets, and through financial engineering, 
transforming them into a marketable security. A typical example of securitization is a Mortgage backed 
Security (MBS), which is secured by a collection of mortgages.  http://www.investopedia.com  
104 
 
5.2. THE CRISIS 
In 2006, interest rates began to rise in the US and, as rates began to climb, investors began to 
turn away from the subprime bonds market. They started to sell back their subprime 
investment obligations to the investment banks from which they had purchased them. This 
left lenders and investment banks with unsold securitised notes and a rising debt with a 
decreasing supply of buyers. 
What developed in late 2007 and into 2008 was a series of runs on financial institutions. 
However, instead of a classic run on banks, it was a run on the shadow banking system. 
Unlike in a classic bank run when bank depositors run on banks to withdraw their deposits, it 
is argued that the panic of 2007-2008 was a run on the sale and repurchases market, known as 
the repo market.254 
The repo market is a short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of security 
transactions between financial institutions, securitization of assets and interbank borrowing. 
Repo transactions are collateralized, back-to-back with securitized bonds. The term 
securitized banking refers to the combination of securitization plus repo finance. 
In the shadow banking system, institutions have short-term liabilities in the form of short-
term borrowing. Those short-term liabilities use longer-term assets like mortgage-backed 
securities as collateral. This means that the due date for repayment of short term debts will 
fall before the financial institution could have the liquidity to repay it. The only option is to 
borrow again to repay the older debt and rollover the liability. This is where the repo market 
comes in to help banks and financial institutions sell and repurchase their debts. 
Gary Gorton believes that it was the wholesale run on the repo market during 2008, a run that 
was not so much on depository institutions, but on the shadow banking system, that caused 
the crisis.255  
The problem with bank borrowings was that those collaterals were in the form of mortgage-
backed securities. As the value of mortgage-backed securities fell, the collateral became 
insufficient for the amount already borrowed by the banks. Financial institutions including 
banks were faced with no choice but to sell their assets (the mortgage backed bonds) at a loss 
to repay their borrowings. This led to the chain reaction of de-leveraging in which financial 
institutions had to sell off assets to cover their exposure or go bankrupt. 
The central discussion relates to the fact that these activities were at the nexus of the crisis 
when the bonds used as collateral for securitised repo transactions collapsed. Concerns about 
the liquidity of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in liquidity collateral 
margins to cover repo transactions (repo haircuts). Unable to go to borrow on the interbank 
market, banks and financial institutions began a frenzied sale of their assets to acquire the 
needed liquidity for their margin calls, causing the value of their assets to decline sharply. 
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With declining asset values and increasing repo haircuts, the U.S. banking system was 
effectively insolvent, and other markets, such as commercial paper markets, started to fall in 
and suffered a “run”. The resulting “assets fire sale” mechanism led to an adverse loop which 
forced financial institutions to deleverage and sell more assets, and the decline in asset values 
continued further, and so on.256 
In 2007, dozens of mortgage lenders, who had become very dependent on the subprime 
market for their profitability, closed their doors. On April 2nd, the U.S.’s largest subprime 
lender, New Century Financial, which in 2006 made over $60 billion in subprime loans, filed 
for “Chapter 11” bankruptcy. Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch both reported losing substantial 
amounts of money in the subprime market in the first quarter of 2007. In August, there was a 
run on Countrywide Bank, the largest mortgage holder in the U.S. By this point, it became 
clear that the subprime collapse would adversely affect every level of the world’s financial 
markets. 257 
The market then crashed in March of 2008 as Bear Stearns announced it was being bought 
out by JP Morgan Chase with substantial help from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Finally, in September 2008, the credit roof caved in. In less than two weeks, the U.S. 
government de-privatized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Bank of America purchased Merrill 
Lynch for $50 billion, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and AIG applied for a federal 
bailout.258 
In early October the crisis spread to Europe and to the emerging countries as the global 
interbank market ceased functioning. The UK authorities responded by pumping equity into 
British banks, guaranteeing all interbank deposits and providing massive liquidity. The EU 
countries responded in kind and on October 13th the US Treasury followed suit with a plan to 
inject $250 billion into the US banks, to provide insurance of senior interbank debt and 
unlimited deposit insurance coverage for non-interest bearing deposits. By the end of the 
month, the effects of the subprime mortgage backed securities crisis were felt throughout the 
entire financial industry, plunging the world into a global financial crisis.259 
6. MISREPRESENTATION AND MISSELLING MORAL HAZARD 
In the tort setting, the potential claim misrepresentation depends on whether the defendant 
decided to take the necessary care so as not to cause harm to the other party. In the contract 
setting, the claim is whether the defendant decided to breach a term of the contract. This rule 
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is generally decided upon at the outset of the contract setting when the parties often write the 
rules that directly regulate the other parties’ required conduct.  
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems arise from the imposition of liability in 
financial services products affecting the investors’ welfare. However, tort systems provide a 
general setting for pecuniary compensation to parties suffering losses due to adverse selection 
and/or misselling. In other words, strict liability implies different types of risk sharing 
between potential parties to an agreement and third parties. During the past fifty years there 
have been debates on how risks are shared between banks and their clients.   
A prevailing product of liability precedent was established in MacPherson v. Buick (1916)260 
where it was held that producers possess informational comparative advantages in designing 
their products that consumers may not be aware of.  Nevertheless, the prevailing doctrine of 
privity in product liability stipulates that damages may be recovered only from the party with 
whom a contract exists. Hence, if a party seeks economic damages from a defective product, 
damages may be recoverable from the firm that sold the product but not from the party that 
produced it.  
However, analyses show how tort liability can provide a setting within an arbitration 
process.261 Privity, contributory and comparative negligence may imply different types of risk 
sharing in strict liability between claimants and respondents. What follows from this analysis 
is that tort liability may be another way to achieve justice. Nevertheless, compensation and 
damages in tort have proven to be more elusive than real. Compensation in tort is poorly 
served because most negligence caused damage does not necessarily result in a claim. 
However, even if it does succeed, the financial compensation is usually consumed by legal 
fees and costs.262  
Similarly, most adverse events are not so much the result of actions by an individual 
provider. The complex system of financial transactions in banks and other financial 
institutions is usually way beyond the experience of a court of justice. It may require tribunals 
with field experience and capabilities that can match the knowhow and size of disputes as 
well as the speed required to resolve them. In all of the above, a challenge in arbitration may 
serve as an effective deterrent for executives of financial firms against risky transactions 
which they then pass over to their clients. 263  
However, in an efficient dispute resolution system as proposed in this thesis, a buyer of 
mortgage backed securities for example can have recourse against the seller for knowingly 
passing over to him a bad deal. In fact recourse will not be limited to just the institution that 
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securitised the mortgage, but it can go all the way to the risk feasor who granted the loan in 
the first place, be it a loan broker or building society. 
6.1. CONTRACT LAW UNDERLINES FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS  
At the bottom of the financial crisis lie failed contracts. Failed contracts are the stuff of 
contract law.264 However, most cases following the crisis have settled for allegations of fraud 
and abusive practices by financial institutions without focusing on the underlying contract 
law in the disputed financial agreement. Discussions and legal arguments about the crisis paid 
little attention to the underlying contract law because most legal depositions were based on 
the assumptions that all contracts at issue would be strictly regarded by courts as enforceable.  
On the other hand, those debates omitted to note that contract laws include generally several 
flexible doctrines that dispute resolution tribunals could use to address problems resulting 
from the crisis.  For example, it is the rule that the capacity to take part in proceedings is 
exclusively determined upon a contractual agreement. This is an indispensable requirement 
for a party to participate in arbitration proceedings, whether as claimant or defendant. 
Financial institutions generally use wizard-like formulas to change relevant party rights to 
arbitration in their contractual financial agreements. An integral part of this section is the 
discussion touching upon the interrelation between parties to a financial transaction and the 
capacity to become party to arbitration proceedings based on interest as determined in 
litigation.265 By reviewing conventional contract law approaches to financial transaction 
contracts, arbitration tribunals might need to interpret various contract law doctrines to 
efficiently address financial disputes. 
UK and US contract law doctrines include, for example:  assignment, modification, restraint 
of trade, unconscionability, mistake, impracticability, damages and the objective theory of 
intent.266 In the combat against moral hazard in the financial industry, the formation of 
financial contractual agreements determines at the outset the circle of persons that can 
participate in an arbitrable financial transaction.267  
Fouchard suggests that those268  parties may and should include the relevant executives of the 
institutions involved in the transaction. This is due to the definition and nature of arbitration 
as a consensual dispute resolution mechanism binding the agreeing parties to an arbitration 
agreement. Modern international financial transactions have become extremely complicated 
requiring the participation of several parties. For example, a typical securitised mortgage 
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bond will involve the mortgagor (the borrower), the mortgagee (the bank or building society), 
the trader purchasing the mortgage, a futures trader within the bank and an executive 
affirming the trade, and finally, the investor or depositor who will be the purchaser of the 
finished product.269  
It is appropriate to clarify whether a party to a financial transaction may have to pursue their 
right for arbitration which exists for investors in an investment transaction on the open 
market. A party to an investment transaction in this case can be a borrower in a securitised 
loan or a purchaser of such loan whether solicited by a banker or directly by the principal 
vendor of the securitised paper.270 However, for financial governance and combating moral 
hazard, the main challenge is whether an investor can establish the contractual liability of the 
security initiating parties as in the cases of mortgage backed securities (MBS). If investors, as 
third parties can claim damages in arbitration, they will then not be bound by the privity 
doctrine and will not need to rely on one of the original lenders to obtain substantial 
redress.271  
The move from privity limitations in terms of how liability is shared ex-ante between 
mortgage lenders and bankers represents an attempt for compensation in tortious liability. 
However, as mentioned earlier in tort, the scope of redress is ultimately determined ex-post 
by the legal system and courts. Of course, it would be reasonable to assume that regulators 
can move to codify existing financial transactions and practices to correlate the risk 
associated with certain transactions to a tort-related penalisation.272 
An important issue being debated is whether persons involved in the above situations are 
sometimes incorrectly disregarded in the financial agreement. However, buyers of investment 
tools should be measured as parties since they are contractually bound by reference to the 
provisions of the established contract initiating the transaction and considered in the right to 
claim compensations on failed securities. 
For example, in Deutsche Bank AG v Tongkah Harbour Public Co Ltd (2011)273, issues arose 
in relation to a series of agreements that provided for optional arbitration and for litigation. In 
this case, the issue was whether Deutsche Bank, as a party to multiple related agreements 
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containing arbitration clauses, could choose to litigate under one agreement and 
simultaneously arbitrate under the other. Deutsche Bank argued that its different divisions in 
Amsterdam and London were involved in different capacities regarding the relationship with 
its customers. The court, following the Lords’ decision in Fiona Trust (2007) UKHL 40, said 
that Deutsche Bank was one contracting entity and the different divisions were irrelevant. 
The legal nature of dispute resolution processes is determined by different doctrines which 
include the nature of jurisdictional procedures and the premise of contractual consent.  There 
are various motivations behind the parties’ choice to depart from the state’s court system and 
enter alternative proceedings for resolving their dispute. However, the most common and 
important motivation will be the recognition and enforceability of the tribunal decision in 
their dispute.  
Third parties seeking compensation should be able to resolve their disputed rights against 
highly paid traders and executives as well as the institution.274 It would be useful at this stage 
to briefly look into certain parties to a financial agreement whose status to a concluded 
transaction arbitration agreement may not be clear.275 
6.2. CURRENT FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES 
Since before the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the financial markets generally regarded the 
use of arbitration to resolve financial disputes involving financial securities with indifference 
if not non-acceptance. This is because of the diverse approach taken by national courts in 
many jurisdictions. National courts seem to resort to public policy to decline enforcement of 
financial arbitral awards against their own banks. This is in spite of the enforceability 
governed by the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards.  
The NY Convention Articles are silent on the procedural norms for the enforcement of 
awards and where Art. III authorizes national courts to follow local rules in connection with 
proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. In addition, the articles of 
the NY Convention do not provide for local rules or procedures to be followed or governed 
by domestic courts when examining the enforcement of awards on their soil. 
Uncertainty in the enforceability of arbitral awards has proven the need for deeper structural 
reforms to the contractual practices currently in place as well as a sustainable dispute 
resolution mechanism for the financial sector within the confines and parameters of the 
existing legal systems. 276 In general, arbitration agreements must meet specific requirements 
of formal and substantive validity.  
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This is especially apparent in the banking industry which began to see a methodical surge in 
systematic moral hazard practices.277  During the financial crisis, millions of bond bearers 
and security buyers across the world ended with worthless investment securities and rigid 
court procedures. Those investors indiscriminately included commercial investment banks, 
retirement funds, governments and semi government institutions. 
Arbitration provisions are governed by specific provisions of arbitration such as arbitration 
laws and international conventions.278 For example, in the UK, these are the Arbitration Act 
(1996) England, NI and Wales, (S.5), the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards, NY 1958 (the NY Convention) Art. II (2), 
the Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the UNCITRAL Model Law) Arts 1-13.  
The applicability of this argument to arbitration is on whether separate consent to arbitrate is 
required for all persons bound by the transaction agreement, whether relational or formal.279 
A party's liability in specific circumstances is determined on the basis of either bad faith or 
on the basis of a duty of care. The investor who needs to have recourse on the SPV that 
created the faulty security should be able to do so through the indirect contractual relation 
they have with the sponsor (bank) of the SPV.280 Such examples exist in the financial sector 
as there are certain traders and financial directors who abuse and who have the incentive to 
game the risk and show evidence of only what is in their own interest.281 The result ultimately 
transpires in the risk taken by investors being much greater than that which was described or 
written in the agreement.282  
According to David Baragwanath,283 existing financial dispute resolution process so far have 
proven inadequate because some court decisions may produce an immense black hole of legal 
uncertainty which crosses state borders. Yet there is no international regime that can 
substantiate it or was able to fully deal with it. 284 This issue is particularly acute in emerging 
markets. In those jurisdictions, few judges with a commercial or financial background are 
appointed. However, many of those judges cannot be expected to understand fully the 
markets involved let alone the contracted banking and financial transactions disputed. 
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Also, ‘The use of arbitration under an ISDA Master Agreement: feedback to members and 
policy options’, a memorandum dated 10 November 2011 prepared by ISDA285 and 
addressed to the ISDA Financial Law Reform Committee and to members of ISDA says that 
uncertainty is not limited only to third world jurisdictions. For instance, the English and US 
courts which generally inspire a relative level of confidence in their ability to resolve 
complicated financial transactions' (CFT's) are not even characterised by uniformity in 
similar cases.286 
Not only have different judges interpreted aspects of contract provisions differently, but also 
several of the parties to some cases have raised a series of different conflicting points and in 
certain instances have successfully put forward sophisticated arguments for various 
interpretations of what the courts have decided.287 The truth is that courts of each state 
jurisdiction can be of very high quality and yet be affected by social, cultural and historical 
factors that their decisions may come out conflicting and reflecting uncertainty on the 
markets. 
For example in the case of DFC v Security Pacific Australia Limited (SecPac)288, the bank 
invoked what was then called “limited two-way payments” (a walkaway clause) in order to 
book substantial amounts as profits under an out-of-the-money swap transaction. It did so in 
the face of an express statement by the statutory managers of DFC, made with the approval 
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of the New Zealand central bank upon DFC being made to meet all of its derivatives 
obligations.  
This case, among others convinced ISDA and regulators that it should be mandatory for 
regulated entities to report their net rather than their gross ISDA Master Agreement 
exposures for risk capital and other purposes. The 1992 ISDA Master Agreement was 
amended accordingly.289 What the markets want is a process that applies more widely in view 
of the expected natural judicial conservatism the uncertainty that may engulf enforcement of 
interbank financial disputes.290 
7. FINANCIAL ARBITRATION  
Arbitration procedures in their current form may not be able to resolve depositors’ and 
investors’ multiparty, multi-claim implications due to their inability to break bilateral 
restraints. Unlike litigation, arbitration derives its substance from contract law due to its 
contractual origins. What might seem as a drawback in the arbitration system, namely its 
inability to resolve all multiparty disputes, including non-signatories to the arbitration 
agreement, is essentially related to the core nature of arbitration.  
Arbitration is a closed dispute resolution system agreed upon by certain parties and for 
resolving disputes arising out of specified bilateral contractual agreements. Parties in 
financial transactions often conclude back-to-back bilateral contracts initiated by the financial 
institution. Further bilateral transactions refer to the same transaction as it develops in its 
nature and transforms into other types of security or financial instrument.  
In fact, these entwined agreements set a network of rights and duties binding parties to each 
other through a chain of bilateral agreements relating to one initial transaction, for example 
mortgage derivatives. 
7.1. PROCEDURES 
Naturally, in situations where consolidation of claims may be relevant, it must be determined 
whether a course of action in arbitration is feasible as well as permissible under the relevant 
legal regime. The essential points that arise in these cases are: 
i) The circumstances and appropriate measures of consolidation of claims 
ii) The legal basis for such consolidations 
These issues are normally not present at the outset when parties agree. Such consolidation 
agreements fall within the doctrine of party autonomy, and courts and tribunals will 
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ordinarily respect such freedom. Thus, the points that arise above are court or tribunal 
ordered substantive or procedural consolidations.   
In a sense, substantive and procedural laws form a balance. Persons who are not party to one 
bilateral agreement in the chain of contracts can nevertheless be strongly associated to the 
transaction one way or another. In principle those parties should be allowed to express their 
case before being excluded or redirected to a different arbitration procedure.  However, once 
the jurisdiction of arbitration authority has been established contractually, procedural law 
takes precedence.  
The jurisdictional aspect of arbitration will then assume a predominant role once a dispute 
arises and arbitration procedures begin. Financial disputes will then have a wider 
jurisdictional sphere of arbitrability and investors with claims of moral hazard and adverse 
selection will be better positioned on agreements involving multiple producers of the same 
transaction. 
7.2. CASES 
Clauses in financial transaction agreements that warrant estoppel on clients are purposely 
placed to stop them from claiming that the transaction in hand resulted from solicitation on 
the part of the bank or any of its representatives.291 The effectiveness of contractual estoppel 
clauses may be challenged only if the contract can be voided for example through claims of 
fraud.292 As an example, US courts have often estopped signatory parties to arbitration 
agreements from initiating court proceedings against “non-signatory” parties, ordering the 
signatories to submit their dispute with the “non-signatories” to arbitration”.293 
The impact of such decisions in the financial sector has given no back-up to disappointed 
investors looking for a method to claim losses resulting from mis-selling by banks and 
financial institutions even if those claimants were also financial institutions or banks. In 
Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino (CRSM) v Barclays Bank,294 the decision 
handed down by the Commercial Court in London, HR Hamblen dismissed a mis-selling 
claim by Banca Di San Marino in relation to the structuring and sale of various structured 
products by Barclays.  
The claim related to a series of CDO-squared notes with a combined par value of EUR 230 
million which were structured by Barclays and sold to CRSM, in 2004 and 2005, and to a 
subsequent restructuring of the transactions.  CRSM brought a claim for misrepresentation 
and, in an amendment shortly before trial, fraud.  All its claims were rejected by the court. 
CRSM’s claim was founded on an assertion that Barclays had emphasised the AAA rating 
awarded to the notes by credit ratings agencies. 
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Such rating implied a low risk of default on the notes which proved later to be false. It was 
also found that the true risk was known to the management of Barclays when the notes were 
solicited to CRSM. Yet, the court held that a statement by the Barclays bank about the AAA 
rating was not a misrepresentation or general abstract statement about risk or probability of 
default, but only a statement about the rating agency’s opinion. 
The court decided not to consider that the representations alleged in relation to default risk 
were made.  Hamblen J. also did not find any inconsistency between a low probability of 
default for AAA rated products derived from historic default levels by rating cohort and more 
credit risk. That was implied in Barclays’ internal financial modelling of the transactions for 
hedging and balance sheet dressing purposes which made use of credit default spreads and 
referred to in the agreement with CRSM. 
Credit spreads were found not to give a reliable indication of “real world” probability of 
default. The judge also dismissed the allegations of fraud, finding that the individuals 
involved at Barclays had reasonable grounds for believing, and believed, what they said 
about the products. 
It was further held that a contractual term in the sales contracts would in any event have 
precluded the claim, with no finding of fraud.  By the term, similar in substance to a 
provision commonly found in transactions governed by ISDA documentation, CRSM 
warranted that it understood and accepted the terms, conditions and risk of purchasing the 
notes and was thus prevented (estopped) from asserting that it was misled as to the risk of the 
CDO papers. 
Findings of contractual estoppel of this nature were also accepted in the English High Court. 
For example in Peekay & Anor v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group (2006) 295 and 
Springwell Navigation v JP Morgan [2010]296 where an investor could not argue that he had 
been persuaded into entering a contract to make an investment by a misrepresentation as to 
the nature of that investment.  
In Springwell, the claimants provided that when the true nature of the transaction had been 
communicated in the final terms and signature processes of the contract, they signed without 
reading. Reasons given by Springwell, which was the investment vehicle for a group of 
shipping companies owned by Adamandios Polemis, were that the entire family had a long-
standing relationship with Chase Manhattan Bank and fully trusted the bank.  At first 
instance, Springwell made two principal claims against Chase in respect of the losses it had 
incurred, alleging that Chase had breached a general advisory duty to Springwell and that 
Chase had misrepresented the risks related to the investments.  
Following a 68-day trial, Mrs Justice Gloster concluded that Chase did not owe a general 
advisory duty to Springwell regarding the appropriateness of its investments and that in any 
event such duty was precluded by the contractual documentation governing their relationship.   
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It was also held that another contractual term, like “non-reliance” clauses found in ISDA 
governed transactions, by which CRSM warranted that it was not relying on any 
communication from Barclays as investment advice or as a recommendation to enter into the 
transactions, did not mean that CRSM was promising that it was not relying on anything that 
Barclays said. This means that the court decided that whether a statement amounts to advice 
or a recommendation depended on the substance of the claim made on a case by case basis.  
These cases signify an emerging pattern demonstrating that it is difficult for investors to 
pursue mis-selling claims against financial institutions in courts especially when parties are of 
equal bargaining strengths as in actions of banks against each other or of sophisticated 
investors against financial institution.297  
There are, however, certain exceptions such as the court’s decision in Cassa Risparmio v. 
Barclays Bank.298 This was an unusual decision in that it concerned allegations that the bank 
had knowledge of a default risk of a structured product. The bank refrained from informing 
the investor that the true risk in the structured security was higher than the rating assigned to 
it by a credit rating agency.  
Despite the above arguments, this exploration of an arbitration process for the speedy 
resolution of banking disputes maintains that a procedural mechanism for efficient and 
speedy proceedings for depositors, investors, interbank and general creditors should be 
established. 
Although arbitration is a private dispute resolution system, it should not remain a closed 
system, exclusively reserved for those parties that are contractually associated. No dispute 
resolution clause will satisfy every segment of the financial services industry. Rather, the 
interaction of all elements of a given financial transaction will determine when and how 
arbitration may (or may not) be appropriate for the resolution of banking and securities 
disputes. 
In most cases, arbitration merits special consideration when assets of a defendant party are 
found in jurisdictions lacking judgment treaties with the probable litigation forum. In other 
cases, it will be appropriate when securities are subject to exchange controls or when debtors 
might file punitive damages or lender liability actions. Arbitration may also be appropriate 
when there may be a need for special expertise, such as in the settlement of documentary 
credit disputes subject to the Uniform Customs and Practices of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. 
Arbitration is a dispute resolution system which in most circumstances is flexible and able to 
communicate between disputing parties in an industry that may genuinely have pending 
interests in the outcome of an ongoing dispute. 
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8. CONTROLLING MORAL HAZARD 
De-rooting moral hazard entirely in the financial sector is an ambitious target that is difficult 
to achieve, at least in the near future and not without major re-structuring to financial markets 
and regulatory processes. This is due to imbedded practices and implanted profit seeking 
culture within the financial sector and bank ventures.299 
Traders and fund managers always have an incentive to “game” the risk management system. 
They respond intelligently to the system in their own interests. They identify the financial 
system’s errors and use them to their benefit. It is their job that they were hired to do. 
For example, financial traders exploit relative pricing imbalances or underestimated risks to 
grab a deal and make their profitable transactions. The result, almost inevitably, is that a 
client of the institution is taking the real risks because traders use depositors’ money. This 
occurs especially when the actual risk is likely to be greater than the risk allowed by the 
regulatory system or internal controls of the institution.  
This suggests that no system can be perfect and there are limits to the extent to which any 
system can feasibly take account of how traders will react to it. These problems point to a 
curious paradox at the heart of modern financial risk management. 
The more sophisticated the system, the more unreliable it might be, as traders invent ways to 
go around it. Increased sophistication means greater complexity and so greater scope for 
error. In turn, less transparency will make errors harder to detect leading to greater 
dependence on assumptions of which any could be wrong. 
The primary reason why people give their money to financial service providers and banks is 
the existing risk arising from information asymmetry. The gap of information between the 
provider of funds and the receiver of those funds is so wide and fast moving.  
A banker is supposed to know more about the sale item than the provider of funds does. The 
tragedy of the financial crisis was that bankers knew of the risk associated with the mortgage 
backed securities, but they did not know the nature or the composition of those securities.  
Likewise, a borrower knows more about his financial condition and his future prospects than 
the lender. The lender does not know for sure that the borrower will not simply disappear 
with the funds. Another possibility is that the borrower will misuse the funds in a high risk 
venture, by using them differently from what he claimed he would do when he asked for the 
loan.  
A company that sells stock may not put the money to its best use. It might be used to pay 
extravagant compensation to its CEO or to pay huge bonuses to bankers who practically 
destroy their company. These examples illustrate the two types of risks that are present when 
there is information asymmetry: 
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- Adverse selection, which is a risk exposure that exists before the money is lent or 
invested 
- After transaction moral hazard, which is the risk traders take without the clients’ 
knowledge after the financial transaction has been concluded 
8.1. ADVERSE SELECTION 
Selecting whom to give more of your money is a very important part of controlling risk. If 
you give it to a crook, you lose your money. If you give it to someone who is not good at 
handling money, you could also lose it. In fact, without information about those seeking 
funds, theory goes that you would have to charge an average price for your money or sale 
item. 
But an average price would cause those who are better risks or have better products to shun 
your offer, while those with higher risks will seek your offer, resulting in adverse selection.  
The discussion of moral hazard referring to banks taking higher risk because of protection 
from failure through depositor protection schemes is of no longer standing. Recent banking 
literature has identified the activities lying behind banking crises, precisely because of the 
moral hazard problem.300  
Moral hazard in this context need not involve active concealment of information. It can be an 
act of inattention on the part of bank customers or poor monitoring by the central bank. It can 
also be an inability of the central bank to prevent increased risk taking due to concealed data 
on the part of the bank. 
The 2007 financial crisis involved all of these things. One example is structured products 
which incorporated securitised loans in an opaque way and concealed the extent of risk 
attached to them. This concealment now appears to have been deliberate on the part of the 
bankers.301 
Yet the products were traded in spite of their make-up, and the lack of clarity as to the likely 
risk attached to their value. Market sentiment was such as to encourage optimism that 
downside risks were low and asset prices would continue their long rise. 
However, because banks themselves trusted the state to provide support to prevent them from 
failing, they took on additional risk, which brought about more closely the prospect of failure. 
Bankers argue that the moral hazard problem can be resolved by removing the state from 
banking altogether. 302  
In that theory, banks would succeed or not on the strength of their portfolios. Customers 
would signal their unhappiness to banks with increased exposure to risk by withdrawing 
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deposits or placing disputes in front of tribunals.303 The market would thus discipline banks, 
which did not behave prudently or misguided their investors.304  
8.2. RESOLVING MORAL HAZARD THROUGH DISPUTES 
Once disputed, banks will be obliged to compensate the injured investor and will see their 
bonuses diminish.305 This proposal falls squarely within the mainstream approach where it is 
presumed that there are objective risk measures, to which everyone in principle has access.  
It is presumed that banks will risk failure only at the micro level as a result of imprudent 
individualistic behaviours. However, it has long been recognized that workers whose wages 
are in the form of bonuses or for whom the pay-out is not linked to the firm's performance 
may have limited incentive to work diligently, particularly when this performance is not 
documented conclusively to any third party.306 
An essential difficulty in controlling such non-diligence is to find a tractable method to deal 
with the incentive compatibility constraints which can capture the strategic behaviour of the 
employee who in turn can carry the constraint up the corporate pyramid of the firm.307 
Incentive compatibility is challenging for at least two reasons:-1- employee’s actions are 
continuous; and 2- assumed constraints turn around directors’ decisions for profit 
optimization problems.308   
Empirical research provided a general methodical solution to solve moral hazard problems 
when output (performance) of the feasor is a continuous random variable.309 That involved 
solving the original problem using a pattern derived from proposed procedural studies. That 
is to say, use constraint compensatory values for rewarding performance. 310  
Researchers acknowledge, however, that the procedure may be difficult unless sufficient 
structural information on the employing firms is known.311 Nevertheless, as the examples in 
those studies illustrate, this may not be an issue. The studies show that moral hazard was 
restrained in cases where compensation was restricted through observation and intervention 
of third parties.312 
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Such intervention can be applied via successful disputes against the firm (employer). Indeed, 
the proposition is helpful in regard to this thesis and the efficacy of a speedy arbitration 
process. The alternate approach is proposed here for an instant payment of arbitral awards in 
banking disputes, which will bring the required constraint on compensatory rewards. 
There will be no risk of systemic crisis, whereby if one bank is in trouble it is reasonable to 
doubt other banks will follow. This stems from the socioeconomic belief that societies will 
accept the liabilities of banks if blame is clear and compensation is swift.313 
8.3. MINIMISING ADVERSE SELECTION  
The risks of adverse selection and moral hazard make direct financing expensive, especially 
for small firms, since people are not willing to lend to or invest in unknown entities. With 
their expertise in gathering reliable information at reduced cost, financial intermediaries can 
extend financing to many firms or individuals who would otherwise not get it. 
The cure for information asymmetry is in providing accurate and timely information to 
potential buyers. The best predictor of future creditworthiness is past performance and 
creditworthiness. Checking the history of the fund receiver reduces adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Requiring collateral can also reduce information asymmetry risks. Collateral 
reduces adverse selection by requiring a specific value of collateral, such as a 20% down 
payment on a house, for instance. 
Collateral also lowers moral hazard risk because the borrowers stand to lose their collateral if 
they do not make the required payments. Requiring a minimum asset net-worth will reduce 
adverse selection. The reason is that only those individuals or businesses with sufficient 
assets over liabilities can be considered for a loan. Moral hazard will then be reduced because 
the borrower can be sued if they fail to make timely payments on their loans. 
8.4. PRE-MEDITATED MORAL HAZARD  
Banks created and spread credit derivatives such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS), through 
which they could buy protection against the credit risks of their loan portfolios. They also 
resorted to so-called “structured products”, instruments which result from the combination of 
credit bonds, debentures, bonuses, negotiable bonds, mortgages, credit card debts, etc. and 
the set of financial derivatives, which include futures, swaps, options and credit derivatives.  
At a later moment, these banks started issuing “synthetic” versions of these instruments, 
backed by credit derivatives and not by the loans granted. Unable to raise resources from 
depositors, financial intermediaries resorted to the capital market, mainly by issuing 
commercial papers bought by money market mutual funds. 
SIVs could not create money by granting credit directly as they were not banks. Therefore, 
they made use of short-term resources to assume the counterparty of the banks’ operations. 
Banks began through their fully owned funds selling securities on the derivatives market, and 
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then selling protection against credit risks through options. They thus came to participate in 
the credit market by raising short-term resources to fund long-term credit.314 
Besides the losses in their credit portfolios, new problems arose from the repeated drops in 
the quotation of papers, bringing to light alleged misdeeds which had remained unnoticed 
during the banking profits euphoria. At times of low liquidity and high losses, investigations 
of the SEC made many banks cut deals of dozens of billions of dollars. The case involved 
papers called auction rate securities (ARS), long-term debt instruments whose interests were 
established at auction. Banks were accused of luring their clients into selling them as 
extremely safe assets, even when their market had ceased to exist. Until August 14th, 2008, 
some banks such as Citigroup, UBS, Merrill Lynch and others, had committed themselves to 
repurchasing US$ 43 billion in ARSs, whereas others had to follow the same path, laying 
additional pressure on their capital reserves.315 
9. CONCLUSION 
There is certainly scope for misfeasance in the financial sector, as elsewhere. But the analysis 
suggests that this goes much further than the conventional understanding of moral hazard. 
While institutional behaviour should arise from successful social conventions, structured and 
thus both enabled and constrained, by a sound institutional environment, actions of moral 
hazard does not depart clearly from the mainstream view of self-interest behaviour. 
From the regulatory perspective, full knowledge of risk is impossible for buyers and sellers of 
securities. Because in an open system objective risk cannot be measured, what bankers are 
concealing can be legally construed not to be true knowledge of risk. Each party may 
estimate risk, but each will regard that estimate with some degree of confidence. There is 
certainly scope for immoral behaviour in the financial sector, as elsewhere. But the analysis 
suggests that this goes much further than the conventional understanding of moral hazard. 
Moral behaviour arises from successful social conventions, structured and thus both enabled 
and constrained, by a sound institutional environment. 
This means that the knowledge the banker may be holding back from the buyer falls short of 
absolute certainty of the true risk. Bankers may conceal information, and depositors may 
accordingly find it more difficult to assess risk.  
Ultimately, since neither party can have full understanding of the future path of the 
conditions under which the security formula and transaction contracts are made, the 
investor’s reliance on his banker is built on trust. The investor trusts the banker not to 
intentionally take the investor’s money into additional risk, which would break the 
understanding on which the trust is built.  
                                                 
314
 Borio C., “The Financial Turmoil of 2007- A Preliminary Assessment and Some Policy Considerations”, BIS 
Working Papers, n. 251, Basle, BIS, March 2008. DOI : 10.2139/ssrn.1132776 
315




Mainstream theories analyse trust effectively as the exercise of rational self-interest. The 
open-systems approach analyses it in terms of conventional understandings about the exercise 
of agency. Moral hazard is the danger that these understandings break down, eroding trust.316 
Actions of moral hazard involve increased risk taking: “if I can take risks that you have to 
bear, then I may as well take them. However, if I have to bear the consequences of my own 
risky actions, I will act more responsibly.”  
Thus, inadequate control of moral hazards often leads to socially excessive risk-taking, and 
excessive risk-taking was certainly a recurring theme in the last financial crisis. No other 
industry but finance has a compatible talent for privatising gains and socialising losses.317 
The growth of modern financial instruments such as mortgage backed securities (MBS) and 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), gave lending institutions such as banks and insurance 
companies the extra incentive to make various types of loans available to borrowers. As the 
risks associated with those loans (mortgages, credit cards, car loans, etc.) were passed 
through to the investors via the financial instruments, it became easier for individuals in the 
society to obtain loans and satisfy their dreams. 
The fast expansion and high yield of those instruments in the markets also made it possible 
for investors all over the world to buy into the US housing and consumer markets. When the 
housing market collapsed in the US, major financial institutions around the world suffered 
large losses due to their investments in the subprime MBS.318 The vicious circle of 
foreclosures and falling house prices in the US started to spread to other parts of the world 
economy as the deflationary effect of drying credit began.  
Investors were willing to go along with these generous terms because the funds had generated 
good returns for many years. These remuneration packages prompted an exodus of talent 
(real or imaginary) from the banks into the funds, and the banks responded by adopting 
similar practices themselves.  
Fund managers and bankers then took much greater risks than they would have had if their 
own money was at stake. However, with none of their own money on the line and the 
potential to generate colossal bonuses, many bankers were seemingly seduced by their own 
propaganda. They believed that structured finance was revolutionary financial technology for 
transforming poor quality loans into high quality investments.  
Bankers in private equity partnerships and hedge funds were induced by their own 
institutions. They were promised high bonus remuneration systems and no personal risk.  
Those bonuses once paid, they were not recoverable except through court orders.  
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This absence of any deferred compensation gives fund managers an incentive to focus only 
on the period to their next bonus. If the fund makes losses later, then that is not their concern 
(or, of course, their fault). The absence of deferred remuneration thus institutionalises short-
termism and undermines the incentive to take a more responsible longer-term view. 
Yet the subprime scandal and the greed game are merely illustrative of a much broader and 
deeper problem. Namely, that moral hazard in the financial sector has simply been out of 
control.  
Creating value is the principal practice of financial institutions, including structured finance, 
alternative risk transfer etc. However, practices of huge leverages, aggressive accounting and 
dodgy credit ratings have enabled large banks and financial services providers to extract 
value from the market on a massive scale. Such actions have occurred while those banks were 
unconstrained by either risk management ethics or by corporate governance and financial 




      CHAPTER FOUR 
REGULATORY LIMITATIONS IN FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE 
The research in Chapter Four follows on from the previous chapters leading to the conclusion 
that if investors would have at least disputed successfully the methods their funds were 
directed by bankers, the picture would have been different in 2008. 
A debating point is whether mass failures of regulated financial institutions can be construed 
as a failure of regulations or just a failure in the functioning of regulatory tools. Critics and 
academics point out the general characterisation of moral hazard in the financial sector. 
Empirical research shows that moral hazard emerges when regulators err.319 
In this chapter, the focus is on the development of disciplinary regulations on banks 
worldwide which was substantially reduced and replaced by poorly designed and mispriced 
safety nets for depositors. The changes in regulations in favour of financial service providers 
explains the classical increase in acts of moral hazard behaviour by bankers as public 
taxpayers' money was used to fend the fall of such banks. 320  
The chapter explores foundational normative questions about how to conceptualize justice in 
relation to financial markets. The findings are then related to state bias in the legal 
frameworks of financial markets that produced unjust outcomes post crisis.  
Financial markets should function within perspectives of social objectives. Public funds 
replaced private shareholders' capital as the shield against failure and depositors’ panic. In 
effect, banks were encouraged and found it a chance to increase their profits by getting into 
excessive risk exposure using depositors’ funds. As a result, the assets to liability ratio 
decreased on banks’ balance sheets while they increased their high-risk portfolios reducing 
with it the banks’ capital ratios. Regulatory authorities erred when they decided to ignore the 
clear signs of high-risk transactions. 
1. GOVERNANCE, ARBITRATION AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION 
Many official working groups and academic studies have analysed the causes and policy 
responses to financial crises and banks’ failures transversely across mature economy 
countries.321One interesting recent proposal, by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2012)322 
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established a forum of independent experts to identify flaws in banking system regulation and 
supervision. They then drew their findings on threats to banking stability to the attention of 
the public and regulatory authorities.  
Their approach is to offer, through mutual monitoring by members of society, both individual 
and corporate, a means of establishing a credible and informed process that can voice 
concerns for improved regulation and supervision of banks.323 Well-functioning financial 
markets are crucial for economic well-being and contemporary justice in societies. The great 
financial crisis has shown a disappointment perspective of social trust in the self-regulating 
banking industry and the limitation of financial regulators.324 This is the trust granted by the 
public who cannot capture what is at stake in regulating financial markets.  
The damage done by the great financial crisis, including its distributive consequences, raises 
serious questions about the justice of financial markets as we know them.325 This chapter 
brings together research on legal theory, law, and economics in order to explore the relation 
between justice and financial markets, broadening the perspective from a purely economic 
one to a liberal egalitarian one.  
The financial crisis brought about proposals that were introduced in different jurisdictions on 
how the structures of financial markets could be reformed. However, analysis of why reform 
is not happening at the speed that would be desirable from a perspective of justice are 
producing proof that financial regulatory authorities have a lot to answer for.  
1.1. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
The concept of “governance of financial institutions” is often associated inaccurately with 
“corporate governance”.326  There is a difference between shareholders’ privilege to govern 
their corporate rights and governance of financial institutions to protect investors’ rights 
through the regulating of prudential conduct in banking and financial business.  
The clearest example was the failure of Lehman Brothers in the US which in turn was a direct 
cause of the chain reaction leading to the financial crisis. Shareholders of Lehman Brothers 
were the first to bear the losses when the bank declared bankruptcy. Reasons leading to such 
failure may indeed have been due to poor corporate governance on the part of the 
shareholders of Lehman. Nevertheless, governance of the financial sector or the lack of it has 
been the major contributor to the contagiousness of failure to other institutions and the 
resulting global financial crisis. 
Regulatory governance of financial institutions should in theory influence the activities and 
efficiency of institutions at the corporate level. As a result, the effectiveness of a nation’s 
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financial system further shapes economic performance locally and at the international level. 
Regulatory governance of banks, financial intermediaries and non-bank financial 
intermediaries is different from the standard corporate governance.  
This chapter will explain the complexity and limitations of international financial regulations 
versus the adequacy, flexibility and speed arbitration tribunals can offer. It will explain why 
financial rules and regulations are not sufficient alone to deter bankers and their firms from 
embedded moral hazard activities. The key lesson is that corporate governance may have 
been at fault at the time of the crisis and it is essential to point out the deficiencies in the 
regulatory framework that allowed the pre-failure and pre-crisis activities to exist and 
continue. Governance of the financial sector bears the major part of the responsibility in 
regulating the entire industry where failure of self-governing by banks from within follows 
naturally. Aspects of the limits in supervisory and regulatory networks were apparent in 
allowing extremely rapid and uncontrolled growth in complicated, overly rated and little 
understood high risk structured securities. 
Despite various theories of the regulatory governance of financial institutions, there are 
special problems facing actual governance of banks and financial intermediaries. Financial 
intermediaries and banks in particular have special attributes that intensify those governance 
problems. Moreover, pervasive government involvement, past and present, can create 
additional impediments to effective corporate control over the financial sector in general.  
This chapter combines theoretical perspectives with international observations to arrive at 
solutions to regulatory governance problems in the financial sector particularly in banks and 
financial intermediary industries. Those solutions demand special consideration geared 
towards retributive methods against banks and their corporate executives in the form of direct 
clients’ compensation and damages for the loss of income. 
1.2. GOVERNING THROUGH DISPUTE  
“Agency theory” defines corporate governance problems in terms of how the interest of 
shareholders may conflict with public interest. Equity holders may act passively towards the 
actions of their directors or positively by influencing them to act in the interests of the owners 
of capital rather than the general good of the economy. Banks and financial intermediaries 
may allocate, with the blessing of their shareholders, high stake incentives to induce their 
own fund managers to behave in ways that favour the profitability of the institution. 
At the same time, those managers may behave in a way that hurts the interests of the public 
and the nation's overall financial system. The shareholders will be satisfied if the profitability 
of the institution mounts and they will act passively towards the methods the directors use to 
attain such profits. Consequently, relying on standard corporate governance by shareholders 
alone may not yield the same effect as the governance through dispute approach. This 
approach will focus on the mass role of the investor clients’ base for every bank to shadow 
and observe the activities of their bankers.  
The actions of bankers will be scrutinised by their clients who will be given the ability to 
utilise arbitration to claim restitution in a speedy process. Successfully disputed matters can 
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reveal or raise an alarm, bringing the attention of the regulatory authorities to riskier actions 
that could be happening within the bank that would not have been disclosed until too late. 
The chapter examines literature reviews such as Claessens (2001) which were built on 
empirical analysis with data on 687 corporations from eight crisis countries. Claessens’ 
research investigated regulatory policies including: 327 
1- Liquidity support in cases of a run on financial institutions 
2- Liability guarantees to creditors during early phases of a crisis 
3- Establishing asset management entities for restructuring or resolving troubled banks 
The studies found that a package of these measures can facilitate effective containment and 
quicker recovery of the corporate sector from a crisis and assist the sustainability of the other 
sectors in the economy. Nevertheless, the study does not effectively address the core problem 
which triggers bank runs: namely, panic and fear for loss of funds. Claessens does not 
address unresolved restitution claims by investor clients.328 
1.3. PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
There are many different types of compensatory damages but, broadly speaking, they are 
broken down into general or special damages. Compensatory damages seek to reimburse or 
compensate an injured party for the harm they have suffered, and these kinds of damages are 
available in almost all injury cases, including auto accident, medical malpractice, and slip and 
fall cases. Compensatory damages are also awarded in wrongful death cases, but the damages 
available in these cases are often unique and not typically found elsewhere. Punitive 
damages, on the other hand, are only awarded in a small number of cases. Punitive reliefs are 
in no way tied to the type of harm that has been suffered but are awarded to punish the 
wrongdoer for certain types of behaviour. Both punitive and compensatory damages are 
awarded directly to the injured party or plaintiff. 
In the United States, the Restatement on Contract329 expressly provides for the availability of 
punitive damages when the breach of contract also constitutes an ‘independent’ tort. In 
addition, under the so-called Indiana decisions, punitive relief may also be awarded where the 
breach in question does not amount to an independent tort, but was fraudulent, malicious, 
grossly negligent or oppressive. Punitive damages for breach of contract are also awarded in 
Canada, though apparently to a more limited extent.  
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Subject to a limited number of exceptions, punitive damages are only recognized in common 
law countries. They are notably awarded by the courts of the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zeeland.330 However, as some comparative studies have pointed out, the 
circumstances in which punitive relief is available and the magnitude of punitive damages 
awards vary greatly from one jurisdiction to another. In the UK, the availability of punitive 
relief is a question of law, while in the US, punitive damages are subject to state laws with a 
significant majority of states authorizing awards for punitive damages.331 In civil law 
jurisdictions, punitive damages are generally not available. Hence, under French and German 
law, for example, courts do not grant punitive relief.332 
Arbitration laws on the other hand do not generally address the question of whether 
arbitrators may award punitive relief. As a general rule, they do not even deal with the more 
general question of the available remedies. For example, there are no sections on punitive 
damages or relief contained in the UNCITRAL Model Law, the French Code de Procédure 
Civile, the US Federal Arbitration Act, the German Arbitration Act and the Swiss Private 
International Law Statute (PILS). Hence, in general arbitration laws do not specifically 
contain provisions regarding the arbitrators’ ability to order specific performance on punitive 
relief. 
As a general rule, international commercial arbitration involves disputes based on contracts. 
In fact, the referral of an international commercial dispute to arbitration is based on a 
contractual clause providing for arbitration of disputes arising in connection with the parties’ 
transactional dispute. Hence, the availability of punitive damages in international commercial 
arbitration depends on whether, under the applicable law(s), such damages are available for 
breach of contract cases.333 Most arbitral tribunals as a result will consider that a punitive 
arbitral award may contravene the substantive public policy of the seat and thus be annulled 
by the courts of that seat. As a result, arbitral tribunals may refuse to award punitive relief 
even though it may be available under the lex contractus.334 
2. LIMITATIONS IN FINANCIAL REGULATORY RULES 
Regulations and regulatory authority were able to ban bankers and financial managers for life 
and fine them penalties that may amount to a fraction of the profits they accumulated through 
mis-selling and misrepresentation. But in almost all cases researched, none of the institutions 
found blameable by regulatory authorities were ordered to pay compensation to any of the 
injured parties. Claimants were left to claim damages before courts for whatever length of 
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time and expense it may take. These conduct rules are regulatory requirements which entail 
fines, disqualifications and criminal liabilities.335 
Many cases are now still being litigated that may not be directly related to the 'credit-crunch' 
or the 'global financial crisis', However, those cases may have nevertheless been given added 
stimulus by the general public demanding that banks are to be held to account in an 
unprecedented way for their actions. Banks have had to address claims for mis-selling 
financial products, claims from their own disgruntled employees for unpaid bonuses, and now 
claims arising from the LIBOR-fixing scandal. 
A key development has been a rush by regulators to toughen up enforcement activity, leading 
to a focus on investigatory work rather than retaliatory monetary compensations. That said, as 
with what happened in the LIBOR manipulation case, regulatory interference triggered 
retribution litigation that ended with nominal penalty settlements. Such scandals may yet give 
rise to further litigation, if regulatory investigations into Barclays' 2008 capital raising prove 
to be justified; or vice versa in relation to claims brought against Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS) arising from the prospectus for its 2008 rights issue. 
2.1. CLAIMS AGAINST DISTRESSED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
An expected upsurge in litigation against directors of loss-making banks has not turned out to 
be the case. The Court of Appeal's rejection of the Northern Rock shareholders' appeal, 
grounded in human rights law rather in insolvency law or on company law principles, in SRM 
Global Master Fund LP v Commissioners of HM Treasury [2009] highlighted the weak 
position of shareholders of banks which failed during the financial crisis.336 
The current plight of the Co-Operative Bank illustrates that more financial institutions may 
find themselves in distressed circumstances. How the Co-Operative Bank responds to its 
problems will be informed by recent cases: in Assenagon Asset Management v Irish Bank,337a 
"bail-in" re-structuring was disrupted when the English High Court held that the necessary 
resolution was not validly passed, as the requirement for the "exit consent" from participating 
note holders for the exchange of their notes to be replaced with a reduced value note, was 
unlawful and represented "coercive threat". Following this case it seems highly unlikely that 
the Co-Op will launch an offer on similarly aggressive terms.  
However, Azevedo v Importacao Exportaacao,338 points the way to an alternative approach of 
incentivising consent to a bail-in. The court found it was lawful for a company to offer the 
"carrot" of an additional payment to bondholders who vote in favour of an amendment where 
that additional payment is not made to those who do not vote, or vote against the change. 
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2.2. CLAIMS AGAINST BANKS  
Typical mis-selling claims involve an unsuitable product recommended by the bank, where 
risk or break clauses were not adequately explained, or the presentation of the product was 
misleading. Claims are for breach of statutory duty, negligent advice and misrepresentation. 
Typical mis-selling defences are that the product was suitable, there were no advisory 
relationships on the facts, and that there has been a contractual estoppel precluding any claim. 
Many cases in England concern the validity and scope of clauses in the agreement that 
protect the banks from claims in tort, especially from misrepresentation. The Court of Appeal 
in Springwell Navigation v JP Morgan339 upheld and enforced the principle of contractual 
estoppel arising from exclusion clauses to thwart claims for misrepresentation. 
A further blow to investors was struck in Euroption Strategic Fund v Skandanivaviska 
Enskilda Banken.340 The claimant argued that the bank had negligently delayed the close-out 
and conducted it incompetently. The court held that the bank had not delayed but in any event 
it owed no Tortious duty of care to the claimant. Imposing such a duty would expand the law 
of negligence into a new context, namely, loss of investment opportunities. The claimant also 
unsuccessfully argued that there was an implied term of the mandate that the bank would 
conduct the close-out using reasonable care and to a suitably professional standard. The court 
held that it was not necessary to imply such a term to give business efficacy to the contract. 
The court also held that although the mandate was a contract for the supply of services with 
the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, the implied term in “s.13” of that Act only 
applied to services contemplated by the mandate and closing out of the portfolio was not a 
service that the bank had agreed to carry out under the mandate. 
More recently the balance has shifted against the banks: the decision in Rubenstein v HSBC341 
suggests that financial advisors will be kept to an increasingly high standard. The Court of 
Appeal found that it is reasonably foreseeable that if a financial advisor misleads a client as to 
the nature of its recommended investment and puts its client into an investment which is 
unsuitable when they could have just as easily put the client into something that was more 
suitable, then the financial advisor could be liable for loss resulting from the investment. In 
circumstances where the financial adviser is not only obliged to avoid injuring his client but 
also to protect him from the particular loss which has come about, the scope of the adviser's 
duty may extend to even unusual events, which will not be considered too remote. 
However, the court's decision in Camerata Property v Credit Suisse (Europe) 342 can be 
contrasted to the decision in Rubenstein. In Camarata, losses incurred on a Lehman Brothers' 
note were unrecoverable, as the collapse of Lehman Brothers was held to be unforeseeable. 
The difference between the cases may, as ever, be on the facts: in Camerata, the claimant had 
invested in increasingly adventurous investments over time and was viewed as a 
knowledgeable and experienced investor, by contrast to Mr Rubenstein who wasn't and who 
had asked for specific assurances in relation to the particular risk which led to his loss. 
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2.3. INTEREST RATE SWAP LITIGATION 
One category of investor claims has been in relation to alleged mis-selling of interest rate 
swap agreements. In Green v RBS Plc,343 the court dismissed a claim for negligent 
misstatement and breach of duty to give suitable advice, in relation to the sale of an interest 
rate swap agreement. However, until Green v RBS there had been no reported decisions of the 
English Court on this issue, possibly because cases may have settled before reaching trial. 
Notwithstanding the court's decision in Green, there is likely to be further litigation of 
interest swap agreements, particularly as the outcome of reviews the FSA (now FCA) has 
ordered several banks to carry out into their selling of such products becomes clear. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Financial Ombudsman Service noted in their 
2012/2013 review that they had received 258 complaints from businesses about interest rate 
hedging products sold by banks, but could not deal with most of these as they were from non-
eligible businesses. 
2.4. ALLEGATIONS IN ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT  
There have also been a number of cases arising from uncertainty in the correct interpretation 
of provisions in ISDA Master Agreements, for example, in disputes arising from the 
unilateral close-out of trading accounts or loan facilities. The current provision in the ISDA 
Master Agreement for disputes to be dealt with under the jurisdiction of the English courts or 
the New York Court has given rise to the recent litigation in England. The ISDA Law Reform 
Committee has discussed the possibility of inserting an arbitration clause into the next 
iteration of the ISDA Master Agreement. 
In Lehman v Metavante, for example, it was held that reliance on s. 2(a) (iii) of the ISDA 
Agreement344 and failure to terminate within a reasonable period resulted in loss of the safe 
harbour, which only applies to the right to terminate and close-out.345 
Whether arbitration will be adopted remains to be seen. The same might also be said about 
the P.R.I.M.E. finance arbitration initiative in The Hague. As decisions have been made, the 
scope for disagreement over provisions in the 1992 and 2002 ISDA Master Agreements has 
been reduced. For example, in Lomas v JFB [2012]346, the conjoined appeal of a number of 
claims relating to the close-out and valuation provisions in the 1992 ISDA Master 
Agreement, has provided important clarification for market participants.347 
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2.5. THE LIBOR MANIPULATION CASE  
In June 2012 the LIBOR-fixing scandal broke when it was announced that Barclays had 
agreed to pay around $453 million to regulators in the US and UK to settle charges that its 
conduct had resulted in the manipulation of LBOR. Subsequently UBS and RBS have had to 
pay huge fines as well. The fixing of LIBOR, relied on in thousands of contracts for financial 
products, has raised the prospect of further regulatory action against other banks, in particular 
HSBC, Deutsche Bank and Societe Generale. The charges include criminal prosecutions, 
class-action suits in the USA and even cartel action by the European and other jurisdictions 
(for example, in Singapore). 
In Graiseley Properties Ltd v Barclays Bank plc [2012]348, the High Court allowed an interim 
application by the claimant to amend its claim for the mis-selling of interest rate swaps in 
order to plead alleged implied misrepresentations and breach of implied terms concerning the 
alleged manipulation of LIBOR in the bank's favour. While the court permitted the 
amendments on the basis that they were arguable, the claimant will face significant 
challenges to make good the claim, particularly in proving causation. 
The Graisley Properties Ltd case can already be contrasted to the court's ruling in Deutsche 
Bank v Unitech Global 349, rejecting the defendant's application to amend their defence and 
counter-claim to claim that Deutsche Bank had made LIBOR related misrepresentations 
which had induced the defendant to enter into an interest rate swap agreement and associated 
credit agreement, and that in making these misrepresentations Deutsche Bank had given an 
implied warranty that the representations were true, on the basis that the amended claims had 
no reasonable prospect of success. The court acknowledged that its decision ran counter to 
that in Graisley Properties Ltd but said each case must be decided on its merits. 
Permission has been granted for appeals of both decisions, raising the prospect of the Court 
of Appeal reconciling the position in the two cases and providing a more definitive statement 
of the position to be adopted by the courts in considering claims arising from LIBOR 
manipulation. In any event, how the cases develop will continue to be watched closely; 
whether, or not, other investors launch LIBOR-related claims is likely to be informed by what 
happens next. 
2.6. CASES AND RETALIATION  
As provided above, the global financial crisis of 2008 was a crisis largely of human making. 
It was also a financial institutions governance crisis. Internal imbalances proved just as 
significant as the other triggers to the financial turmoil and the events that happened sparked 
a fresh round of deliberation about the most likely deficiencies in governance of financial 
intermediaries. The roots of the crisis predominantly lay in unsupervised inadequate bank 
capital, highly leveraged hedge funds, subprime mortgage securities and reckless loans. For 
years there were low interest rates, weak government enforcement efforts, minimal 
government interference and deregulations. 
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The collapse of Northern Rock in the UK, Lehman Brothers in the US and other banks 
occurred because the financial risk generated by the US subprime mortgage lending was 
being directed and reused across the world through shadow banking structures. With 
hindsight, the credit-rating agencies failed terribly in the performance of their duties. 
Financial derivative products were so complex and non-transparent that even those who 
created them were unable to understand what they meant, and too much legal manipulation 
was used in order to lay blame on investors’ apparent sophistication. There were profound 
failures of the regulatory policy and inadequate transparency.  
These ingredients came together to trigger a financial crisis of global proportions. Certainly, 
the question of how far poor regulatory governance of financial institutions led to a crisis is 
still a controversial topic to date. An immeasurable number of ‘wrongdoers’ have been 
identified as contributors to the global financial crisis and there are more reasons now to 
address the key elements which contributed to it. 
Those reasons lay mostly in weak regulatory governance, absence of rapid restitution 
methods against offenders, profit driven executives, greedy and inattentive bank shareholders 
and unsuitable remuneration structures. Financial intermediaries lacked understanding of the 
technical strategies of the financial products they were selling and showed no ethical 
standards when they pushed those products onto their clients.  
Shareholders appeared unable to scrutinise and monitor their company boards. They accepted 
all transactions they believed to be leading to higher profits for their shares and holdings. 
They gave low priority to governance issues, thereby encouraging the risk-taking that 
eventually proved fatal for many institutions including their very own.  
In addition, there were clear and unquestionable failures of the system of regulatory 
governance. There were no regulatory rules on the quality and quantity of executive pay. 
There was no interest in the accountability and personal qualifications of those who managed 
financial firms when they were hired, for assessment of possible legal liabilities. Mostly, 
there was no emphasis on recourse methods, particularly on the potential monitoring and 
supervisory role institutional investors can play or resort to, apart from litigation.  
However, if investors can confront the issues through an arbitration process that in theory 
should not take longer than a few days; this can help redress the balance in governance of 
financial institutions. At the very least, such individualistic action can identify deficiencies 
such as those that lead to the crisis. Even if such actions are taken in a pre-calamity epoch of 
any major crisis, it will constitute an indirect form of collective governance by investors.  
With a focus on the position in the United Kingdom and US, the issues underlying 
governance of moral hazard activities rationalisations and conceptions through individuals 
disputing actions will contribute productively and effectively to the ongoing worldwide 
efforts for effective regulatory authority governance of financial institutions.  
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The following are examples of litigated cases where financial intermediaries were able to get 
away with penalties. Investors had no recourse other than courts with long delays and 
expense:  
 Swinton Group Ltd director was indicted for predatory mis-selling. The institution 
and the directors were fined a total of £928,000.350 
 
 Michael Lee Thommes v FSA351 is another case involving a small size investment firm 
with sole directorship carrying on the business of mortgage brokerage. The director 
was indicted for fraud in accepting and filing incorrect details on mortgage applicants 
as well as assisting applicants in misleading lending institutions. The firm and its 
director were fined, and the director was banned for life from “performing a 
controlled function” in the financial services industry. The FSA issued a decision 
notice to Mr. Thommes in July 2011, outlining its intention to prohibit him from 
performing any controlled functions.  
Mr Thommes was the managing director of General Finance Centre Limited and the 
FSA found that he failed to adequately supervise and oversee the general conduct of 
the firm. He did not establish and maintain adequate systems and controls to prevent 
financial crime. He also did not understand his responsibilities associated with 
regulated mortgage business as an approved executive, especially his responsibilities 
as a director holding a controlled function. The matter was referred to the Tribunal, 
which concluded Mr Thommes should be prohibited. The Tribunal decision was 
issued in December 2012 and the Final Notice was issued by the FSA in January 
2013. 
 Martin Currie Investment Management Limited and Martin Currie Inc.352 
The FSA in May 2012 imposed a financial penalty of £3.5 million on Martin Currie 
Investment Management Limited and Martin Currie Inc. (together "Martin Currie") 
for systems and controls failures relating to the identification and handling of conflicts 
of interest. A parallel action was taken by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") in relation to the same conduct which imposed a financial 
penalty of $8.3 million. Both sets of regulatory actions relate to an investment by one 
client of approximately £15 million in an unlisted bond issued by an offshore Chinese 
firm managed by Martin Currie's Shanghai office. The FSA and the SEC found that 
the investment loss incurred by the client had significant advantages for another client 
of the same company.  
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 On 9th February 2012, the FSA fined Donald McKee Morgan £335,204 and banned 
him from performing any functions in relation to regulated financial activities. The 
FSA found that fraud had been committed between approximately 2005 and 2010 
through the deliberate retention by Mr Morgan of premium payments which should 
have been paid to insurers by his firm. It was found that his conduct in doing so and 
falsifying documents breached Principle 1 (integrity) of APER. The financial penalty 
was composed of a punitive element of £112,700 (reduced by 30 per cent as Mr 
Morgan agreed to settle at stage one of the FSA's executive settlement procedures) 
and disgorgement of financial benefit of £222,504.353 
 
 Lack of due diligence and skill were used against Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) 
where on 12th September 2012 the FSA fined Halifax and its director Peter Cummings 
£500,000.  
Mr Cummings was Chief Executive of the Corporate Division of Bank of Scotland 
plc between January 2006 and January 2009. The FSA took action against him for 
breaches of Principle 6 of APER (due skill, care and diligence in managing the 
business of the firm for which he was responsible in his controlled function) and for 
being knowingly concerned in a breach by the firm of Principle 3 (management and 
control) of the principles for Businesses ("the Principles") during that time between 
January 2006 and December 2008.  
Cummings was banned for life from performing any significant influence function in 
any bank, building society, investment firm or insurer. He was also banned from 
holding any senior position in any UK authorised firm. However, Mr Cummings is 
now a senior director of a French Bank operating offshore. 
The FSA based its action on the aggressive growth strategy pursued by the firm under 
Mr Cummings' direction. In its notes, there was no mention of mis-selling or 
misleading investor clients. The FSA acknowledged clearly that Cummings did not 
act deliberately or recklessly and found that he should have been aware of serious 
deficiencies in Halifax’s systems and assessment controls of internal departments. 
The FSA found that he should have acted to remediate those deficiencies and pursue a 
less aggressive strategy. 354 
It is worth noting that the FSA had previously acted against three individual former 
executives of Northern Rock (Messrs Baker, Barclay and Jones in 2010). However, 
this was the first occasion on which it had acted against an individual for conduct 
directly connected with the financial crisis. That fine in 2012, constituted the highest 
fine that the FSA had ever imposed on a senior executive for management failings. 355 
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 By the same token in the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has 
charged 112 entities and individuals with misconduct relating to the financial crisis. 
Of those charged, 55 were Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial Officers and 
other senior executives of financial institutions. The SEC imposed penalties, 
disgorgement and other monetary relief of over $2.2 billion. 
 Post Crisis, the deterrence objective was clear in a fine of £3.345 million imposed by 
the FSA on Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company (Europe) Limited ("MSIE") for 
failures in corporate governance between 2009 and March 2011. The FSA fined 
Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company (Europe) Limited ("MSIE") for failures 
relating to its expansion into non-Japanese markets between October 2009 and March 
2011. It also fined its executive chairman Mr Yohichi Kumagai £119,303 and banned 
him from performing any significant influence-controlled function in the financial 
industry. 
Both fines were reduced by 30% as MSIE and Mr Kumagai settled at stage one of the 
FSA's executive settlement procedures. The FSA also imposed a fine of £119,303 on 
the Executive Chairman of Mitsui Sumitomo and banned him from performing any 
significant influence or control function. 
The APER personal liability for directors and senior management became an effective 
strategy in regulating directors and senior executives in financial institutions. However, these 
changes did not take place until 2013 in the wake of public discontent. That’s when 
legislators and regulators felt compelled to introduce enhanced personal liability for bank 
senior managers with wide-scale enforcements.356 
The Act (Financial Services Banking Reform 2013) adopted much of the Parliamentary 
Commission recommendations and provided for senior persons to be subject to enforcement 
for misconduct in cases where such a person “contravenes” the conduct rules applicable to 
them or to the financial institution they belong to. Nevertheless, the Act did not specifically 
define “Senior Persons” to whom specific liabilities would be attached and by whose 
authority.357 
In all the above cases and all the regulations, those held responsible were subjected to bigger 
liabilities as compared with other employees. They were also found liable for the firm’s 
failure in following regulatory requirements in all aspects that may fall within the general 
activity of the department or area of that person. 
However, in all of the above decisions, there is no process for compensation or indemnity for 
the wronged party. Directors have been banned for life and fined penalties that may amount 
to a fraction of the profits their firms have gained through misrepresentation. They directors 
and/or their firms were not ordered to pay back indemnities or damages to investors who lost 
their fortune. Claimants were left to seek justice in courts and for whatever length of time and 
expense it may take. 
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The best comment here is to use Paula Patrik’s quotation: “What matters if I pay a scrap fine 
and retire as a millionaire?”358  
Collaboration between regulatory authorities and individual actions by investors can achieve 
the systemic stability yearned for by governments to align financial services and bank 
executives in line with pre-set rules and regulations.359 Such collaboration can only occur 
within a process where investors, whether public or corporate believe that they can dispute 
the actions of their bankers with success because they know they can rely on an effective 
process for claims and compensation. Raising disputes will create an independent monitoring 
tool that will aid regulatory authorities to shorten the gap left by attrition in penalising those 
who are responsible and equally compensating the aggrieved. 360 
The role of regulators is pivotal in policing financial services firms. Laws and regulations 
along with the quality of their enforcement by regulators are essential elements of the 
governance of financial markets. Statutory regulations set bounds on contracts which 
individuals and organizations may enter into. Rules are needed to enforce the boundaries of 
performance by different parties to a financial agreement. Tribunals and courts operate within 
those boundaries. Even if arbitration tribunals may have the right to distance themselves from 
certain laws, they will still need the boundaries of rules and regulations to decide upon 
performance and awards. 
Rajiv Sethi, Professor of Economics at Columbia University, commented on the book Bull by 
the Horns by Sheila Bair, the former Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) during the 2007 crisis. In his comments on the book, Professor Sethi explains that: 
 "A fragmented regulatory structure with a variety of norms and standards encourages 
financial institutions to shop for the weakest regulator”. 361 
In the lead up to the 2007 crisis, such regulatory shopping occurred between banks and asset 
managers. Mortgages and securities brokers such as Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and 
Lehman got around a strict regulatory jurisdiction by involving insured banks in other less 
strict jurisdictions in the acquisition and resale of unregulated products. However, Sethi also 
notes that, in some countries, certain banks never needed to shop for regulatory arbitrage. He 
points out three of the largest banks in the US who became quite problematic, namely 
Citigroup, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu).  
Those were insured banks at the time and had been with the same regulators for decades. 
They had all the independence to do what they desired and never needed to shop elsewhere. 
In reality, Sethi is saying the problem was that banks were operating in independence from 
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their regulators, but the regulators were not independent from their banks.362 To take the point 
further, Bair in her book explains her theory that, “The financial system is still fragile and 
vulnerable to the same destructive behaviour that led to the crisis in the first place. We are at 
risk of other financial crises unless the public engages more actively in influencing the 
financial services institutions.” 363  
In other words, the public needs an incentive and a process to be able to engage in monitoring 
their financial service providers. This thesis discusses how a process which can effectively 
impose retaliatory compensations and penalties on financial institutions can provide incentive 
for the public to be active in monitoring their bankers and help to diminish moral hazard in 
the process. 
2.7. BANK RUNS 
A bank run is an event that occurs when large numbers of depositors start withdrawing their 
deposits in fear that their bank is at risk of failing. A bank panic on the other hand, is when 
many banks start to suffer from bank runs almost at the same time including banks running 
onto each other. 
It is interesting to point out that a working paper by the IMF on deposit insurance schemes364 
indicated in 2013 that there were no clear widespread bank runs during the first two years of 
the crisis 2007-2009. The report covered in its analysis 188 countries that were members of 
the IMF. There were some notable exceptions, nevertheless, such as Northern Rock in the 
UK, and some expanded withdrawals by uninsured depositors.  
However, the report shows clearly that the world did not experience systemic bank runs by 
insured depositors. It shows that the events that took place in 2007 within the banking system 
were not retail panics involving individuals running on banks. It was a wholesale panic 
involving banks and financial institutions running on each other.365 
The report indicates plainly that moral hazard existed, misrepresentation was fully fledged, 
banks were suffering from illiquidity, but there was no run on banks by insured depositors. 
Financial institutions and banks, after realising the true depreciation in the market value of 
the assets on their balance sheets, commenced a run on selling those assets to the market-
makers which were mostly the same institutions which had introduced this kind of securities 
to the markets in the first place. 
Having the securitised banking system around the world running on one another caused a fire 
sale in securitised assets and the whole financial system became insolvent to the point of 
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collapse. Insolvency in the securitised banking system left financial institutions around the 
world unable to raise the necessary liquidity for their day-to-day activities. 
Those activities included straightforward credits and loans which supply the necessary 
liquidity to allow other sectors of the economy to continue functioning. Most importantly, it 
also includes repayments of the “on-demand” short-term deposits of banks and financial 
institutions. Lack of interbank liquidity caused a contagious systemic dryness in the wider 
and more global economic activities around the world. 
Shin argues that the failure in the securitisation banking system was a failure of the major 
source of liquidity intended to transfer credit risk from financial institutions to the open 
market.366 Channelling financial papers through the open market is the ultimate source for 
funds for banks and financial institutions where securities are absorbed by the large 
population of multi layered segments of individuals and investors. By failing to repay each 
other, banks caused a collapse in the liquidity generating machine and the global financial 
sector ran out of money. 
At this point it is essential to differentiate between protecting investors’ rights and regulating 
prudential conduct of banking business. The idea is not to rely entirely on financial regulatory 
systems to monitor banks and financial institutions. An effective arbitration process can act as 
a tool of client-bank check process inducing greater monitoring efforts on the part of the 
public and keeping regulatory authorities aware of serious disputes that may indicate more 
serious regulatory infringements. 
Bank clients must be able to monitor banks (dispute monitoring). By monitoring their banks 
and pricing risk correctly in their agreements, creditors are also effectively influencing banks’ 
behaviour (public monitoring). Making public monitoring discipline work calls for more 
comprehensive supervisory frameworks of which compensation through dispute resolution 
can be a part of the regulatory monitoring process, even if indirectly. Arbitration processes 
may ultimately be the banking regulatory supervisor tool in monitoring banks’ behaviour on a 
case by case basis. 
Investors are most dependent on the law and regulatory guidelines for protection against 
bankers’ clear misdemeanours. The most manifest of those delinquencies are actions of moral 
hazard which have no one specific legal form or shape. They exist in reckless and immoral 
actions that may tread on the borders of illegality but with no attainable evidence of 
trespassing financial rules or breaking the law. They mutate and adapt to every new rule and 
regulation. Immorality lies in the fact that, when financial institutions design a new product, 
they make sure that it is within the frame of the written rules and regulations but will go 
jurisdiction shopping to arbitrage advantages from the discrepancies between regulations in 
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different jurisdictions.367 They will then offer securities that are not permitted in one 
jurisdiction to local financial firms located in an unregulated jurisdiction. 
When offering these securities, bankers will not voluntarily disclose to their clients the full 
details of the regulatory bypass and risk involved in the transaction. In certain cases, bankers 
themselves do not realise or fully understand the scale of the risk involved or how the 
security has been formulated.368 However, regulatory processes are so far not set up for 
compensating investors or awarding damages. This is left to courts to examine contract 
performance and adjudicate reparations. Lest we forget, I emphasize once more that at the 
bottom of the crisis lie failed contracts.369 Given the ever-increasing financial-engineering 
capabilities of banks today, economists and regulators expect other future financial crises are 
still to come with more severe damage to financial markets as moral hazard activities still go 
on. The search now for preventive measures is thus of critical importance. 370 
3. ARBITRATION AS A TOOL IN GOVERNING BANKS  
Regulatory system processes differ from one country to the other and from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and particularly so with regard to financial disagreements. In comparison, 
international arbitration has standard processes that resemble judiciary hearings while flexible 
enough to adapt to all parties regardless of ethnicity. In domestic as well as cross border 
financial disputes, arbitration can play two essential roles:  
1- Resolving bank and financial disputes in a speedy and efficient manner  
2- By compensating claimants and financially penalising respondents, it can play a valuable 
role in the governance of the financial sector. 
Regulators cannot be everywhere and examine every transaction within the banking system. 
If investors can use the right to dispute actions of moral hazard, there will be an unlimited 
number of observers in the form of banks’ clients and investors in every bank and in every 
country of the world. If one investor succeeds in disputing a questionable transaction, that 
dispute may reveal a series of other dubious activities that financial institutions are engaged 
in.  
Regulators will have a chance to commence investigations for the possibility of suspicious 
transactions. The bank involved can face retribution and possibly be ordered to refund 
outstanding transactions to clients. Financial institutions will be forced to repay their bonuses 
and claimed profits as investors begin to reclaim back their losses plus possible 
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compensations. After a point, banks and financial institutions will find that it is better to 
refrain from excessive risk and mis-selling activities. 
Arbitration is voluntary and consensual in origin. It is an extension of the will of the parties in 
a contract to refer their dispute to one or more persons for a final decision. Arbitration is a 
process of universal judicial application that has a significant function to adjudicate and not 
to create rights. That is to say arbitration does not create judicial precedents.371 
Basic social facts and their implications must be fully realised before the full potentials of an 
international arbitration process for resolving financial disputes can be achieved. The social 
potential here relates to the common man, wherever he is and under whatever jurisdiction he 
may reside.  
It is essential for that common man, to have confidence in some kind of a judicial process, a 
process that the whole of society will come to believe in and have faith that it can bring back 
their money. Such realisation can repel social unrest and deter the panic of bank-runs. 
For those reasons, the thrust of this thesis is based on a swift arbitration mechanism as an 
adequate deterrence to moral hazard in the financial sector. The principle is built upon equity 
and justice that Arbitration Tribunals use to build their conclusions on.  
Tribunals are entitled to look behind written agreements and read through the intentions of 
the parties.  They can part from statutory rules and strictly worded pre-set contracts to arrive 
at the merit of the agreement. Arbitrators, as social actors, also express values which may 
have a broader social destiny.372 When the French Court of Cassation affirmed that an 
international award is “[a] decision of international justice”, it expressed values as to what 
arbitration is or should be to a broader international audience. 373 
Awards are expressive decisions that can have influence on more than just the parties 
concerned in a single dispute or in one legal circle or jurisdiction. Similarly, when the House 
of Lords recognized the severability of the arbitration agreement in Fiona Trust, it set forth 
an international standard in addition to providing a solution for the case at hand.374 
3.1. ARBITRATION FOR PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
There may not have been a shattering surge of litigation since the onset of the financial crisis, 
but there has been a steady increase in financial services litigation. In some cases the courts 
                                                 
371
 Earl S. Wolaver, “The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration”, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 132 (1934). 
372
 E Gaillard at Note 517 (English translation, French International Arbitration Reports 1963–2007) 
373
  This statement was made in order to justify the fact that recognition of an award should focus on the 
award itself, not ancillary decisions pertaining to assess its validity at the place in which the award is rendered. 
Cass 1e civ, 29 June 2007, PT Putrabali Adyamulia v Rena Holding, 2007(3) Revue de l’Arbitrage 507, E Gaillard 
at 517, French International Arbitration Reports 1963–2007, Case No 62, at 539 (T Clay and P Pinsolle eds, Juris 
Publishing, 2014)). 
374
 House of Lords, Premium Nafta Products Limited (20th Defendant) and others (Respondents) v Fili Shipping 
Company Limited (14th Claimant) and others (Appellants), [2007] EWCA Civ 20, 32; Fiona Trust and Holding 
Corporation and Others v Yuri Privalov and Others, [2007] EWCA Civ 2 and Fiona Trust & Holding Corp & others 
v Yuri Privalov & others, [2006] EWHC 2583 (Comm). 
141 
 
have provided helpful guidance and certainty to market participants, reducing the scope for 
further disputes to arise.  
However, just as the financial crisis is far from being over, so we can continue to expect 
plenty of financial services disputes over the years to come. Banks are likely to face future 
claims from investors arising from causes of action uncovered by more vigorous regulatory 
enforcement. 
The issue this thesis addresses is considered as a pivotal point in regulatory governance of 
banking and financial intermediary activities. The issue specifically concerns the speed by 
which dispute resolution methods get processed and the guarantees they offer of finality. That 
is to say, investors involved in banking disputes do not need to wait longer than a few days in 
order to reach a final decision and get paid. The speed of granting resolutions will promptly 
redress clients’ claims and quietens possible panic in the future. On the other hand, swift 
retribution will improve governance of financial institutions as dispute results can raise an 
alarm for the regulatory authority to analyse causes of the dispute and identify areas of high 
risk and deficiencies in banks activities. This point is especially important as it evaluates 
coordinated regulatory developments internationally in a comparative perspective. It also 
draws out some of the implications for broader global trends in governance of financial 
institutions as disputes become broader and faster in getting resolved.  
In examining the arbitration of regulatory matters involving financial institutions, there are 
three areas to consider: 
(i) The arbitrability of disputes between clients or investors and financial institutions 
involving misleading transactional agreements and whether they involve regulatory breaches. 
(ii) Specialised arbitral institutions that administer dispute resolution proceedings between 
clients and financial institutions 
(iii) The possibility of using arbitration by investors or financial institutions to seek remedies 
in response to alleged improper actions on the part of regulators. 
Investor clients equipped with such an indirect instrument of governance through dispute can 
provide a thorough critique of at least three fundamental elements:  
 Executives’ personal and professional accountability;  
 Executives’ remuneration as an incentive to take high risk; and 
 Regulatory Authorities' alerting, engagement and activism.  
Prior to 2007, quantitative measures imposed by financial regulators were not able to capture 
qualitative problems such as poor management, even where asset impairment had been 
properly measured. In the banking and insurance sectors, regulators focused primarily on an 
institution’s ability to meet its obligations to depositors and policyholders, with some 
attention to systemic stability in banking. 
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Their primary emphasis was on investor protection and market efficiency considerations. 
Regulators relied primarily on disclosure reports coming from the banks and their auditors to 
ensure market discipline and sound legal and accounting practices.375  
The term “regulatory” in the context of financial institutions, encompasses a broad range of 
subjects including prudential supervision, application and enforcement of rules of conduct for 
doing business, and the regulation of financial products and markets.  
For years, the global structure of financial regulations remained roughly the same. Regulatory 
committees were formed then replaced by others. Forums were held, and regulation practices 
remained the same. The paradox is that legal and auditing inspections imposed by financial 
regulators were not able to capture qualitative problems in the banking operations such as 
poor fund management or asymmetrically formed agreements. In fact, reports revealed no 
discrepancies or regulatory failures during all the years prior to Lehman’s collapse.376  
Moreover, the report by The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) on Ben 
Bernanke’s377 testimony during the crisis quotes him as saying that, “out of thirteen of the 
most important financial institutions in the United States, twelve of them were at risk of 
failure within a period of a week or two”.378 
The question that needs to be asked is whether there were any regulatory processes exercised 
on those institutions and if ‘yes’ then why did the crisis occur? The FCIC report gives an 
answer in its conclusion. It says, “In our inquiry, we found dramatic breakdowns of corporate 
governance, profound lapses in regulatory oversight, and near fatal flaws in the financial 
regulations systems”.379  
3.2. FINANCIAL REGULATIONS AND ARBITRATION 
The difficulty with regulatory authority lies in that regulators cannot shift regulatory rulings 
instantaneously. Any conduct of moral hazard involving newly invented financial 
transactions will require new regulations which will need time to be worded and enacted. 
Regulators are unable to spontaneously respond to certain actions because of the time lag 
between when a demeanour occurs, and the time required to produce a rule penalising or 
prohibiting it.  It may take up to a year for the legislation of new financial regulations to pass 
and be implemented. Alas, even those newly enacted regulations will still not be able to 
resolve what has already been transacted. 
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Laws and regulations in principle do not get to be applied retroactively. Thus, investors with 
bad deals will have no recourse on the financial institution under any newly enacted rules. 
However, disputes raised by creditors and investors in front of financial arbitration tribunals 
can theoretically take a fraction of such a period in order to resolve. 
Additionally, raising such disputes can help regulators identify unclear or hidden conducts 
that may be taking place within the financial service sector.380 Bankers and financial service 
providers continue to reward high performing traders on the trading floors. This occurs 
regardless of the level of uncontrolled and excessive risks those traders may engage in while 
manoeuvring around the existing set of rules and regulations.  
Such practices by financial institutions and bankers have allowed a culture of dangerous risk 
taking, immoral misrepresentation and fraud to develop in the financial sector. It developed 
into a cultural mode within banks, financial institutions and insurance conglomerates to the 
extent that it became a feature of the day-to-day conduct of business.381 
3.3. REGULATORY POLICIES  
Creditors are the principal transmitters of contagion for systemic bank failures on a national 
scale. However, and in contrast to existing perceptions, creditors do not start bank failures.  
Failures, to a certain extent, are a result of compounded factors of inherent policies and 
practices in banks and financial institutions. 
A collapse of a financial institution is not always a direct result of external factors. Excessive 
risk taking, and moral hazard actions are accumulative and the economy can endure it for a 
length of time. However, there comes an instant when the compounded effect of more than 
one bank taking excessive risk surmounts any regulatory attempts and will then result in 
uncontrolled contagion failures.382 
The effectiveness of interference by regulators at this stage is debatable and dependable on 
politicians and policy makers. Debates on ex-ante versus ex-post interference by regulators, 
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have traditionally been associated with the question whether the law should be given content 
before or after harmful conduct has occurred.383 
A run on one single regional bank can eventually transfer into a large-scale financial 
malfunction. Such failure can reach into a global financial breakdown due to contagion 
shortages in liquidity. But, if creditors’ claims can be resolved at the early stages of a 
financial crisis, the entire panic transmission process may be contained ex-ante. Unlike other 
areas of regulations, financial regulatory authorities operate in the context of complex co-
dependent systems.  
Financial markets and financial institutions including banks are dependent on legal rules for 
day-to-day operations. This has implications on regulatory policies, in particular the choice 
between ex-ante regulations aimed at preventing financial failures and ex-post regulations 
aimed at responding to a failure.384 
Regulatory systems should be able to impose order or discipline when it comes to dissolving 
ailing institutions. The purpose of imposing such discipline is to insure the rights of creditors 
and investors. Guaranteeing creditors’ rights here is of the utmost priority to mitigate panic 
and contagion failure within the financial markets. 
“Regulatory Theory” is not the focus of this thesis; however, it is worth noting that 
regulations in the context of financial failures take separate forms. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to focus on regulatory-imposing forms. In other words, it is important to examine 
how policy makers and financial regulators impose forms of rules and regulations on 
financial institutions. The focus is on what kind of exemptions if any, are granted and to 
which institutions; and if there are rules aimed at reducing the likely economic effect to a 
failure of a financial institution. 
As Steven Schwarcz385 explains, there is a dual role for regulatory authorities to play. His 
study implies that ex-ante and ex-post a crisis, regulations should be balanced throughout by 
an independent and officially authorized operating system. Its role is to interfere and prevent 
moral hazard within financial institutions. Executives and traders of banks and financial 
institutions should be discouraged from engaging into further risky activities before a failure 
occurs and, moreover, after a crisis materialises. Certain institutions try to use a crisis for 
their benefit by engaging in risky financial transactions such as shorting the markets or 
acquiring put options. 
At this juncture, I put forward that a dispute resolution system such as arbitration can play ex-
ante and ex-post roles. This lends support to the view of this thesis that arbitration as a 
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dispute resolution process can be effective in encouraging investors to monitor their banks. 
The public’s monitoring function will act as a complementary compliance method monitoring 
moral hazard within financial service providers, whether banks or brokerage firms. 
A public’s role as such will add to the efforts of containment by regulatory authorities prior to 
a failure of a bank. It will also support efforts to restrain panic runs in a financial crisis 
through an orderly disputes resolution system for aggrieved parties. Arbitration will provide a 
time restraint on distressed parties. 
While assured that arbitration will grant them their rights effectively, investors will be 
restrained from running on ailing banks and causing panic. This in turn will contribute to the 
slowing down of bank failures as regulatory sanctions and the possible shutting down of 
troubled institutions can be stayed while arbitration procedures are in progress. 
Transmission of panic is not exclusive to consumers and individual clients of banks and 
financial institutions. Banks can also start running on each other, as was evident in 2008. 
Balance sheets of financial institutions ultimately include liabilities that are assets of other 
banks. This in turn makes the value of balance sheets of other banks dependent on the 
behaviour of financial institutions that get into trouble. 
Drawing on the same principle of assuring savers and investors, an arbitration framework 
with effective and speedy payment process will persuade creditors and investors of their 
rights. Parties to a dispute with a bank will be satisfied to claim compensation in front of a 
neutral and speedy tribunal. An indication of how the markets are receptive to such a process 
shows in the post financial crisis dramatic increase in the number of financial disputes 
referred to arbitration.  In the US, for example, slightly more than 3,000 arbitration cases 
were filed in 2007 with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The number of 
cases filed in January 2009 was 12,000. 
An award handed down by a FINRA tribunal in February 2009 arising from transactions in 
auction rate securities, illustrates the enormous magnitude of disputes arising from the 
financial crisis and the speed with which they can be resolved through arbitration.  The 
tribunal ordered a brokerage unit of Credit Suisse Securities US, to pay $400 million to its 
customer ST Microelectronics NV, a European semiconductor maker. 
ST Microelectronics386 claimed it had authorized Credit Suisse to make investments in top-
rated securities backed by U.S. Government guaranteed student loans, but instead the funds 
were invested in collateralized debt obligations some of which were backed by sub-prime 
mortgages.  The entire process, including 28 hearing sessions over two months, took just 
under a year.  Any court proceeding would undoubtedly have taken far longer.  Nonetheless, 
ST Microelectronics, according to the award, incurred more than $4 million in legal fees 
during that time. It is worth noting that all financial institutions who are FINRA members are 
compelled to arbitrate customer disputes. 
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Advocates for international financial regulatory systems argue that errors by national 
regulators were “by no means” at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. On the other hand, 
there is unanimous agreement between both sides of the argument on the serious lack of 
international coordination between regulatory authorities.387 
What this means is that bankers have an incentive to engage in moral hazard on an 
international scale to bypass local restrictions. In this case, counter actions need to be 
coordinated and specifically internationally enforceable so that it can have the desired effect 
in combating jurisdiction arbitrage. The introduction of government regulations and 
regulatory institutions in countries such as the United States was intended to provide 
protection against the fragility of banks. However, it appears to have unintentionally 
increased both the fragility of the banks and their failure rate.388 
This illustrates the predictable and classical moral hazard behaviour as public taxpayers' 
money shielded banks from failure and depositors’ panic.389 In effect, banks were encouraged 
and found it a chance to increase their profits by getting into excessive risk exposure using 
depositors’ funds while being protected from failure. As a result, assets to liability ratios of 
large banks decreased while high-risk portfolios multiplied. Regulatory Authorities around 
the world accordingly could not brace the world economy for the impact of the failure in the 
mortgage market in one country that spread into a contagion global banks failure.390 
In the years leading to the crisis, regulators were mainly concerned with the applicable 
deposit insurance system and potential impact of bank failures within their local jurisdictions. 
Their outlook neglected that there could be wide macroeconomic ramifications resulting in 
international contagion financial failures. 391 A breakdown of one bank’s liquidity would 
result in a worldwide failure in the interbank payment systems such as that of Lehman Bros. 
which led to the 2008 liquidity crisis.392 
3.5. MORAL HAZARD MISFEASANCE IN BANKS  
It is essential to look at how regulatory systems in the US operated and developed through 
two quotations by two Comptrollers of the currency 100 years apart:  
                                                 
387
 Arner, Douglas W. and Taylor, Michael, “The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: 
Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation?” (June 1, 2009). AIIFL Working Paper No. 6.  
388
 Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and E. Detragiache, 2002, “Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? 
An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 49, No. 7, pp. 1373-1406. 
389
 Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt & Edward Kane, Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Volume 16, Number 2, 1 April 2002, pp. 175-195(21) The failure of the late Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to promptly resolve insolvent savings and loan associations in 
the 1980s, led to its own insolvency, the shifting of its approximate $150 billion negative net worth to the U.S. 
taxpayer, and a record number of thrift failures. (Brinkmann, Horvitz, and Huang 1996; 1995a) 
390
 Mazar, N., Amir & Ariely, D. The dishonesty of honest people: a theory of self-concept maintenance. J. Mark. 
Res. 45, 633–644 (2008). 
391
 Senate Report on the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 - 109-326. 
392
 Gerard Caprio Jr. and Ross Levine, 2002, “Corporate governance in Finance: Concepts and International 
Observations”, in Liton, Pomerleano and Sundararajan, eds. Financial Sector Governance: “The Roles of the 
Public and Private Sectors”, pp.17-50 (Washington DC, Brookings Institute Press). 
147 
 
[T]’he Comptroller of the Currency in the US Treasury in the 11th Annual Report 1874 on the 
“Panic of 1873” said that all the bank failures that occurred were due to “[..], criminal 
mismanagement of the officers of the banks or neglect or violation of the National Banks Act 
on the part of the directors” (Knox, 1873)  
One hundred years later, Robert Clarke393, then Comptroller of the Currency, in an evaluation 
on factors contributing to the 2008 crisis and bank failures reported that:  
[I]insider abuse such as self-dealing, inappropriate transactions with purpose built affiliates or 
fraudulent misrepresentation and unauthorised transactions on behalf of depositors were 
significant factors leading to failures of 35% of the failed banks. 
History could have helped regulatory authorities understand and foresee the situation and 
guide thoughts about regulatory reforms.  One constant factor that remained was that bank 
failures in almost every developed economy with well-developed markets and functioning 
banking systems had never stopped since the Great Depression. 
However, the speed and complexity of leveraging had grown so much within the banking 
sector that it had become practically impossible for regulators to monitor any irregularity 
until a crisis or a failure occurred. In a similar proportion moral hazard and information 
asymmetry surrounding banking activities grew, and was not properly addressed by the 
regulators. 
Regardless of what regulations are aimed to prevent, correct or deter in the banking world, 
eradicating immorality seems to be the goal. Mitigation of immoralities cannot, however, be 
achieved by rules and regulations alone. Wrongdoers can always find a way around rules and 
regulations.  
Deterrence must be of the same kind as that of the action. Bankers’ stimulus in performing 
risky transactions is motivated by profitability and to gain more money.  
Thus, a slapping and speedy financial deterrent can discourage hunters of profits from wrong 
doing. However, not just any deterrent that can work. The deterrence must be of a quantity 
superior to what has been gained plus compensation to the injured party.  
To curb bankers’ appetite from risking their clients’ funds, there must be a method that can 
make them instantly refund their investors as well as hefty compensations for costs. The 
current penal system penalises institutions collectively for misdemeanours but does not 
reimburse investors individually for their losses.394  
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4. PUBLIC MONITORING AND POLICY MAKERS  
Caprio and Klingebiel found in a sample of 24 systemic banking crises in emerging-markets 
and developed countries, that deficient bank management and controls were responsible in all 
cases. On the microeconomic side, poor supervision, over regulation and deficient bank 
management were often found to be a significant factor. Since then, there have been 
numerous reports and articles produced. 395 
The results clarified the causes of the crisis and presented proposals for avoiding a recurrence 
of another financial crisis.  The proposals related to many facets of the banking system such 
as tougher prudential capital requirements, enhanced liquidity requirements and prohibitions 
on banks carrying on certain types of business.396 
They also reflected apparent decline in public confidence which stemmed from the 
unprecedented increase in the incidences of bank failures before and during the crisis of 
2008. 397Decline in public confidence can also reveal the fact that as the number of banking 
laws and regulations increased, there was also an increase in the probability of neglecting 
investors’ disputed rights. This normally occurs and becomes more apparent at times of 
crises. 
Authorities became preoccupied more with the political effect of the crisis and the upheaval 
of failing banks than with the failure of creditors and losses to investors.398  This is where the 
challenging and monitoring power of the public can be influential. If investors can be 
guaranteed an instant and adequate method to recuperate their funds and be compensated for 
their losses, public confidence will self-mitigate panic bank runs. 
The policy response from governments, central banks and regulatory authorities to public 
reactions took many forms post 2007-2008 crisis: 
 Internationally, at the highest level, were the G20 countries, who adopted 
recommendations of the newly-created Financial Stability Board and the Basel 
Commission on Banking Supervision, and are now introducing wide-ranging changes 
to its best practice guidelines 
 At national levels, legislations and regulatory reforms were brought forward across 
the globe to address faults identified in individual banking regulatory systems. There 
were also searches for effective mechanisms for resolving failed banks internationally 
and across national boundaries with revised deposit protection schemes. 
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Accounting and auditing rules for financial instruments were also amended as well as a total 
re-evaluation of the role of credit rating agencies.399 Measures of financial institutions’ 
supervisory competence were also enhanced, whether through structural changes or by 
strengthening regulatory resources and regulators’ authority. 
Those are all important changes in their own right. However, for the sake of efficacy, most of 
those supervisory powers will depend upon investors and depositors monitoring their banks 
for acts of moral hazard. 400 
In their report, “Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance”, The Basel Commission on 
Banking Supervision argues that effective depositors and investors’ monitoring practices are 
essential to achieving and maintaining public trust and confidence in the banking system. 
Those are critical components for the proper functioning of the banking sector and the world 
economy.  
Further on, the report reiterates that poor monitoring by the public can contribute to banking 
failures, which can in turn pose significant public costs and economic consequences. 
Fundamentally lax public supervision can lead markets to lose confidence in the ability of a 
bank to properly manage its assets and liabilities, including deposits and investors’ funds, 
which could in turn trigger a bank run. 401 
Combating moral hazard takes both sides of the equation. Depositors can also be accomplices 
in deeds of moral hazard. They may choose to let their bankers take higher risks with their 
money but raise disputes of mis-selling or fraud should the investments begin to show losses.  
Add to that, if the public know that their banks will not be allowed to fail, depositors and 
investors can also be engaged in an “offset moral hazard” by neglecting or choosing to 
disregard risk taken by their bankers.402 In fact, even if investors choose to monitor and 
supervise their bankers, they will find that it is extremely difficult in practice for the public to 
monitor the actual risk profile of a bank. 
Bank’s assets are hard to evaluate even for specialised regulators, let alone a member of the 
public. There are general arguments in different countries that accounting standards and 
methodologies by which assets are measured have failed to make adequate provision for the 
more complex financial instruments to which banks are party.403 
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Not only that, but the profile and risk characteristics of assets build-up can change very 
quickly and defeat the most determined monitoring efforts by the public. Bankers will 
attempt to elude their clients as well as the supervisory regulations and take excessive risks, 
betting on winning against the odds by using their clients’ money. 
For instance, investors who invested their funds with Bernard Madoff lost most of their $65 
billion because Madoff was running a “Ponzi Scheme”. Rather than investing the money as 
the investors intended, he was paying initial depositors with money received from newer 
investors.  
Madoff did not actually invest any of his client's money for years. The fraudulent process was 
exposed during the 2008 credit crisis. That’s when more investors began to withdraw funds 
than those who were placing which caused the pyramiding process to finally collapse. 
People who invested in American International Group (AIG) thought that their money was 
relatively safe because they were investing in an insurance company that had the highest 
credit rating given by the credit rating agencies. However, AIG was also selling credit default 
swaps on mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) that started to default in large numbers in 2008 
requiring them to post more collateral than they had.  
Why did AIG take such risks? Because the traders who sold the credit default swaps (CDSs) 
to AIG were receiving huge bonuses and they didn't have to bear the risk. But AIG wasn't 
concerned about risks because it was too big to fail, since they were selling most of these 
CDSs to banks and other investors.  
Hence, if AIG couldn't make the payments on the CDSs or post collateral as the CDS 
contracts required if AIG's credit rating dropped, then the government would have to bail 
them out; otherwise, many other banks would collapse if they did not receive the payments 
on their defaulted MBSs. Indeed, the government did bail them out, wiping out the 
stockholders of the company.  
The risks of adverse selection and moral hazard make direct financing expensive, especially 
for small firms, since people are not willing to lend or invest money in unknown entities. 
With their expertise in gathering reliable information at reduced cost, financial intermediaries 
can extend financing to many firms or individuals who would otherwise not get it. 
The cure for information asymmetry is more information about potential fund receivers. The 
best predictor of future creditworthiness is past performance and creditworthiness. Checking 
the history of the fund receiver reduces adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Requiring collateral can also reduce information asymmetry risks. Collateral reduces adverse 
selection by requiring a specific value of collateral, such as 20% down payment on a house, 
for instance. Collateral also lowers moral hazard risk because the borrowers stand to lose 
their collateral if they do not make the required payments. 
Requiring a minimum asset net-worth also reduces adverse selection because only those 
individuals or businesses with sufficient assets over liabilities can be considered for a loan. 
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Moral hazard is reduced because the borrower can be sued if they fail to make timely 
payments on their loans. 
There are additional methods of reducing moral hazard. One method for equity finance, 
which is financing through the issuance of stock, is to require the managers to own a certain 
percentage of the company, which is often achieved through the granting of stock options as 
part of the compensation package. 
Another method for debt finance through the issuance of bonds is to require restrictive 
covenants that prevent the bond issuer from taking too many risks, or to restrict the amount of 
debt that can be added later. By law, all bonds are required to have a 3rd party trustee who 
ensures that the bond issuer will comply with the terms of the bond. 
Smaller firms, who are unable or unwilling to obtain financing through the issuance of stocks 
or bonds, apply for loans. Lenders can lower their risk of moral hazard lending to these small 
firms by using the standard debt contract, sometimes referred to as the optimal debt contract. 
Small firms often borrow money for specific projects, but it is difficult for lenders to 
determine the profitability of those projects.  
Additionally, costs would be incurred by investigating or monitoring the project. So, in 
addition to the traditional credit screening tools, the lender can stipulate via the contract that 
monitoring or investigating the project will not be undertaken as long as the borrower repays 
their debt. If the repayment is insufficient, delayed, or non-existent, then the lender must 
spend some money for monitoring or investigating, to identify sources of revenue, which the 
lender can attach or levy to fulfil the repayment of the loan. 
Mishkin argues that the role of banks is in directing funds from savers to investors with a 
certain level of risk. However, a certain impediment to this process is the asymmetric 
information (non-disclosure) present in standardised financial services providers’ 
contracts.404   
The dilemma is how to hold corporate executives accountable for the risky decisions they 
take while still allowing those same executives the autonomy, the motivation and the power 
they need to maintain profitability for the institutions they are running. The issue here is 
primarily the personal accountability of financial institution executives through the 
enforcement of law. The focus is on the failure of bankers rather than the failure of banks.  
When investors deposit their money with a financial institution, they face the risk that the 
returns they were promised on their investments will never materialize. Expropriation, which 
is another form of moral hazard, is related to the agency problem described by Jensen and 
Meckling. They focused on the consumption of perquisites by firm executives and 
directors.405 
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This means that the executives and controlling managers of those banks use the profits of the 
firm to benefit themselves rather than present the returns to the investors and creditors.  They 
expropriate those deposits before the return on the investors' deposits may even materialise. 
The point I raise here predominantly takes a view on recklessness rather than fraud. This is 
because the crisis of 2007/2008 is characterised by lack of understanding of consequences of 
financial business decisions marred by “immoral” hazards and reckless activities.  
Those acts have proven disastrous for the global economy with a consensus that this type of 
behaviour is precisely what pushed many institutions, particularly investment banks to the 
brink of collapse. Even though the damage done cannot be overturned, the sharpening of 
bankers’ accountability can make less likely the occurrence of other episodes that can cause 
similar serious calamities.406 
Personal liability is imperative, primarily due to the conflicting enticements promoted 
through limited liability and the phenomenon of moral hazard. Yet, despite the crisis and the 
subsequent regulatory response, some of this behaviour remains to the current day. 
Inconsistencies in law and regulation need to be eradicated.  
For instance, at present, it is possible to disqualify the directors of companies for unfitness or 
make them personally liable. They can even be ordered to personally contribute financially to 
their institutions’ commercial liabilities. However, a director of a financial institution brought 
to the brink of insolvency but rescued by a form of government intervention cannot be 
disqualified or held accountable for the actions that brought about the failure of his bank. 
This is irrespective of the level of wrongful or reckless trading they have engaged in. 
Certainly, this is a serious deficiency of the current system of accountability, made worse by 
the fact that directors are generally confident that the system will not allow large institutions 
to fail. Moral hazard occurs thereafter when the borrower or deposit taker, in this case the 
bank, starts to change behaviour and engages in higher-risk activities using investors’ money 
in a way other than what has been affirmed to the depositor.  
In fact, the difficulties are that universally formatted agreements such as the ISDA Master 
Agreement have to make compromises between the need for brevity in their structure and the 
need for details such as effective enforceability under jurisdictional conflicts.  
Key issues for financial markets and participants are the understanding of the nature of their 
agreements and the confidence they can have in interpreting a financial transaction dispute 
clause, as occurred in cases such as CRSM v Barclays407 and Springwell v JP Morgan.408  
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This comes about when investors are being overawed by authoritatively trained brokers and 
blinded by a veil of trust in their bankers. It prevents them from challenging an age long 
established trust in financial institutions and banks which occupy a respected position in the 
economy.  Therefore, as the current regulations have not proven to be an effective constraint 
against reckless behaviour by bankers and financial intermediaries, it is time to consider a 
variety of legal strategies that help eradicate the weaknesses. Instating and enforcing personal 
and professional responsibility in the financial sector will require a blend of different 
strategies.  
The arbitration process proposed by this thesis will act as an assisting tool in the financial 
governance of financial institutions and banks. It will grant savers and investors the tool to 
monitor their bankers and file for claims should the need arise. Reinstating and reinforcing 
savers claims speedily and effectively and holding banks and their directors liable will 
strongly aid to eradicate acts of moral hazard in all its forms. On the other hand, regulatory 
authorities such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) will have the scope over financial 
irregularities as disputed matters take place. 
This will occur primarily as banks publish financial records which will include entries of 
payments of penal awards. The actual disputed arbitrations are, however, confidential and 
only regulators will be able to access them. The arbitral process will have greater 
international enforcement powers granted by the N.Y. Convention.  
It will be backed by financial institutions and banks without the need to move to full treaty 
based or hard law amendments. This mechanism will likely enhance the ongoing supervision 
of cross border financial markets and lead to higher supervisory standards over international 
transactions.409 
5. REGULATORY SCHEMES  
Banks and financial institutions are legal entities operating in markets that are essentially 
legal. Collateral is a form of contractual property such as derivatives which are mere financial 
commitments under contracts. Money markets and securitisations are creatures of those 
contractual agreements and are governed by the law. Monitoring of these financial 
instruments and the institutions that deal in them should not fall far from the supervisory 
powers of the law. In that sense, financial transactions are fundamentally agreements where 
parties have the legal right to monitor the performance of one another. 
Most regulatory schemes strive to maintain the joint objectives of financial stability and 
depositors’ protection. Since the crash of 2007, the debate has raged on what should have 
been done differently.  
Amendments to debt-to-equity ratios in financial institutions’ that was imposed by Basel III 
are regulated at about 15:1 for banks and 30:1 for securities institutions. 
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This leverage has some implications. Financial Regulatory Authorities sitting in Basel were 
right in deciding to distinguish capital liabilities from assets. But in reality, their theory was 
wrong. Not all assets or liabilities are treated the same and not all institutions declare their 
assets and liabilities the same way.410 
This is especially true for large investment banks with substantial contingent liabilities in the 
form of derivatives contracts. Similarly, a small change in the variance of bank assets can 
lead to a large change in bank risk. This has some unpleasant implications for governance.  
Jensen and Meckling411 explain that over-leveraged institutions will gamble with their 
creditors’ money by shifting the nature of their assets and liabilities by using derivatives 
which are supplementary to the credit nature of the bank’s assets such as loans, but inbuilt as 
a main source of liquidity in their risk-shifting manipulations of their balance sheets. Bank 
deposits are not the only financial liability. 
Insurance company policies are another form of liability for financial institutions. For 
example, if we consider a term policy with an insurer to healthy policyholders, the policy is 
worth little, because it is easy to replace. But consider a person who purchased the policy at a 
low cost when healthy, then subsequently develops cancer with right to renew. Derivatives in 
this case will help the insurance company to hedge the risk against fluctuations in future 
payments and match their future assets forecasts to present liabilities. 
But considering that those derivatives were purchased and placed with an insolvent bank such 
as Lehman, a quick pro rata redistribution of debt upon the resolution of Lehman will be a 
disaster for the insurer at today's present value for the derivatives. Add to the situation, the 
insurer's future obligations without the protection of the derivatives which disappeared with 
Lehman’s failure. 
Beck et al.412 found that legal systems that are adaptable swiftly to changes in the 
contracting needs of investors in an economy will stimulate speedy financial recovery 
in a crisis. The legal literature has convincingly made the case that there is often a positive 
and causal empirical relationship between creditors’ rights and financial and economic 
development, which depends on the quality of the legal environment.  
However, the exact ways in which this empirical regularity is shaped at the micro level and 
the relative importance of legal versus other determinants of financial regulatory 
development are still largely unexplored.413 That is because there are inbuilt difficulties that 
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became associated with the introduction of different schemes: those related with moral 
hazard, asymmetric information and excessive risk taking. 414 
As mentioned earlier, moral hazard in financial institutions currently is not just limited to 
insurance deposit schemes and excessive risk taking using depositors’ funds. There are other 
facets where moral hazard materialises in extravagant bonuses and rewards paid to executives 
and traders of such institutions. 
Rosa Lastra argues that amongst the numerous explanations given consequence to the 2008 
crisis was that moral hazard has swelled in correlation to the swelling of rules and regulations 
taken by regulators and governments to combat excessive risk taking. The more rules the 
regulators imposed, the more inventive the bankers became to legally bypass such rules.415 
Lastra mentions that there are still major challenges and points of debate on relevance, form 
and scope of regulatory interventions and the efficient method to overhaul the financial 
regulatory system whether by introducing new regulations or eliminating some altogether.  
5.1. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEMS 
Initially, the activities of financial institutions (mostly banks) were regulated by the 
respective national central banks. The supervisory function in that era did not involve too 
much supervision of the day-to-day operations of the banks. Such lax supervision was altered 
drastically following universal banking system and corporate sector crises including the 
Nordic countries’ crises in the early 1990s, the Mexico crisis in 1994/95, and the crises in 
East Asian countries after 1997. 
The challenges facing international financial regulations, however, are mostly in the method 
of homogeneous application of rules and regulations. Regulators issue uniform directives on 
diversified sectoral financial institutions with varied financial market activities, expecting 
those institutions to comply regardless of their asset holdings and fund management methods. 
5.2. WHERE REGULATORS MAY HAVE ERRED  
With reference to the FCIC report on the crisis416, the Financial Committee found profound 
lapses in financial regulatory systems. Regulators cannot supervise and encourage 
                                                                                                                                                        
additional empirical evidence in Demirgi.i9-Kunt and Levine (1999), Beck et al. (2000), Beck and Levine (2000), 
Levine et al. (2000), and Leahy et al. (2001). In 2001 the most important results were published in book form 
(Demirgi.i9 Kunt and Levine (2001)). The main policy implications were described in World Bank Repot (2001). 
414
 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) 
415
 Rosa M Lastra & Geoffrey Wood, The Recent Financial Crisis: Why did it Happen and What Lessons Can it 
Teach?; Journal of International Economic Law, Special Issue ‘The Quest for International Law in Financial 
Regulation’, V. 13(iss3), 9/2010   
416
 Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (FCIC): The Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the 
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States - In the wake of the most significant financial crisis since the 
Great Depression, President Obama signed into law on May 20, 2009, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act of 2009, creating the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. It was established to examine the causes, 
domestic and global of the financial and economic crisis. During the course of its investigation, the ten person 
committee reviewed millions of pages of documents, interviewed more than 700 witnesses and held 19 days 
of public hearings in New York, Washington, D.C., and communities across the country that were hit hard by 
156 
 
compliance with the rules or decide the appropriate mode of enforcement unless they can 
interpret the requirements of such rules considering each particular case. 417 
In May 2005, two years before the crisis, Prime Minister Tony Blair characterized regulators 
of the FSA who attempted to regularly supervise and impose straining regulations on banks, 
as “hugely inhibiting of efficient business by perfectly respectable companies that have never 
defrauded anyone”.418 
Dorene Isenberg419 argues that regulators and regulatory authorities go by what politicians 
aspire to rather than by what markets need. Regulations are imposed in many situations 
where the regulated population cannot comply with the directives because they do not know 
or understand the reasoning behind them.  
In other instances, the regulated population do not believe in the neutrality of the regulators 
because they believe regulation may be politically motivated or designed to benefit specific 
institutions more than others. Isenberg discusses how Hank Paulson, The US Secretary of 
Treasury was the main engineer behind the sweeping regulatory intervention by the US 
Government. Nevertheless, Paulson was a former Goldman Sachs Senior Board Executive 
until 2006. Isenberg in her remark raises a question which ultimately leads to the conclusion 
that Paulson approved personally almost all trades in subprime notes or at least someone 
close to him on the board of Goldman Sachs did.  
Paulson was one of the executives of an institution that conspired to engineer subprime notes. 
Should we not ask how other regulated institutions can believe in the neutrality of regulators? 
By the same token, Elliott and Baily (2009) blame financial institutions and regulators for the 
crisis, the reckless behaviour inside and outside of the US and disregard of regulations.420 
In systemic crises, individual corporate fates will depend on the reactions of international 
financial regulatory authorities in face of the actions of banks and financial institutions. 
However, during the years prior to the crisis, the pattern of financial crises highlighted the 
complex coordination problems that had arisen amongst individual financial regulatory 
authorities around the world.421 
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5.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL CRISES  
It is essential to lay out what is meant by a financial crisis and how a dispute resolution 
mechanism may possibly contain it. Until the 20th century, only problems in the banking 
system as narrowly defined could be regarded as a crisis.422 Failures of merchant banks were 
regarded as a crisis and only when it led to a run on the banks whose liabilities were part of 
the money stock of merchant banking. 
Anna Schwartz423 described ‘real’ crises as those which are fuelled by public fear that means 
of payment and ability to acquire the day-to-day necessity of life will not be available as 
banks start to close. In a fractional reserve banking system this leads to a rush by the public 
for a run on banks. Meanwhile, there will be a decline in asset prices, equity stocks will drop 
and the value of real estate follows. With merchant banks dealing in securities, they start 
facing substantial liquidity pressure as investors in “silent runs” scramble to liquidate their 
holdings searching for cash. Central banks do not intervene to relieve merchant banks from 
such runs.424 
There are two primary explanations for the main causes of a financial crisis: banking 
practices of previous years, with banks getting into securities dealings, and the behaviour of 
the Federal Reserve in the US and actions (or lack of them) by international financial 
regulatory authorities. The first explanation has been examined by Peach (1941)425, Benston 
(1990)426 and Kroszner and Rajan (1994).  
A universal banking system and corporate sector crisis can be characterized as a situation 
where economies around the world simultaneously, or within a short period of time, start to 
face large-scale financial and corporate distress. 427 
Likewise, judicial and dispute settlement and retaliatory processes that are exclusively based 
upon authoritarian international rulings, need to be put to speed and efficiently enforced. The 
crisis has proven the need for financial and monetary regulatory reform. On the other hand, 
the fact finding efforts has also proven the need for the appropriate frameworks for settlement 
of bank disputes of cross-border nature and efficacy in enforcement.428 
In effect sanctioning procedures regarding cases of securities violations discovered by a 
central bank (the acting authority as the supervisor on banking financial activities) may not 
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include issuance of fines on violations by banks in financial market activities.429 This largely 
means that certain supervisory regulatory “authorities” may be left without “authority”. 430  
Handling the aftermath is more important than the technical creation of a crisis management 
mechanism. Bolstered by support from national public and world population, crisis 
management becomes a considerably lighter responsibility and a more manageable task.431 
As discussed in this thesis, this can be initially achieved in an economic sectional system 
such as the banking and financial sectors. Initially to apply administrative sanctions that are 
to provide rules for financial transactional activities as well as a certain degree of deterrence 
that can be independent from the general legal systems. 432 That is to say, it can be applied 
within dispute settlement environment while financial sanctions can be applied on either 
party.433 
6. BAILOUT 
Without a credible resolution option, authorities would have only one option for systemically 
important institutions: a public bailout. However, bailouts often come at huge cost for the 
taxpayer and with negative consequences for the economy. In addition, bailouts create the 
wrong incentives for internal risk management and a moral hazard problem, as the cost of 
failure is not borne by those who have taken the risks but by taxpayers. Bailout mechanisms 
have also proven to create an uneven playing field among banks as governments are 
perceived to be more likely to step in and save large and complex banks than smaller banks. 
The International Association for Deposit Insurers (IADI) published a set of draft Core 
Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (Core Principles)434 for the benefit of 
countries considering the adoption or reform of a deposit insurance system (published 29 
February 2008). The draft Core Principles include preconditions that should be in-place to 
support an effective deposit insurance system and are designed to be adaptable to a broad 
range of countries taking account of circumstances, settings and structures. 
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In March 2009 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and IADI jointly 
issued a consultative Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (Joint Core 
Principles). Current guidance on mitigating moral hazard is provided by the BCBS-IADI 
Joint Core Principles. Principle 2 states that moral hazard should be mitigated by ensuring 
that the deposit insurance system contains appropriate design features and through other 
elements of the financial system safety net.  
The guidance suggests practices of deposit insurers should follow such as:   
- setting limits on the amounts insured 
- excluding certain categories of depositors from coverage 
- implementing differential or risk-adjusted premium systems  
- minimizing the risk of loss through timely intervention 
- resolution of troubled and failed institutions by deposit insurers 
Depending on their mandates, deposit insurers and other financial safety-net participants can 
mitigate moral hazard by creating and promoting appropriate incentives for banks and their 
stakeholders through good corporate governance and effective market and regulatory 
discipline. 
The IMF (2014) finds that implicit bailout funding cost subsidies rose across the board during 
the crisis 2008-2009. Interestingly, the report shows that these subsidies have declined since 
the crisis in many countries but remained comparatively elevated in the euro area. However, 
the study omitted the effect of bailout guarantees on banks’ risk taking. Most empirical 
literature confirms higher risk-taking of institutions classified as too-big-to-fail. 435 
More recently, Black and Hazelwood (2013) showed that large banks rescued under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) were encouraged to increase their risk-taking. Based 
on a German bank sample, Dam and Koetter (2012) also find a positive relationship between 
bailout expectations and moral hazard risk-taking. Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011) also 
show that bailout guarantees may also lead to a rise in risk-taking within competitor banks. 436 
6.1. WHY ARBITRATION IF WE HAVE REGULATIONS 
The question that may be asked is why we need arbitration to combat acts of moral hazard 
where there are financial regulators, rules and regulations. 
During a crisis, the speed of recovery is a priority. Depending on governmental priorities, the 
magnitude of fiscal resources available to any government in a crisis is usually directed 
where it is politically needed. In most countries, governments’ main concern in a crisis is to 
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resolve major corporate insolvencies, and rules and regulations take second priority together 
with possible long term economic costs to the society as a whole. Government policies 
usually take the short term view for obvious political reasons while rules and regulations are 
fundamentally designed for resolving crises in the long run. But in the short run and in spite 
of much analysis and the large number of rules and regulations, less has been done to resolve 
the immediate effect on investors, depositors and creditors. Policy makers seem to be 
oblivious to the fact that investors are the main source of money. 
By securing creditors’ rights, markets can regain investors’ confidence, and liquidity can be 
maintained on the balance sheet of financial service providers such as banks and insurance 
and financial firms.437 Regulators are best positioned to represent and balance the various 
stakeholders’ interests. However, in certain countries the regulators’ role can be limited for 
judicial or public policy reasons. For example, in the UK, corporate governance regulation 
has traditionally not focused on the special role of banks and financial institutions. 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, sought to fill this gap by authorizing the FSA 
to devise rules and regulations to enhance corporate governance for financial firms. In the 
US, the regulatory approach has been limited by Federal Court decisions that restrict the role 
that regulators can play in imposing prudential directives on banks and bank holding 
companies. Today, high speed dynamic evolutions in financial services are stirring up 
regulatory debates again. Through the past few years, financial innovations in derivatives by 
banks and financial firms have been vastly increasing through “off-balance sheet” 
transactions. The international nature of such undeclared and possibly hidden activities is 
rendering control by national authorities more and more difficult.438  
Recent theoretical insights into the role of financial intermediaries and banks shed new light 
on the role of financial regulations. Researchers as well as parliamentarians in different 
countries started probing into how ineffective (or effective) those regulations can be. The 
main concern is whether regulations provide for compensating investors and depositors for 
their losses in cases of moral hazard, information asymmetry, adverse selection and mis-
selling. 
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6.2. PUBLIC MORAL HAZARD 
There are two main predicaments with deposit insurance. The first is that by being insured, 
customers will take little or no interest in the way that the bank lends and takes risks. This is 
recognized as “passive moral hazard”.439 
In a system without deposit insurance, depositors would have a strong incentive to monitor 
their bank’s behaviour to ensure the bank does not act in a manner that may endanger its own 
solvency. For example, a depositor would be concerned with the types of loans their bank 
was making and the amount of capital their bank had (capital acts as a buffer, protecting 
depositors from losses when loans go bad). 
Other things being equal a bank with a higher capital ratio would be considered safer and in 
consequence could be expected to attract more customers than a bank with a smaller capital 
base. However, in a system with deposit insurance there is no incentive for customers to 
monitor their bank’s behaviour, as depositors are guaranteed to receive their money back 
regardless of the level of risk taken by the bank. 
This lack of scrutiny from customers (or the financial press) means that banks are not 
restricted to taking the level of risk that their depositors would be comfortable with. Instead, 
they are free to lend as much as they like to whomever they like, in the process lowering their 
capital ratio (increasing their leverage). 
Thus, the presence of deposit insurance removes possible risk constraints on the banks’ desire 
to increase “high risk - high return” lending transactions regardless of the unreliability of 
borrowers. Those banks need such increase in their lending portfolios in order to attract 
deposits by offering higher rates of return on depositors’ funds than their competitors. 
However, to maintain their profitability margins those banks will have to create high yielding 
instruments through securitisation. 440 
All being equal those instruments will ultimately yield higher returns, but only whilst banks 
will knowingly take greater risks that enfold higher possibilities of default by borrowers, and 
that’s when the real crisis unfolds. On the other hand, depositors’ moral hazard becomes quite 
apparent at these instances as depositors and investors become more intrigued by the higher 
than normal return on their investments instead of caring about their bank’s solvency. 
The public ceases to monitor the credibility of the financial institutions they are dealing with 
because they rely on two conceptual principles: the government guarantees household 
deposits by way of deposit insurance schemes; and, more importantly, the “My Bank is Too-
Big-To-Fail” principle. 
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The second problem with deposit insurance regards the insolvency procedure and its costs in 
the case of a bank failure. In a country with a deposit guarantee scheme, bank insolvency 
normally means either a government bailout of the bank in question, or the closing of the 
bank, the sale of its assets, and compensation for deposit holders up to the designated amount. 
How likely are governments to take the second option?  Dorene Isenberg argues that, “The 
problem with the bailout is not its size, but its structure”. The purchase of the assets of 
financial institutions with taxpayers’ money will not be complemented by an ownership or 
control structure that reflects public ownership, as proposed for example in certain “bail-in 
processes”.441 
Within the regulatory rules, the public who became the new owners through nationalisation 
will have no say about running the bank let alone executive pay-out, bonuses or the disposal 
of profits. As the bailout now stands, the regulations that allowed this risky behaviour, which 
is responsible for one of the largest systemic meltdowns in history, are still in place and there 
are no harmonized international plans for it to change. 
7. BAIL-IN  
The bail-in tool aims to recapitalise a bank in resolution or to provide capital for a bridge 
institution in case liquidation of the bank is not possible due to negative externalities. The 
case of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) can serve as an example. When RBS’s nearly 
collapsed in November 2008 during the crisis, the UK government had the option to close the 
bank and let it fail. However, because of its obligations to depositors, the government would 
have been obliged to find approximately £800 billion. This is greater than the entire national 
debt at that time and similar in size to the entire UK’s annual tax income. In an ideal world 
much of this could potentially have been raised by the sale of the bank’s assets.  
However, the government was constrained in its actions and had to resolve the bank’s 
liquidity quickly to avoid the panic from spreading in a contagion manner to other banks. 
Finding buyers for £800 billion of assets from a failed bank in the middle of a financial crisis 
is hard. As a result the government would most likely have to accept a price for the assets far 
below its market values and make up the shortfall from the taxpayers’ money or borrow 
against its sovereign debt. Invoking bankruptcy procedures against RBS would have therefore 
been highly costly.442 
The new bail-in tool in the bank resolution toolkit embeds much strength, notably in relation 
to mitigating moral hazard and other problems inherent in a strong reliance on bailouts. A 
credible resolution framework such as the “bail-in tool” was introduced to mitigate these 
negative externalities. The process is seen primarily to shift costs of bank failures from 
taxpayers to the shareholders and creditors of the failing bank. Investors, depositors and 
holders of certificates of deposits (CDs) are all forms of creditors on a bank’s balance sheet 
                                                 
441
  The failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland, Financial Services Authority Board Report 
442
 The legal basis for the bail-in tool is provided by the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRM) Article 
27.  Similar provisions can be found for the European Union in the BRRD. 
163 
 
and in total they represent the major bulk of a bank’s debt. As such, they rank higher than 
shareholders’ equity and this gives them a better claim to get their money back when a bank 
faces a bankruptcy situation. 
Following the financial crisis, when governments injected hundreds of billions into banks, 
most creditors of banks were left untouched - even those holding subordinated, or junior, 
debt, which is theoretically designed to bear losses in times of stress. That was true until the 
“Bail-In Directive” or as it is known in EU: The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.  
The legislation is the centrepiece of efforts to avoid a repeat of the €1.6tn of taxpayers’ 
support to banks during the 2008 financial crisis. It empowers regulators to intervene quickly 
when a bank is weak, avoiding the panic that could arise from a messy and prolonged 
insolvency procedure. The law took effect in January 2015, but markets were given an extra 
year to adjust to the application of those measures. 
In a sense “bail-in” can be defined as equity write-off and conversion of debt into equity, and 
it theoretically takes place before a bankruptcy of a bank. Under current proposals, regulators 
would have the power to impose losses on the shareholders and creditors of a bank. The idea 
is that by quickly addressing the problems of sickly banks and financial institutions, they 
would also help stabilize the financial system by removing uncertainty and contagious 
failures.443 
Financial institutions’ and banks’ insolvency is very different in kind than the insolvency of 
ordinary companies. The key distinction is that financial institutions are dominated by 
financial liabilities. Those liabilities have a value that is greater than the net present value of 
the institution’s capital and the total income stream. The “bail-in insolvency process” is to 
convert claims of creditors against a bank into holding equity of the failing institution or 
ideally a parent company which will be a holder of the failing institution. 
The creditors will then be paid out of the return on equity of the holding company. This bail-
in process is presumed to impair only the nonfinancial liabilities in the parent company and 
preserves the financial liabilities in the subsidiary. In an ideal world, it will then preserve the 
failing institution’s liquidity and rearrange creditors’ claims, including depositors without 
disturbing the ongoing operations. This is supposed to allow the institution to survive by 
continuing its operations and repay its creditors. In short, depositors and creditors of a bank 
will have their deposits impounded and converted into equity of the failing bank. Any 
revenue generated after that will be used to repay them what was taken from them.444 
However, insolvency laws require that operations can continue using separate financing that 
is detached from claims. In other words, in cases of insolvency, the law forbids borrowing 
more money to finance previously borrowed money. It is what the law names as 
“pyramiding”. Proposed bail-in processes do this with the automatic stay and post-petition 
lending. The automatic stay keeps the former creditor away from operations by converting 
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their claims into equity. Post-insolvency depositors’ and creditors’ funds will go on to current 
operations.445 
In banking assets calculation, the segregation between older and newer deposits is impossible 
without the clear distinction between the different types of liabilities (such as long and short 
term), assets bundles and financing products. Bail-in on the other hand, works by segregating 
financial assets (loans) from non- financing products. This segregation requires insolvency 
priorities for the disposal of non-performing financial products.  
Such processes in their current form are only designed to contain risk rather than eliminate it. 
It is recognized that the issuance of bail-in debt instruments or conversion of debt into equity 
will raise the cost of funding for financial institutions. Nevertheless, the removal of explicit 
bailout programs is believed to eliminate moral hazard and lead to greater market discipline. 
Depositors will be converted into shareholders and be more effectual in monitoring the 
performance and risk-taking activities of their banks. 
However, impounding depositors funds and creditors, will not eliminate panic runs on banks. 
It is necessary to imagine that not all depositors can afford to convert their life savings into 
equity in financial institutions or banks that are shifty and not of good financial standings. It 
is also important to assume that some of those depositors rely on their savings for their day-
to-day living. It is therefore prudent to assume that should a bank starts to face trouble, they 
may face the same panic run on them if not more severe in the absence of bailout 
possibilities. 
It should also be noted, that the Capital Requirement Directives and Regulations as well as 
the Banks Recovery and Resolution Directives (BRRD) are designed to reduce and mitigate 
the effects of a failure of a financial institution. Whether those directives were efficient but 
not applied or applied but not efficiently, many within the industry acknowledge that there is 
a lack of enforcement of rules. In a sector as complicated and sensitive as the financial sector, 
rules are to be enforced sufficiently and the first thing governments need to do is figure out 
what it takes to get them enforced. 
8. ARBITRATION IN GOVERNING BANKS 
 In a banking financial dispute, the sums at stake are large and many of the claims are debt or 
quantum claims. Hence, delays can be advantageous to the defendant and a party’s local court 
is likely to be sympathetic to that party’s claim if the dispute is brought in front of them. 
Parties of the dispute may therefore engage in gaming behaviour for the purpose of changing 
venues and gaining precious time.  
In this multi-party, multi-jurisdictional, cross-border world of bank disputes, disputes 
regarding jurisdiction of courts and tribunals continue to be prominent, as can be shown in 
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the cases below. For this reason, an ideal arbitration process would contain provisions 
intended to provide for the better resolution of financial disputes.446  
Preceding discussions of varying jurisdictional decisions in banking cases are some proof of 
the propensity for courts to overlook cases where parties seek opportunistic refuge in 
delaying tactics or seeking a chance to move the case to their own national courts. There will 
be little confidence in a dispute resolution process that will grant a learned opinion on the 
matter and resolve the issue in a speedy and efficient manner but nevertheless, the 
enforcement of its award will remain subject to the same delays. The following cases are an 
indication. 
8.1. CASES 
Dallah Real Estate v Pakistan Ministry of Religious Affairs is an interesting case in the 
context of the arbitration tribunal question of jurisdiction. The case raised issues concerning 
whether the local courts have the power to decide whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to 
decide on a case. The case also raised other questions on whether the arbitration tribunal can 
decide upon its own jurisdiction for an international arbitration. 447  
In this case, Dallah entered into an agreement with a trust established by the Government of 
Pakistan to build accommodation. The agreement provided for international arbitration in 
Paris. The trust later ceased to exist. For that reason, Dallah commenced arbitration 
proceedings against the Government of Pakistan, the Government having promoted the 
accommodation project in the first place.  
The arbitral tribunal determined that it had joinder jurisdiction over the Government of 
Pakistan even though the Government was not a party to the agreement. The tribunal did so 
on the basis that the Government of Pakistan was, to all intents and purposes, a party to the 
agreement with Dallah. 
Dallah sought to enforce the award in England. The New York Convention permits an 
arbitral award to be enforced more easily in countries that are party to the New York 
Convention than a court judgment. However, the New York Convention contains narrow 
exceptions that allow a court to refuse to enforce an award.  
These exceptions relate to fundamental principles in arbitration: whether the tribunal has 
jurisdiction, whether the arbitration procedure accords with due process, whether there has 
been a breach of public policy and whether the arbitration agreement is invalid. It was settled 
that the tribunal had power to decide whether it has jurisdiction under the globally recognized 
doctrine called competence-competence (i.e. the tribunal has competence to decide its own 
competence). 
The question was how the case was constructed and how far the court should defer to the 
tribunal’s prior determination that it had jurisdiction or whether it should conduct a full 
rehearing of the issue. The Supreme Court held that, when a party (here, the Government of 
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Pakistan) disputes whether it is a party to an arbitration agreement at the enforcement stage, 
the final word on the issue lies with the court and not with the arbitral tribunal. Moreover, the 
court must conduct a full rehearing of the tribunal’s decision, and not a limited review.448 
Ever since the Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham 449swap case, ultra vires issues have been 
subject to well-established law in transactions by banks, statutory or municipal entities, law 
firms and legal advisers. Many jurisdictions since the publishing of this case in 1993 were 
issued enacting laws and regulations to the effect that municipal entities have express 
capacity to enter into derivatives and complicated financial transactions.  
That capacity to enter into such transactions is subjected in most jurisdictions to restrictions 
such as duly authorised contractual agreements with the bank or financial entity, even where 
the transaction is of a speculative nature. In Haugesund & Narvik Kommune v Depfa Bank450, 
a bank proposed to enter into swap transactions with two Norwegian municipal counterparty 
communities.  
The bank asked counsel from a firm of lawyers in Norway on the question of the capacity of 
the municipalities. This was the only question on which the bank sought legal advice. The 
lawyers advised in unqualified terms that the municipalities had full capacity. The lawyers 
also advised the bank that, under Norwegian law, a claim against a Norwegian municipality 
cannot be enforced and that no execution, bankruptcy or debt proceedings may be initiated 
against a local council in Norway.  
The bank was prepared to take the foreclosure risk, “undoubtedly” taking the view that the 
municipalities were “honourable, respectable and creditworthy counterparties”. It was held 
that the municipalities lacked the “substantive power” under Norwegian law to enter into the 
swaps. 
This lack of ‘substantive power’ was characterized in English legal terms as a lack of 
capacity. Hence, the swaps were void. The bank was nevertheless entitled in restitution to the 
capital sums advanced together with interest. 
The municipalities were not entitled to rely on a defence of change of position. It was also 
held that the Norwegian lawyers’ advice was negligent and that they were liable for damages. 
It was also held in appeal that the lawyers’ firm was not responsible for the bank’s losses as 
the lawyers were not responsible for the loss relating to a bank’s enforcement on credit risks. 
This was a matter that most probably would have been resolved on equitable basis if 
presented to arbitration. It is also reasonable to point out that the judges in Haugesund & 
Narvik Kommune would not be disposed to let a party such as the municipal entities be 
opportunistic and escape its contractual commitment where that commitment proved later not 
to be financially advantageous. Nevertheless, it’s needless to say that bankers are 
opportunistic too. 
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In Berliner (BVG) v JP Morgan Chase the bank (JP Morgan Chase) claimed $112 million. .451 
BVG alleged that an English-law governed credit default swap to which it and JP Morgan 
were counterparties was ultra vires, or beyond the power of BVG to enter into.  
They argued that based on European Council Judgments Regulation, Articles 22 and 25 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 the ultra vires issue was to be determined under 
German law, being the law of incorporation of Berliner BVG. 452  
The Court of Appeal held that while the ultra vires issue was important, because it might be 
dispositive of the proceeding, the proceedings were not ‘principally concerned with’ the ultra 
vires issue, which was the requisite test under Article 25. However, in this case the ultra vires 
issue could not be isolated from the other issues. For example, BVG alleged mis-selling by JP 
Morgan and that they were given asymmetric advice at the time the transaction was entered 
into. 
The Court of Appeal characterized the proceedings as being ‘principally concerned with’ the 
validity of the credit default swap and whether JP Morgan could enforce its rights under it. 
Hence, ultra vires was not the focus of the proceedings.  
The correct interpretation of Article 22(2) required the Court of Appeal to make an overall 
judgment under Article 25 on whether the proceedings were ‘principally concerned with’ one 
of the matters set out in Article 22(2). The claim was principally concerned with the default 
of BVG of non-payment of the swap.  
The ultra vires argument was one of BVG’s possible defences to the claim by JP Morgan. 
The defence was over-ruled by the Court of Appeal. BVG further appealed to the Supreme 
Court which in turn referred the issue to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
BVG had also filed proceedings in Germany which were also referred to the ECJ. In those 
latter proceedings, the ECJ in effect agreed with the decision in the English Court of Appeal, 
saying that: 
 [In] a dispute of a contractual nature, questions relating to the contract’s 
validity, interpretation or enforceability are at the heart of the dispute and form 
its subject-matter. Any question concerning the validity of the decision to 
conclude the contract, taken previously by the organs of one of the companies’ 
party to it, must be considered ancillary. While it may form part of the analysis 
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required to be carried out in that regard, it nevertheless does not constitute the 
sole, or even the principal, subject of the analysis. 453 
Depfa Bank v Provincia di Pisa; Dexia Crediop. v Provincia di Pisa 454 are similar cases. In 
this case, two banks sought declaratory relief against the Province of Pisa under two interest 
rate swaps. The claims were in particular for the confirmation that the swap transactions 
issued with the Italian authority were valid and binding.  
The swaps were documented under the ISDA Master Agreement 1992, which contained the 
ISDA-standard English governing law and jurisdiction clauses. The Province of Pisa 
challenged the swaps when it became apparent, in the case of the final payment, that it was 
out-of-the-money and hence would need to make a payment to the banks.  
As did BVG, the Province of Pisa challenged the jurisdiction of the English courts on the 
ground that the swaps were allegedly ultra vires and the actions were under Article 22(2) of 
the Judgments Regulation, ‘principally concerned with’ matters over which the Italian courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction.  
After the banks issued proceedings in England, the Province of Pisa subsequently issued 
governance-related executive decisions that purported to revoke certain decisions taken at the 
time that the swaps were entered into. Public law powers under Italian law purportedly 
entitled the Province of Pisa to exercise a right of self-redress. It issued proceedings in Italy 
accordingly. 
The banks argued that the court should be aware of the attempts of the defendant, Province of 
Pisa, to seize jurisdiction away from the English Courts, a contractually chosen forum, in 
favour of Italian courts, a home court for the defendant. The Province of Pisa sought to 
characterize the Italian proceedings as only about ultra vires, but appeared in due course also 
to wish to allege non-disclosure and mis-selling.  
The defendant also alleged that the true cost of the swaps had not been disclosed at the time. 
While the judge accepted that the Province of Pisa had a good arguable case of ultra vires 
based on it exceeding its powers; he also accepted that the Province of Pisa’s case would 
include those wider issues.  
For that reason, the judge held that the proceedings were not likely to be ‘principally 
concerned with’ the validity of the decisions of the Province of Pisa and hence ultra vires. 
While that was an important issue, it was not of itself a decisive issue because of the wider 
issue of the validity and enforceability of the swaps. The judge accordingly refused to decline 
English jurisdiction. 
In the banking and financial sector parties enter into contracts bilaterally or multilaterally 
using different forms of standardised agreements such as the ISDA Master Agreements and 
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other forms with different governing law and jurisdiction clauses. Some of the jurisdiction 
clauses can be exclusive or non-exclusive.  
Many transactions, particularly structured finance transactions, involve multiple agreements 
and multiple parties domiciled in different jurisdictions. A number of the transaction 
agreements can often be governed by different laws. In such, a single transaction can involve 
agreements that contain submissions to the exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction of 
different courts. In addition, the parties’ contractual relation can be governed by one law or 
more depending on the structure of the transaction.  
This does not, however, preclude them from choosing exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Further, 
a bank may operate in different markets through one or more branches in those markets. As a 
result, a customer of the bank can enter into different agreements with different branches in 
different jurisdictions. Each agreement can contain different choices of law and jurisdiction 
clauses. 
A dispute between the two parties may lead to disputing one or more of these agreements. 
Needless to say, that customer can be another bank with multiple branches. Therefore, 
multiple and parallel proceedings are quite likely and the risk of inconsistent decisions 
occurring in this multi-jurisdictional dispute is eminent.455  
However, the risk of inconsistent decisions is not always a multi-jurisdictional one: it can 
happen between judges in the same jurisdiction. In Rawlinson v Kaupthing Bank 456 and 
Lornamead Acquisitions Limited v Kaupthing Bank HF [2011] EWHC 2611 (Comm.) 457 the 
issue was whether claims made in England against Kaupthing Bank an Icelandic bank, should 
be decided in the English courts or in the Icelandic courts. Kaupthing was subject to 
insolvency orders and proceedings in Iceland due to the financial crisis.  
In the Rawlinson case, Burton J held that the English courts had jurisdiction on the broad 
basis that the English proceedings had been commenced prior to the relevant Icelandic 
insolvency proceedings.  
On the other hand, Gloster J in the Lornamead case, with what seemed to be the same 
circumstances and jurisdictional issues, said that: "[I] have concluded that, in the interests of 
judicial comity, and deployment of judicial resources, the appropriate course is for me to say 
that, despite my doubts, I am not ‘convinced’ that Burton J was wrong and that, accordingly, 
I should follow his decision.” 
In two other cases, it can be illustrated how jurisdictional issues can arise in a non-ultra vires 
context. First, in Deutsche v Sebastian Holdings458 the Court of Appeal, following Fiona 
Trust Holding Corp v Privalov,459 said that jurisdiction clauses must be construed broadly. 
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Parties to multiple agreements do not expect their disputes to be litigated or determined by 
different tribunals.  
However, where there are multiple related agreements, the courts will look into the intention 
of the parties as revealed by their agreement at the outset of the transaction, against those 
general principles, for example, if the agreements may have been entered into not as part of 
one overall transaction but of multiple transactions and over a long period. 
In Deutsche Bank v Tongkah,460 similar issues were raised in relation to a series of 
agreements that provided for optional arbitration and for litigation. The issues concerned 
Deutsche Bank and whether as a party to multiple related agreements containing optional 
arbitration clauses it could choose to litigate under one agreement and simultaneously 
arbitrate under the other.  
The claimant, Deutsche Bank, argued that its different divisions in Amsterdam and London 
were both involved with the same customer Tongkah Harbour Public Co, a Thai corporation, 
and each branch took a different view of arbitrating in Amsterdam and litigating in London. 
The court, following Fiona Trust461 said that Deutsche Bank was one contracting entity and 
the different divisions were irrelevant. 
Another case of two banks disputing an issue of securities is UBS AG v HSH Nordbank 462, a 
case involving issuing securities under a CDO transaction463. None of the contracts out of 
which the dispute arose contained a submission to the jurisdiction of the English courts. HSH 
argued that the English court had no jurisdiction under the Judgments Regulation.  
UBS in turn argued that the dispute arose from contracts forming part of an overall 
transaction. They presented that these contracts contained exclusive English jurisdiction 
clauses. They also argued further that an exclusive English jurisdiction clause in a dealer’s 
confirmation of the transaction applied to the dispute.  
8.2. CASES IN ARBITRATION  
The above cases could have been presented to a financial arbitration tribunal for resolving the 
dispute. The counterparties may be disposed to the possibility of choosing a hearing in their 
own or neutral jurisdiction. Arbitration also offers those parties the ability to appoint an 
expert tribunal as opposed to the more random judicial allocation process, over which the 
parties have no control, with the possibility of a contradicting outcome, as we have seen in 
the Icelandic Banks cases.   
By resorting to financial arbitration, parties to a dispute will find substantial advantages other 
than deciding on jurisdiction and ultra vires. Parties have their disputes heard, including 
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multi-party disputes, and resolved efficiently, cost-effectively and with certainty by 
arbitrators with expertise drawn from the financial sector and chosen by the parties.  
Arbitration, as a process, is not required to resolve any dispute unless the parties to the 
dispute have agreed, either by way of a pre-existing arbitration clause in an applicable 
agreement between them, or ex post, that their dispute is to be resolved by an arbitration 
tribunal.  
It may also be that a party that has raised a jurisdictional issue is persuaded by the other party 
or parties to the dispute to drop that issue on the basis that both or all parties submit to the 
jurisdiction of a financial tribunal. 
8.3 COMPLICATED FINANCIAL DISPUTES 
While judges may and do say that ‘there is no dispute’ about the principles to be used in the 
interpretation of contracts or that those principles are ‘not controversial’, the act of 
interpretation itself is disputed and can be controversial. In Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank464, 
Lord Clarke said that the correct approach to construction of the securities in question 
(bonds) as in the case of any contract, was not in dispute.’ Other recent cases in the English 
courts are good examples of these difficulties facing parties in litigation for financial 
disputes.  
The issue in that matter also lies in market understanding of the documentation and the 
structure of a complex financial transaction (CFT) and what the public perceive (a) judicial 
decisions that do not support CFT understanding; (b) in the face of conflicting judicial 
decisions, confidence in financial institutions is eroded especially in times of crises.  
Confidence in the ability and knowledge of state and national courts when faced with a CFT 
dispute is an essential requisite for market confidence. This concern and lack of confidence 
today in large measure explain the background to the need for an established theory and 
practice of an arbitration process capable of contract interpretation, and jurisprudence that 
best suits the interpretation of market standard agreements, in markets and jurisdictions 
worldwide. 
Part of the answer to that issue further lies in the fact that, in the case of market standard 
agreements such as the ISDA Master Agreement, the tension between relative brevity and the 
need to draft an agreement that is effective or ‘works’ in a range of jurisdictions as well as 
under two governing laws (e.g. the laws of England and Wales and of the State of New 
York), means that compromise by the parties is inevitable.  
However, in the financial sector where substantial sums are at stake ambiguity may also exist 
because CFT agreements are complex and specialized. The risk of ambiguity arises, for 
example, because the commercial terms of the actual transaction need to be drafted, or 
because that transaction may be unusual or uncommon.  
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For those reasons, it may be expected that a reasonable number of CFT agreements are poorly 
or wrongly drafted. When the harsh light of hindsight is thrown on some of the provisions in 
those agreements, some sense needs to be made of the ambiguities.465 
8.4. OBSERVATIONS ON CASES  
From the perspective of financial arbitration, a number of observations may be made about 
disputes involving complicated transactions: 
(a) A complicated transaction dispute is naturally a case for arbitration comprised of a panel 
of expert arbitrators to be chosen by the parties. If the court for example in Anthracite had 
had the ‘hindsight’ to decide for elective early redemption, the arbitrators being experts 
would have had the knowledge to know how the financial markets operate and that an 
elective termination is what traders transact upon. 
(b) An interpretation case involving the construction of a provision in a market standard CFT 
agreement is a financial arbitration case. This is true especially when “something has gone 
wrong with the language” that can raise commercial absurdity arguments in the performance 
of a financial transaction. It is true to say that financial tribunals would be expected to better 
understand the wider documentation context and any consequent absurdity better than a court 
judge and also be alive to potential manipulation of the wording by the parties. 
(c) Cases such as Lehman Brothers surfaced post 2008 crisis when certain entities became 
insolvent. The mandatory nature of insolvency law and principals involved can allow 
financial mediation to hear a dispute that raises insolvency issues.  
8.5. MIS-SELLING FROM THE ARBITRATION PERSPECTIVE  
Following the global financial crisis in 2008 there was a huge surge of claims from clients 
and customers of banks and financial institutions who made claims of mis-selling involving 
CFTs. The claims were made to recover losses and ask for restitution. The claims before 
courts were raised by institutional and professional clients including banks against banks, 
sophisticated clients and customers, pension and hedge funds, municipalities, high net worth 
individuals. Those clients were often trading through investment vehicles fully owned or 
operated by large investment banks.  
Fewer claims were made by retail clients although many of them were settled outside court. 
In the case of Bank Leumi v Wachner the client was a high net worth and extremely 
successful businesswoman, the CEO of a Fortune 500 company. She traded dozens of 
complicated reverse knock-in foreign exchange options. The bank sought to recover its 
margin call from the defendant. She counterclaimed alleging negligence in the sale to her by 
the claimant of foreign exchange options. Wachner’s counterclaim failed.466 
 (a) Typically, these cases have involved claims by aggrieved bank clients and customers who 
may have been expected to believe that a court will give them a sympathetic hearing. This 
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stems from the post financial crisis and the belief on the part of much of the public that banks 
and bankers deserve some retribution. That being so, it may also be expected that such a 
claimant has been predisposed to issue judicial proceedings rather than agree ex post with the 
bank to submit their dispute to arbitration. In broad terms courts have not been sympathetic to 
claimants alleging misrepresentation or mis-selling against banks. It may also be claimed that 
the reported cases are ones that banks had confidence of winning. Put another way, banks 
have been settling mis-selling claims where they consider that their prospects of success at 
trial are not sufficiently strong.  
(b) The above cases are in principle arbitration cases but it may be that the parties were not 
willing to submit to arbitration. Nevertheless, arbitration’s neutrality and the expertise of 
arbitrators will assist the resolution of such disputes in the future with the confidence that the 
process and settlement of awards will be swift. Prospective defendants to misselling or other 
financial services claims will welcome the court’s finding that the terms of the parties’ legal 
relationship does not change as a result of the defendants providing the claimants with market 
information and opinions. As with Springwell,467 the decision in Wilson v MF 
Global,468demonstrates that the courts are receptive to the argument that financial services 
cannot be provided without some form of advice or recommendation being given, but that 
fact alone should not be taken out of all context in order to advance a claim. MF Global 
Holdings Ltd. was sued by an investor who claims the brokerage caused him to lose about 1 
million pounds ($1.55 million) by encouraging him to make short-term, risky trades. It was 
held that no advisory duty owed by broking house to client trading in high risk securities. 
However, much will depend on the facts. For example, claimants (Wilson) attempted to 
demonstrate that they had not been properly classified regarding expert trading. This was met 
with some resistance from the court in circumstances where Wilson himself was responsible 
for the errors in the information on which his classification was based. More details are to 
follow on this case in (8.7). 
Generally, the English courts have taken a pro-bank and financial institution approach. They 
have taken a sensible approach tending to refuse assessing risk in relation to CFT agreements 
following the global financial crisis. Courts have looked closely at the commercial context 
and the realities of the parties’ relationship and have given effect to party autonomy in 
contract. In particular courts have held the aggrieved investors to their contractual bargain in 
which they agreed that the banks’ liability for misrepresentation was excluded and that the 
banks owed no advisory duty. Where there is no duty, the investor in effect must rely on 
misrepresentation, which in turn requires the court to investigate in some detail what was said 
to the investor and by whom. The claims of regulatory breach tend to be more difficult. Some 
banks have been found inefficient in terms of the communications made to their investor 
sales process.  
For these reasons, mis-selling cases are fact-specific and much turns on the evidence, which 
the English courts have not shied away from examining in great detail, in part to uncover 
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opportunistic claims.469 Where there has been a breach of duty, the courts have tended to find 
that there was no reliance and no causation and hence no loss.470  In other words, courts 
decided in cases of misselling that investors who invested in the wholesale market such as 
overseas banks and other corporate institutions are supposed to be experts and to be treated as 
a matter of caveat emptor - Buyer be aware.  
8.6. CASE FOR ARBITRATION 
All that said, it is likely that some claimants regard courts as unsympathetic to misselling 
claims. It came to be expected also that more jurisdictional issues are raised in claims of this 
type. The case for a specialized court or tribunal such as P.R.I.M.E. Finance on an 
international basis in complicated financial transactions is a compelling and a sound one. The 
case for a swift process of resolving financial disputes with guaranteed award settlement is 
well positioned to address many issues that arise in financial and banks disputes and to fill the 
asserted international void. State and national courts will always have their important place. 
However, conflicting recent cases in courts are good examples of the difficulties and 
complexities that exist in the resolution of CFT disputes in the international world of banking 
and finance. These cases are also examples of how judges can struggle with complex issues 
that market participants would have carefully thought through and understood from a legal as 
well as a practical perspective. 
Markets and market participants can today bank on CFT disputes continuing to occur if not 
increase. Markets and market participants need legal clarity, certainty and predictability. 
They also need confidence in the outcomes of the resolution of their disputes, as well as in 
disputes in other markets and with other market participants. The proposal for a swift 
clearance of financial awards is well positioned to satisfy the provisions of the required 
clarity and predictability the markets are seeking. 
8.7. DUTHIE WILSON V MF GLOBAL  
Duthie Wilson v MF Global is a case involving CFT futures derivatives trading471 where 
significant part of the strategy of Wilson which involved frequent day-trading of contracts for 
futures and options in a very active and aggressive way. Wilson brought these proceedings in 
his personal capacity as well as being a trustee of a company pension scheme known as 
Donwin, of which PS Trustees Ltd was the corporate co-trustee.  
The defendants were financial intermediaries, brokers and derivative traders, regulated by the 
FSA, through whom Wilson (on behalf of himself and Donwin) had conducted short-term 
trades in contracts for differences, futures and options.  
Pursuant to the applicable account documentation, trades were conducted on an execution-
only basis, Wilson having accepted “a calculable risk in order to achieve a profit” with a 12-
month investment horizon. The claimants sought to recover losses arising from Wilson’s 
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trading activity, alleging: breach of statutory duty under s150 FSMA 2000472 and breach of 
contract. In respect of all but one account, the claimants had been classified as “intermediate 
customers” pursuant to Code of Business Rules (COB) Rule 4.1R, which was part of the FSA 
Handbook.  
The claimants alleged that they should have been classified by the defendants as “private 
customers” instead. Had they been so classified, they would have obtained the protections 
granted to private customers then available under COB. These included the obligation to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that: 
 Any personal recommendation to buy or sell a designated investment was suitable 
(COB rule 5.3.5R) 
 When making a personal recommendation, the private customer understood the nature 
of the risks involved in its trading activity (COB rule 5.4.3R). 
Accordingly, the defendants should have explained to the claimants at the beginning that 
engaging in short-term trading was inappropriate, highly risky and likely to lead to losses due 
to the commission and financing charges payable. As such, their trading losses would have 
been avoided.  
However, the claimants alleged that regardless of classification and notwithstanding the 
execution-only basis of the contractual relationship, the defendants had in fact conducted 
their relationship with the claimants on an advisory basis. They also claimed the defendants 
had made personal recommendations. The claimants also pursued claims for breach of 
implied terms to comply with COB and breach of duty of care. 
Judge Eady J rejected all of the claimants’ breach allegations. The court came to this decision 
following the approach in Spreadex v Sekhon.473 The test is whether reasonable care had been 
taken to determine that the clients had sufficient experience and understanding to be 
classified as intermediate customers under COB rule 4.1.9R. 
The defendants discharged their responsibilities with respect to classification by way of a 
two-stage process. First, they undertook a preliminary classification in order to tailor 
documentation to be sent to the clients in order to obtain further information. Secondly, any 
information sent by the client would have been assessed before a final classification was 
made.  
The defendants confirmed that they followed that process by making a preliminary 
classification of “intermediate customer” based on the information they obtained from 
Wilson over a telephone call. Wilson was subsequently sent documentation which he signed 
and returned, confirming: 
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 He had more than two years’ experience of trading in shares, bonds and funds, with 
an average daily trade of £20,000; 
 He had less than six months’ experience of trading in futures and options; 
 He had between six months’ and two years’ experience of trading in CFDs; and 
 His gross annual income is in excess of £300,000. 
Amongst the claimants’ submissions is that the alleged information provided was insufficient 
for the defendants to undertake a classification of his risk level and was also inaccurate.  The 
court rejected this submission. The defendants were entitled to take Wilson’s claims as to 
past trading and experience at face value.  
Any inaccuracies in that information were his own fault. Further, the defendants’ 
classification system was carefully designed to convey warnings and elicit information that 
would enable them to comply with their classification obligations. The claimants had no 
legitimate complaint about the classification process. It followed that the protections in COB 
for private customers could not have been triggered. 
The court rejected the advisory claim. 
With respect to the advisory claim and that the defendants gave the wrong advice to the 
claimant, the defendants accepted that regardless of the contractual documentation if personal 
recommendations had been made it would have been necessary to comply with COB rule 
5.3.5R. The question for the court was, therefore, whether the relationship had been 
conducted on an advisory basis and whether any personal recommendations had been made. 
The Judge emphasised the status of Wilson and Donwin as “intermediate customers” and the 
fact that Wilson’s account included an on-line trading platform was designed to enable him to 
implement his own investment strategy and personal day-to-day trading using his own risk 
judgement. Against this background, there was no duty on the part of the defendants to 
provide advice and there was no obligation to ensure that recommendations were suitable. It 
would be clearly understood by any reasonable client in Wilson’s position that he was not 
being given advice on the merits of particular transactions and any information or opinions 
offered were to be regarded as purely incidental to the dealing relationship.  
The conversations between the claimant and the defendant were characterised as exchanging 
information or “bouncing ideas off each other”. The Judge said that: 
“It would be unfair and unrealistic to pick upon certain passages in [the broker’s] 
observations, with six or seven years of hindsight, and to conclude that he had 
suddenly changed into “advice mode” and was undertaking an obligation, on his 
own initiative, to give advice on behalf of his employers to an “intermediate 
customer”. If such conversations were to be subjected regularly to analysis of that 
kind with a view to changing the express terms of the parties’ relationship, 




In addition, the telephone transcripts and tapes offered as evidence clearly indicated that 
Wilson was an experienced and confident investor. The Judge also rejected the claimants’ 
common law claims.  
The court held that there was no basis to imply an obligation to comply with the applicable 
COB rules since that obligation was imposed by statute in any event. In doing so, the Eady J 
referred to Redmayne Stockbrokers v Isaacs474.  
In this case, Hamblen J declined to imply a suitability term requiring compliance with COB 
rule 9R. The decision was based on the difficulty in concluding that an implied term was 
necessary or that the contract was unworkable without the term where the obligation was 
covered by regulatory requirements in respect of which there is a cause of action for breach 
of statutory duty. As to a breach of duty of care, the defendants in Redmayne and Duthie 
Wilson were entitled to rely on the applicable exemption clauses in the account 
documentation. In addition, the court noted that the fact the broker expressed his views from 
time to time about the market or about particular opportunities did not amount to an 
assumption of responsibility on the part of the defendants. Hence, it does not bring on the full 
range of obligations of an investment adviser.475  
Quantification of Loss: The court considered the claimants’ case on quantification of loss 
and if they were properly advised, they would have implemented a long term trading strategy. 
The Judge rejected this submission on the basis that it was difficult to see why such advice 
should have been given, as Wilson never at any stage asked for advice on his trades. In any 
event, the court confirmed the defendant’s statement that the defendants would not have 
advised him to approach certain products in which he traded on his own.  
8.8. CAMERATA PROPERTY INC. V CREDIT SUISSE  
In Camerata Property  v Credit Suisse476, the claimant requested that in the “course of the 
dealings they conducted with Credit Suisse, the relevant bank account manager increasingly 
became interested and excited by more adventurous investments that he solicited to the 
claimant  
The judgment in Camarata was that the loss of an investment in a five-year note (“the Note”) 
issued by a Lehman Brothers entity, had not been caused by negligence or gross negligence 
on the part of Credit Suisse under the terms of the investment advisory service agreement 
(“the Agreement”). Although the claim failed, the court considered the difference between 
negligence and gross negligence under English law. 
Camarata, a company owned by a trust whose sole beneficiary was an individual, bought the 
Note through Credit Suisse for US$12 million. When Lehman Brothers became bankrupt, 
Camarata lost a significant part of its investment. Prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
Camarata sought advice from its relationship manager at Credit Suisse regarding its 
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investments, including the Note. Camarata claimed that the advice it received was negligent 
and in breach of the Agreement. Camarata also had claimed that, but for this advice, 
Camarata would have sold the Note before Lehman Brothers failed. Credit Suisse argued that 
it was not in breach of its duties and that, in any case, Camarata would not have sold the Note 
even if Credit Suisse had given different advice. 
Decision 
The Court held that the advice sought by Camarata was generic and did not specifically ask 
whether the Note was safe from neither risk of counterparty default nor whether the banks 
with which Camarata held investments were safe. In view of the general nature of the advice 
sought, Credit Suisse was not at fault in failing to check the identity of the Note’s issuer 
before responding. Whilst it was accepted that Camarata would have sold the note had Credit 
Suisse advised that there was a serious risk of counterparty default, there was no way that 
Credit Suisse could have predicted the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Thus, even if Camarata 
had established that Credit Suisse had been guilty of negligence or gross negligence that 
would not have caused Camarata's loss. 
The court held that the concept of gross negligence had to be considered in view of the 
Agreement as a whole as opposed to being a defined concept under English law. As the 
Agreement referred to both negligence and gross negligence, a difference between the two 
terms had been intended and mere negligence on Credit Suisse’s part would be insufficient in 
the circumstances. The court suggested that the difference between the two was one of degree 
as opposed to kind and would need to be considered in the context of a contract on a case by 
case basis. 
8.9. OBSERVATIONS ON MIS-SELLING CASES 
These disputes have common themes. They involve complicated financial products such as 
derivatives and structured obligations. They involve sometimes implied sophistication by the 
client or investor in search of yield. The products sold or traded result sometimes in 
substantial losses often as a result of margin calls that were not met. The client will then tend 
to bring claims on a broad basis, alleging the existence of mis-advice rather than an 
execution-only relationship. In Standard Chartered v Ceylon Petroleum,477 a claim for 
damages arising out of alleged breach of advisory duty partly on the basis of the asymmetry 
of sophistication between the parties, the court held that the bank did not in the circumstances 
hold itself out as an adviser; rather, the bank acted in a sales capacity.  
Other claims involve breach of fiduciary duty, negligent or even fraudulent misstatement.478 
Others may go as far as deceit, misrepresentation and breach of implied terms. In Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland479 the Austrian bank claimed that RBS was 
liable in deceit for knowingly making false misrepresentations.  
                                                 
477
 Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corporation [2011] EWHC 1785 (Comm) 
478
 Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino S.p.A. v Barclays Bank Ltd [2011] EWHC 484 (Comm) 
479
 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm) 
179 
 
In Risparmio. v Barclays480, the court found no evidence that any such false representations 
had been made by Barclays PLC with requisite knowledge. In Cassa di, the San Marino bank 
claimed that Barclays Bank was liable for deceit in relation to certain structured credit notes. 
The claims varied from lack of sophistication, misunderstanding about the nature of the 
investment, contractual terms signed but neither read nor understood, the unsuitability to the 
investor of the products sold or trades made, and breach of regulatory or statutory duty, as 
well as illegality, lack of capacity and lack of authority.481  
9. GOVERNANCE THROUGH AWARD SETTLEMENT  
Arbitration laws in most jurisdictions are quite detailed. They cover matters such as the 
consent of the parties to an arbitral or conciliation proceeding, the appointment of arbitrators, 
provisions regarding witnesses, evidence, costs, registration, modification, and correction of 
the award. A notable shortcoming, however, is the absence of important detail regarding the 
procedures to be followed when it comes to award enforcement. 
Other provisions in most jurisdictions are apparent in allowing their national courts wide 
discretion in interfering with the procedure of enforcement of awards itself.  Here, the scope 
of analysis should move from the realm of procedural norms to the substance of the 
applicable laws that govern payment of awards. 
Those are the provisions of the substantive applicable laws with common consent of the 
parties to arbitration. Those provisions are what a clearing process needs to refer to and upon 
which the enforcement and payment of the arbitral award is to be based.  
Based on these considerations, it is clear that there is no unified, single legal framework that 
is accepted by all parties as being a process for the payment of awards resulting from disputes 
between financial institutions and their clients. Financial regulatory authorities rely on 
statutory laws that are still, after years of numerous crises strongly entrenched in reactive 
legislations and regulations.  
These laws apply in principle in individualistic jurisdictional systems over entire countries, 
but in practice their use is confined to domestic banks and locally disputed transactions. 
However, further confirmation of the difficulty of resolving international financial disputes is 
based upon the fact that conflicts have exacerbated in the 2008 crisis.  
This increase was mostly influenced by the intensifying of financial regulations and 
legislation upon tribal like banks and corporate intermediaries. They failed to register 
excessively large high risk items on their balance sheets and financial reports either out of 
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being overwhelmed by the intensity and volume of regulations or out of ignorance of the law 
and how to abide by it.482  
This chapter has submitted justifications on the thesis that arbitration can be a tool in the 
regulatory processes and the governance of the financial sector against acts of moral hazard 
as well as restrain panic runs. It must be noted that this does not present arbitration as a 
replacement of regulations or regulatory authority and the supervisory power they can 
provide. However, regulators are restricted from interfering in financial disputes due to the 
contractual nature of such disputes which can only be resolved through litigation or some 
form of ADR.483  
The network model of investors and clients can be able to assess the size of potential direct 
contagion channels due to cross-holding of securities between investors.  The network can 
also simulate how an outcome of an arbitration involving one bank can lead to a flow of 
information and modification of links within the banking sector. Banks and financial 
institutions can distance themselves from one risky institution if news come out that they 
were compelled by arbitration to compensate their clients. 484 
Moreover, it may also give guidance to regulators on practices taking place within the 
banking interconnected network. The network model can therefore help to identify situations 
where outcomes of one or more disputes do involve financial stability risks. It will alert 
authorities to ex-ante crises, so they can take mitigating measures to reduce such contagion 
risk. 
This thesis proposes, in conjunction with the clearing of awards, another process where 
awards can be discounted for financing the losing party and to instantly pay the claimant. 
This mechanism will help inform policy makers and regulators about the adequacy of capital 
levels in the banking sector and the ability of banks to meet further resolutions such as bail-
in.  
This can support regional regulatory authorities where there is the need for possible 
restrictions on bail-in or state interference bailouts. The minimum requirement for an eligible 
liabilities level can then be set for each bank on a case-by-case basis. 
As mentioned earlier, between 2007 and 2009, there were high numbers of national and 
transnational bank failures such as Fortis Bank in Belgium, Lehman Brothers in US, Anglo 
Irish Bank in Ireland, Dexia Bank in Belgium, plus the entire Icelandic banking system 
offshore and local. Those failures revealed essential inadequacies in the existing financial 
regulatory tools available to regulators.  
                                                 
482
 Crédit Agricole v European Central Bank (T-758/ 16) 24 April 2018, EU General Court 5.35– 5.36 
483
 A. Kashyap, R. Rajan and J. Stein (2008), “Rethinking Capital Regulation”, in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City, 2008 Economic Symposium, "Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System", pp. 431-471. 
484
 European Commission v Kingdom of Spain, 21 March 2012 [2012] ECR I-55 12.09 (Opinion of Mr. Mengozzi 
the Advocate General, Court of Justice of the European Union) 
181 
 
The main shortfall is that banks are global operators while regulatory rules are based on 
national policies. This entails a serious lack in coordination of financial regulatory reforms 
and the resolution of investors’ claims. Transnational coordination requires to be brought up 
to date with the rapid development in financial markets, to be effective in mitigating 
undesirable practices of moral hazard in the financial sector.485 Disputes of mis-selling, 
misrepresentation and asymmetric information have multiplied in view of such impairment 
and the absence of suitable platforms for resolving financial disputes.486 
Nevertheless, regarding consumer disputes and household depositors, governments, such as 
those in the US, India, EU and many Asian States, provide for consumer alternative dispute 
resolution schemes, such as ombudsmen, mediators or complaint boards that are put in place 
to resolve disputes between consumers and their financial service providers out-of-court. 
Usually, these ADR schemes offer a much quicker and cheaper way to settle disputes than in 
courts. 
In the EU, the currently dispute resolution (ADR) schemes in different member states either 
cover financial services sectors (e.g. the Italian Banking Ombudsman scheme, the German 
Insurance Ombudsman, the French Ombudsman of the Authority of Financial Markets) or 
cover all financial services sectors (e.g. the UK Financial Ombudsman Service, the Consumer 
Complaints Manager of the Malta Financial Services Authority, and the Dutch Financial 
Services Complaints Institute).  
On the other hand, there are schemes that handle consumer complaints in general, for 
example the Swedish National Board for Consumer Complaints and the Lithuanian State 
Consumer Protection Authority. 
Most of the ADR schemes are central but some, such as the Lisbon Arbitration Centre for 
Consumer Conflicts, are regional. There are schemes that were established by public 
authorities (e.g. the Complaints Service of the Bank of Spain, and the Irish Financial Services 
Ombudsman's Bureau) and others were established by private actors such as the associations 
of financial services providers (e.g. the Ombudsman of the German Cooperative Banks). 
In other cases, those schemes are established by associations of financial services providers in 
cooperation with consumer organisations such as the Danish Complaint Boards.487 This has 
led this thesis to particularly examine corporate and banking disputes that are mainly between 
investors, banks and financial institutions.  
This thesis presents an arbitration proposal as a solution for general defects in the judicial 
systems around the world which have to deal with increasingly complicated financial disputes 
and the excessive duration of civil cases in front of courts. 
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The right for speed and immediate justice is a main principle established in the EU Lisbon 
Treaty, to “ascertain social justice”. It expressly affirms the principles adopted by the 
European Parliament ensuring the development of alternative methods of dispute resolution 
as a right for swiftly satisfying the need for justice (Article 81 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU). 
The establishment of a swiftly satisfying financial dispute resolution process and overcoming 
the difficulties in enforcing the outcomes of such disputes’ resolution to all parties in the 
dispute are the basis for this thesis. The proposed process operates in a unique sector where 
disputants are banks and financial institutions that hold assets for one another. The award 
paying mechanism proposed here will use the existing interbank clearing and settlement 
systems such as SWIFT488 and CHAPS.489 
The clearing systems can be used for immediate enforcement and payment of international 
arbitration awards within a network of a banks’ forum for the resolution of financial and 
banking disputes. The forum will include, therefore, the positioning of doctrines derived from 
within the rules and regulations of the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958).  
As a result, current financial market disputes which accentuate uniform means of settlement 
now will in the future be able to lead other industry sectors towards the containment of 
disrupted economies in times of crisis by swiftly resolving creditors’ disputes. In the specific 
sector of banking and financial services most of the transactions are of international nature.  
The said mechanism will give an added value by circumventing slow paced national judicial 
systems of given countries and apply a level of efficiency through fully comprehending the 
disputed transaction in hand. However, recourse to such mechanism will not only be for 
avoiding litigation. To an extent, the main objective is to decelerate multiplying breakdown 
in the relation of trust between financial institutions and their creditors. 
Arbitration as a form of dispute resolution enjoys certain privileges of privacy and secrecy. 
The benefit of avoiding the damaging effect of “excessive” publicity on the substandard 
conduct of certain financial institutions can be positively perceived. Confidentiality will 
soften the negative publicity of the financial sector and reduce the risks of panic runs by the 
public.  
As explained earlier, this thesis does not identify dispute resolution as the only effective 
approach for the mitigation of moral hazard and containment of crises. Results of financial 
disputes are indicative evidence of noticeable disagreements. If those disputes are in the 
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banking sector it may constitute a beginning of an undesired trend requiring strict regulatory 
intervention.490 
Europe and the US experienced institutional failures in their financial sectors during the crisis 
due to existing traditional banking regulatory models that were developed but never changed. 
The global financial crisis that ensued has brought about profound changes to the world of 
banking. Within those changes, there was greater awareness of the rights and duties of those 
operating in the financial sector.  
The search has continued for suitable measures to protect the interests of investors, customers 
and financial intermediaries as an essential safeguard for the stability of financial systems 
around the world.491 A swift payment process for arbitral awards in the financial sector can be 
the answer for this search. 
10. CONCLUSION 
Corporate governance influences the efficiency of firms’ production at the corporate level so 
that the effectiveness of a nation’s corporate governance system shapes economic 
performance at a country level. Standard agency theory defines the corporate governance 
problem in terms of how institutions may be held liable for the actions of their executives, 
and the extent to which shareholders as well as depositors of a financial institution can induce 
managers to act for the benefit of both, the institution represented by the shareholders and the 
public represented by depositors and investors. 
In particular banks and financial institutions, in certain cases may allocate with the blessing 
of their shareholders, high stake incentives to induce fund managers to behave in ways that 
favour the interests of the institution but may hurt the interests of the public and the nation's 
overall financial system. In that, shareholders will be satisfied if the profitability of their 
institutions mounts and shares gain value regardless of how the directors they elected attained 
such profits. 
Regulatory governance of banks, financial intermediaries and non-bank financial 
intermediaries is different from standard corporate governance. Financial intermediaries and 
banks in particular have special attributes that intensify standard corporate governance 
problems and pervasive government involvement which raises impediments to effective 
corporate control.  
In essence, standard theories of financial corporate governance highlight the special problems 
facing the corporate governance of banks and financial intermediaries. By combining this 
theoretical perspective with international observations it is possible to conclude that the 
proposed arbitration method to resolve enforcement of investors disputes in the banking and 
financial sector will be effective. 
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The global financial crisis of 2008 was a crisis largely of human making. It was also a 
financial institutions’ governance crisis. Internal imbalances proved just as significant as the 
other triggers to the financial turmoil, and the events sparked a fresh round of deliberation 
about the most likely deficiencies in the governance of financial intermediaries. 
The roots of the crisis predominantly lay in unsupervised, inadequate bank capital, highly 
leveraged hedge funds, subprime mortgage securities and reckless loans. For years there were 
low interest rates, weak government enforcement efforts, minimal government interference 
and deregulations. 
The collapse of Northern Rock in the UK, Lehman Brothers in the US and other banks 
occurred because the financial risk generated by the US subprime mortgage lending was 
being directed and reused across the world through shadow banking structures. With 
hindsight, the credit-rating agencies failed terribly in the performance of their duties.  
Financial derivative products were so complex and non-transparent that even those who 
created them were unable to understand what they meant and too much legal manipulation 
was employed  to blame investors’ apparent sophistication. There were profound failures of 
the regulatory policy inadequate transparency. These ingredients came together to trigger a 
financial crisis of global proportions.  
Certainly, the question of how far poor regulatory governance of financial institutions led to a 
crisis is still a controversial topic to date. An immeasurable number of ‘wrongdoers’ have 
been identified to have contributed to the global financial crisis and there are more reasons 
now to isolate the key elements which contributed to it. 
Those reasons lay mostly in weak regulatory governance, absence of rapid restitution 
methods against offenders, profit driven executives, greedy and inattentive bank shareholders 
and unsuitable remuneration structures. 
Financial intermediaries lacked understanding of the technical strategies of the financial 
products they were selling and showed low ethical standards when they pushed those 
products onto their clients.  
Shareholders appeared unable to scrutinise and monitor their company boards. They accepted 
all transactions they believed to be leading to higher profits for their holdings. They gave low 
priority to governance issues, thereby encouraging the risk-taking that eventually proved fatal 
for many institutions including their very own.  
In addition, there were clear and unquestionable failures of the system of regulatory 
governance. There were no regulatory rules on the quality and quantity of executive pay. 
There was no interest in the accountability and personal qualifications of those who managed 
financial firms when they were hired, for assessment of possible legal liabilities. 
Mostly, there was no emphasis on recourse methods particularly on the potential monitoring 
and supervisory role institutional investors can play or resort too apart from litigation.  
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The issue this thesis addresses is regarded as the pivotal point in regulatory governance of the 
banking and financial intermediary sector: investors confronting the aforementioned issues 
through an arbitration process that should not take longer than a few days can help redress the 
balance in governance of financial institutions. 
At the very least, it can identify deficiencies that can play a significant role in leading to a 
crisis, even if that role was in an indirect form.  
Investors equipped with such indirect governance over their bankers can provide a thorough 
critique of at least three fundamental elements of moral hazard:  
 Executives’ personal and professional accountability  
 Executive remuneration and its role as an incentive for high risk and immoral 
transactions 
 Regulatory authorities' alerting, engagement and activism  
The last point is especially important as it evaluates coordinated regulatory developments in a 
comparative perspective and will draw out some of the implications for the broader global 
trends in the area of financial institutions' governance. 
However, with a focus on the position in the UK and US, the issues underlying governance of 
moral hazard activities are in particular the rationalisations and conceptions through 
individualistic disputing actions. It will contribute productively and effectively to the ongoing 
worldwide efforts on financial institutions' governance. 
A key dilemma in any corporate governance system is how to make corporate executives 
accountable while still allowing those same executives the autonomy, the motivation and the 
power they need to create tough and solid institutions. The attention here is on the restoration 
of personal accountability primarily through law. The focus is on the failure of banks, and 
therefore the discussion predominantly talks about bankers’ accountability. 
Significantly, the approach taken is designed to address recklessness rather than fraud; this is 
because this latest crisis period is one characterised by reckless business decisions and lack of 
understanding of consequences, characteristics that have proven disastrous for the UK and 
global economy.  The general consensus is that precisely this type of behaviour pushed many 
institutions, particularly banks, to the brink of collapse.  
Even though the damage done cannot be overturned, the sharpening of bankers’ 
accountability can make less likely the occurrence of episodes that can cause serious 
externalities. Personal liability is imperative, primarily due to the conflicting enticements 
promoted through limited liability and the phenomenon of moral hazard. Yet, despite the 
crisis and the subsequent regulatory response, some of this behaviour remains.  
Although there are robust new liquidity standards and personal liability measures, more can 
be done to tackle mismanagement, incompetence and reckless risk-taking. Inconsistencies in 
law and regulation need to be eradicated. For instance, while it is possible to disqualify the 
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directors for unfitness, or make them personally liable to contribute financially to their 
institutions’ liabilities, the director of a company brought to the brink of insolvency but 
rescued by nationalisation or another form of government protection is not held accountable 
for the debts of the failing institutions.  
This is so irrespective of the level of wrongful or reckless trading they have engaged in.  
Certainly this is a serious deficiency of the current system of accountability, made worse by 
the fact that directors are generally confident that the system will not allow large institutions 
to fail. 
Directors frequently appear unable to comprehend the density of their institutions’ activities. 
Due to the complexities of financial models, directors frequently lack the knowledge to make 
good decisions and manage risk. The recent crisis is indicative of this: many of those who 
were involved with the production of complex products such as highly leveraged hedge funds 
and subprime mortgage securities had not really grasped the meaning of those products. 
But institutions can and do suffer when those who manage them are unable to appreciate fully 
the multifaceted operations their institutions are participating in; the crisis that started in the 
summer of 2007 showed a collective wisdom of individual ignorance, and ultimately many 
appeared out of their comfort zone. The weakness of executives to properly calculate and 
stick to a degree of risk suitable to their particular circumstances led them to place excessive 
reliance on internal advice, as shown by the events of Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock.  
Crucially, this reinforces the need to have appropriate behavioural incentives in place that can 
potentially diminish their cognitive limitations, at least to a degree. Therefore, as the current 
law has not proven to be an effective constraint against reckless behaviour, it is necessary to 
consider a variety of legal and regulatory strategies that can help eradicate the 
aforementioned weaknesses. 
Reinstating and reinforcing personal and professional responsibility in the financial sector 
will require a blend of different strategies; for instance, the promotion of ethics through the 
medium of education can be a cost-effective way to push for more responsibility in decision-
making. But a key focus falls upon the examination of two types of personal liability: 
monetary and non-monetary, including disqualification, wrongful trading and strict liability. 
These are considered as means to better the current accountability regime. The monetary 
liability of executives, promoted through the wrongful trading provisions of the Insolvency 
Act 1986, has been considered in depth, as well as the role the Banking Act 2009 can play in 
the sharpening of bankers’ accountability. Refining this area will enable the loophole that 
currently exists in law, whereby directors of nearly failed banks can escape liability, to be 
filled, at least to a degree.  
In relation to non-monetary liability, the effectiveness of disqualification, promoted through 
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, is deliberated at length, as well as the new 
criminal sanctions proposed by the government to tackle the kind of managerial misconduct 
witnessed during the past few years. 
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Yet, despite its powerful reappearance following the latest crisis, the levels of litigation and 
dispute resolution methods of enforcement do not seem to have been effective to a notable 
degree (if at all); in fact, directors have continued to reward themselves rather excessively.  
In the economic literature, the agency theory, which supports the client to bank primacy 
model, has long been the dominant theoretical framework used to validate executive actions. 
This theory reinforces all that executives enjoy, such as pay, remuneration and incentives. 
Theorists view "Pay for Performance" as an efficient mechanism for proper behaviour by 
company executives. However, a by-product of the incentives idea is another mechanism for 
motivating management to boost performance regardless of the risk associated with it. This 
can be generally regarded as an alignment problem.  
The question addressed is whether the current incentive mechanisms remain appropriate for 
rationalising executive actions. From this is generated the theoretical foundation of executive 
penalisation through a rapidly deployed dispute resolution mechanism that is final and 
immutable to appeal such as arbitration. 
The agency theory forms the basis of the corporate governance debate, but the catastrophic 
events of recent years create doubts as to whether it is still sensible to use it to rationalise the 
current levels of executive remuneration. The key principle of the agency theory is its 
efficiency in improving the corporate practices of executives through penalising the firm for 
the actions of their agencies. Rewards are supposed to motivate executives of a bank to act 
with a long-term focus on the welfare of the firm and its clients.  
However, this is the part where speedy enforceable arbitration awards can act as an incentive 
method and it is right to assume that they can motivate executives to do the right thing.  The 
key is that performance targets can narrow an executive’s focus, motivating them to take 
reckless risks instead unless they are to face retaliating damage payments and compensations. 
Realistically, regulations alone will never be sufficient if we fail to consider the problematic 
nature of banking and financial executives’ perspective of financial incentive psychology. 
Bankers get paid instantly for the profits they make for their institutions. Since key financial 
incentives are arguably effective to get bankers to break all rules of morality, countering that 
by imposing instantaneous damages and compensations will certainly explore the psychology 
angle of the most dominant part of a banker’s method of conducting business. 
This research takes a micro-perspective of individual investors and their capabilities to raise 
issues with the banks when needed. It introduces the interconnectedness of financial 
institutions as well the tendency for problems to be hidden during boom and exposed during 
crisis. 
The dispute resolution mechanism proposed will help identify financial institutions with large 
capacity to create high risk operations of financial market instruments and the risk of such 
instruments to breakdown the entire financial system. The mechanism will utilise a payment 
process of awards resulting of such disputes. It will be a clearing mechanism that grants 
instant international payment to arbitral awards in banking disputes. The mechanism will pay 
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claimants their awarded compensation instantly. At the same time, such compensation will 
represent instant retribution upon risk-taking bankers.  
Such compensatory payments will serve as an alert to financial regulatory authorities as to the 
activities of bankers and the nature of their high-risk activities. Such data will be available 
daily to the regulators due to the Standard Accounting Reporting requirements in most 
jurisdictions which require banks to present a closing financial report statement on a daily 
basis to their central banks.  
The proposed mechanism will use existing standard bank clearing networks for the 
enforcement and clearing of arbitral awards.  The technique proposed identifies the 
possibility of clearing, trading and discounting of arbitral awards for the sake of guaranteeing 




CHAPTER FIVE  
 INTERBANK AWARD CLEARING FRAMEWORK  
There are two essential components in the process of clearing of an international arbitration 
award for the final payment:  
1- Authentication; 
2- Enforcement. 
This Chapter introduces the possibility of implementing an award payment framework 
designed specifically for financial institution disputes. The framework can be implemented so 
that it can clear and pay out awards through existing international banking clearing systems 
such as SWIFT, European Standard Bank (ESB), TARGET, etc. The clearing process in this 
case should not take more than a few hours for an award to be presented for enforcement and 
be fully paid to the award creditor. 
On the other hand, there are several options that may involve blockchain and distributed 
ledger technology (DLT). Certain models that were developed involve central banks as the 
clearing hub which can also be introduced for the clearing of awards. However, the 
possibility of involving central banks may remove the confidentiality element of arbitral 
disputes and may influence the financial sector from resorting to this process in resolving 
their disputes.  
Another model to be proposed here will involve a third party formed of a forum of banks. 
The forum will have a more passive role than central banks trespassing into a confidential 
dispute process. Currently, there are currency and securities clearance models that can be 
evaluated on monetary supply implications and the positive impact on liquidity management 
for commercial banks, securities settlement risk, credit risk, and complexity of 
transactions.492 
1. INTERBANK AWARDS CLEARING 
The proposed framework in this thesis builds upon the existence of existing interbank 
clearing networks and identifies the possibility of clearing, trading and discounting of arbitral 
awards. By using such models, the process is guaranteed immediate functioning, the same 
speed of clearing awards as with financial instruments and the maintenance of liquidity in the 
market. As mentioned in earlier chapters, this theory follows empirical research showing that 
enforceable and swift dispute resolution mechanism for financial disputes can establish 
certainty and assist in deterring imbedded acts of moral hazard within the financial sector. In 
addition, by maintaining liquidity in the markets, it can impede financial crises and alleviate 
the burden on state bailouts using taxpayers’ money. 493 
The essential characteristics of an award are summarised in four main functions:  
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1- Conclusion of dispute - A final award terminates the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
2- Determination of parties’ rights and obligations - An award concludes the dispute as to the 
specific issue determined by the disputants so that it has “res-judicata” effect between the 
parties; 
3- Disposition of disputants’ claims - so as to dispose of parties’ respective claims; 
4- Recognition and enforceability - An international arbitration award should receive 
recognition by national judicial courts for the purpose of enforcement. 
These four main functions provide for the legal context and appreciation of arbitral awards. 
1.1. LEGAL DEFINITION OF ARBITRAL AWARDS 
There are very few definitions offered of arbitral awards. It is worth pointing out, for 
definition purposes, that there is no legal distinction to be made between international 
commercial awards and financial awards. Both instruments have the same function as they 
bring an end to a dispute with a decision rendered by an independent and impartial tribunal 
and are capable of being enforced.  
However, it is essential to ascertain the essential characteristics and legal nature of arbitral 
awards in order to appreciate their legal or economic value.  Such consideration is essential 
for the enforcement process which follows the issuing of the award.  
A meaningful definition and delimitation of the legal nature of arbitral awards may be well 
aligned with discussions about the juridical nature and philosophical foundations of 
arbitration. A legal definition of an arbitral award is that it is a decision made by an 
arbitration tribunal in an arbitration proceeding.494 It is a form of a declaration upon a decided 
matter determined in the arbitration proceedings, an injunctive relief, specific performance, 
contract rectification, setting aside or cancellation of a deed or other document. What is 
relevant in this definition is that an award is considered to be similar and corresponding to a 
court judgment.495 
Therefore an award is vested with the same functionality and powers as that of a court order. 
This definition aims to establish that arbitration has a powerful outcome and is not a poor 
alternative to court litigation. This is undisputedly a true statement, courtesy of The NY 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards which was 
designed to give coinage and international legal tender to arbitral awards.496  
The concern now is that the New York Convention has its weaknesses since the mechanics 
for enforcement are left to domestic courts and national judicial procedures.  Efficiency of the 
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enforcement mechanism is often intertwined with judicial efficiency, as well as nationalistic 
judicial attitudes towards the arbitral process.  
1.2. INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTABILITY OF AWARDS CLEARING 
An essential part of the worldwide financial system payment, clearing and settlement 
systems, also known as financial market utilities (FMUs), is to secure liquidity to financial 
institutions through speedy settlement of payments and securities clearance. Membership in 
FMUs allows financial institutions to maintain liquidity levels while serving customers and 
clients around the globe. 
The possibility of starting the clearing of financial awards in one of the currently existing 
clearing systems such as TARGET or FMU is to start the award clearing process working 
without regulatory or start-up delays of forums. On the other hand it will ensure that financial 
disputes processes and financial markets daily transactions function smoothly and effectively. 
Essentially, trust in banks is a fundamental ingredient in the effectiveness of the economy. 
Hence, the trust in a system that guarantees investors’ indemnity and restitution of rights is 
fundamental to the smooth operating of interbank relations. Such principle will motivate the 
free flow of capital across borders and support the implementation of general investment 
objectives without fear of misrepresentation or delays in award enforcement which is 
representative of legal remedies. 
Upon this principle, financial markets and financial institutions can bank on a dispute 
resolution system guaranteeing swift results between themselves and within the global 
financial sector. However, it is necessary to point out that dispute resolution processes 
currently in place, especially international arbitration, do not suffer shortages or defects in 
processing disputes.  
Parties choose arbitration as a dispute resolution process with the expectation that, with a 
settlement, an award will be rendered at the end of the arbitral process. The end-product of 
the arbitral process, the award, is clearly of utmost importance to the parties, and the 
successful party expects the award to be performed without undue delay. Unless parties can 
be relatively certain that they will be able to enforce the award at the end of the arbitral 
proceedings (if not complied with voluntarily), "an award in their favour will be only a 
peripheral victory" and would render the arbitral process largely meaningless.497 
A sound legal framework is indispensable in ensuring the recognition and enforcement of 
awards. The relative extensiveness and ease of enforceability of the arbitral award is an 
advantage of arbitration process. It arises because of networks of international and regional 
treaties providing for the recognition and enforcement of international awards. 
Similarly, a widespread and better developed network of corresponding financial institutions 
can be well coordinated for the payment of enforceable awards. Treaties and conventions 
form part of the legal framework for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. This 
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network will ensure an effective and reliable enforcement tool for the banks to commence on 
the clearing of arbitral awards. Meaningful arbitral awards are conditional upon effective and 
reliable enforcement mechanisms. 498 
Legal frameworks of enforcement such as national courts should not include only domestic 
interpretation and the black-letter law encapsulated in treaties and various national laws. 
They should also, encompass the underlying spirit of the scheme and principles of arbitration 
treaties, particularly the New York Convention. 
Judicial understanding of such principles and judicial attitude towards the enforcement of 
arbitral awards and arbitration in general, is crucial for the world economy and the 
continuation of such a process of dispute resolution. Statistics evidence the effectiveness of 
the legal frameworks in place for the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
However, while there is an international policy favouring the enforcement of international 
arbitral awards, and it is increasingly rare to find 'horror stories' of non-enforcement in 
published cases, exceptions unfortunately persist. In Asia for example, where the practice of 
international arbitration is more recent, there have been cases of non-enforcement which are 
contrary to international standards and practices in relation to the enforcement of arbitral 
awards.499 
Financial markets are naturally fragile and over regulated more so after the 2008 crisis as 
regulatory authorities and states stay non-trustingly vigilant over market innovations by 
banks of complicated financial transactions. One  way to ensure that the global financial 
industry stays healthy as a whole, even if individual impact investments struggle, is to 
develop innovative and value-aligned approaches to dispute resolution that mirror the 
innovations and value alignment found in financial investment deal structures as happened in 
subprime notes and mortgage backed bonds. 
Therefore it is necessary to examine trends in disputes in financial transaction structures and 
the documentation (contracts) that distinguishes financial disputes from other banking and 
commercial disputes such as commercial and syndicated loans. It is also necessary to identify 
unique challenges that may arise in disputes concerning weak or failing investments. 500 
2. INTERNATIONAL COINAGE FOR ARBITRAL AWARDS 
This thesis argues for international coinage and legal tender status for arbitral awards that 
essentially stems from the NY Convention principles. Universal acceptance requires 
recognition of international awards and instant enforceability.501 For an award to be 
                                                 
498
 Marc Blessing - The Major Problems Areas in the New York Convention, p.9 - 2006 
499
 Nicola Christine Port, Dirk Otto, Patricia Nacimiento and Herbert Kronke, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer Law International, 2010), 
p 145. 
500
 “International Bank Insolvencies, A Central Bank Perspective”, (Eds) Mario Giovanoli & Gregor Heinrich, 
Kluwer Law International, 1999. 
501
 S Bollee, “Les Methodes Du Droit International Prive a Lepreuve Des Sentences Arbitrales” Economica 2004. 
193 
 
universally acceptable on face value, it implies examining the following characteristics of an 
international arbitration award and the processes that may be required by national courts: 
 Any document having the form of an award be easily recognized and enforced as a 
promise to pay, in a form similar to a bill of exchange or other negotiable 
instrument;502 
 The role of recognition and enforcement by national courts is to view the award as if 
it were a judgment of another national court of the same jurisdiction; 
 National courts may satisfy themselves as to the procedures followed by the tribunal 
in reaching the award through authentication;503 
 The Blockchain and smart contract technology may further speed the required 
authentication process and validation of the award. 
By legally qualifying a foreign arbitration award and the various theories relating to the 
nature of arbitral awards, this Chapter is to examine the missing elements needed to provide a 
comprehensive all-around internationally recognisable award payment framework.504 
2.1. DEFINITION AND LEGAL NATURE OF ARBITRAL AWARDS  
The discussion of the legal nature of arbitral awards is connected to the debate about the legal 
or juridical nature of arbitration. Although at first glance it appears to be a theoretical debate, 
it does have practical consequences.  
There is consensus as to the main theories about the juridical nature of arbitration with 
associated conclusions as to the legal nature of arbitral awards:  
(i) The contractual theory focuses on the origin of arbitration in the agreement of the parties 
to refer their dispute to arbitration and the consensual nature of arbitration. Since the 
arbitration agreement is enforceable, the outcome of the arbitration, the award, must also be 
enforceable. The arbitral award is the outcome of the agreement to arbitrate.  
For many, this is the result of agent theory: the award is a contract made by the arbitrators 
acting as an agent for the parties. This is an important concept as it ascertains the possibility 
that the holder of the award will maintain the right to sell, dispose clear or endorse the award 
to a third party, should it be agreed upon in the arbitration agreement.505 
(ii) The jurisdictional theory focuses on the endorsement of arbitration by national legal 
systems and the status of the arbitrator, which is equated to the judicial function of the judge. 
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The caveat, of course, is that judges and arbitrators are in the same business: the judge on the 
public side, and the arbitrator on the private side.  
It is the premise of this theory that arbitration and the national courts and national law 
interact, and that the law of the seat of arbitration is critical in determining the level of 
interaction.506 The arbitrators perform a judicial function and the result of this work, the 
arbitral award, is treated and is given the effect of a judgment of a national court at the place 
of enforcement.507 
(iii) However, the autonomous theory sees arbitration as a self-sufficient system founded on 
party autonomy and at least tolerated or endorsed by national laws. In the pure form of this 
theory, ‘the award is not a judgment and the arbitral agreement is not a contract like any 
other’.508  
The autonomy of arbitration combined with enforceability of its awards is indeed the ideal 
concept, even though this is possibly unattainable during the current world situation. 
Nevertheless, the concept could be feasible via the application of certain coordinated 
processes of award enforcement mechanisms in certain economic sectors such as the financial 
and banking sector as proposed by this thesis. 
On the other hand, a long term plan can still be put through for increasing harmonization of 
arbitration laws and practices through the New York Convention. This can be brought 
gradually to realisation at varying rates as different states require longer than others to impose 
alterations or amendments to their judicial processes and established laws.  
The focus now would be on the convention for more justification and legitimacy of 
arbitration as a dispute settlement system. The essential duty is of the instantaneous 
enforceability and monetizing of arbitral awards within the community of nations operating 
under the same principles of the NY Convention. However, these theories can have a major 
impact on how we legally define enforcement of arbitral awards. 509 
2.2. THE CONTRACTUAL LEGALITY OF AWARD ENFORCEMENT 
If an award were solely the outcome of a jurisdictional theory, then it would be fully 
controlled by the courts in whose territory the award was made. However, if an award is the 
outcome of a purely contractual approach, its enforcement will be entirely in the hands of the 
parties.510 
In the case of Saipem v Republic of Bangladesh, The International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) confirmed that when determining the validity of an award, they 
need to look at the entire operation. That included the initial transaction contract, the 
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transaction itself, the warranties, any retention money paid or received and the related ICC 
Arbitration Award.511 
The ICSID Tribunal explained that an award cannot be viewed in isolation. In other words, 
an award is part of the entire contractual agreement including all consensual provisions 
leading to the enforcement of the award. Should the parties consent that the award is to be 
exchanged or assigned, the rights are attached to the award. 
The Tribunal in its decision indicated that in taking the ordinary meaning of an arbitral 
award’s wording, rights under awards include the ordering of a party to pay an amount of 
money. This reflects the tradable nature of arbitral awards and the possibility of any 
document having the form of an award to be easily recognized and paid. It can be endorsed or 
cleared as a promissory note, a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument. 512 
The French Cour de Cassation in the much discussed Putrabali513 case stated that an 
international award is not connected to any legal system. It is an international judicial 
decision in its nature, whose legality is examined with regard to the applicable laws in the 
country where its recognition and enforcement are sought. 
However, international and transnational law, such as the New York Convention, also have 
an influence on the recognition and enforcement process. An award is de facto and de jure a 
judgment with transnational effect. This is supported by the New York Convention (Articles 
III-VI) and the ICSID Convention (Articles 53-55). 
The articles clearly impose a public international obligation on their respective contracting 
states to recognize and treat an award as if it were a decision of a local court.  Irrespective of 
where the debate regarding the legal nature of the arbitration as a system is, it is undisputed 
that the functionality of an award is judicial but has a wider enforceability than the judgment 
of a state court. 514 
3. THE VALUE OF MONETIZING ARBITRAL AWARDS 
Much like an investor willing to fund the legal fees and expenses to progress a claim, other 
investors also exist who have an investment appetite to purchase arbitration awards. The 
motivations for a claimant to want to monetize or partially monetize their award can vary 
enormously according to the discounted value of the award. 
For some it could simply be down to business survival and a pressing need for capital. The 
arbitration award might be the company’s most valuable asset, yet it is not one likely to be 
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recognized by traditional financial institutions. For others it might simply be spending fatigue 
(arising, for example, from a wish see an exit to what may have been a half decade or more of 
paying legal fees). 515 
For larger enterprises, an award can represent “non-asset backed” corporate finance so that 
the underpinning collateral is solely limited to the arbitration award rather than secured 
against other more tangible assets. Other reasons to monetize arbitration assets can be for 
bolstering the balance sheet in turbulent times. A government may use arbitral awards as 
collateral for supporting rather their local banks rather than the usual Bailout method.  
3.1. AWARD DISCOUNT CONCEPT 
The list of possible motivations could go on and on, but it is important to stress these 
arrangements have potential application regardless of the financial status of the claimant. 
There are no specific formulas as to how these arrangements are structured. Each case so far, 
had its own unique features such as: 
- The level of award and whether the award could be susceptible to future challenges in its 
enforceability; 
- The respondent’s financial status being in question;  
- The level of advance the claimant or respondent are seeking;  
- The pricing of the discount. 
Another important aspect when considering monetizing an award is that it doesn’t necessarily 
have to be at the post-award stage. For example, some professional investors will consider a 
partial monetization before an award is rendered, if required. Clearly this is a higher risk to 
the investor since they not only have to worry about whether the claim will prevail on 
liability, but also  lack certainty as to the quantum of the award if a favourable decision is 
received.  
Sometimes these pre-award monetization arrangements will form part of a wider litigation 
funding agreement, with the investor also funding some or all the legal budget on the 
claimant’s behalf. Whereas in other cases it might be a standalone arrangement, perhaps with 
the claimant self-funding fees or where the lawyers are on some form of contingency fee 
arrangement. 
Some (non-exhaustive) examples of how monetization arrangements might be structured are: 
i) The claimant is self-funding fees and expenses, but nonetheless has a need to raise capital 
from their arbitration asset. A partial monetization payment is made by an investor pre-award 
in exchange for a share of the proceeds ultimately recovered. The claimant is free to use the 
capital for whatever purpose they require. 
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ii) As above, but the monetization payment is only made at the point an award is received. In 
this scenario the parties might have already agreed the financial structure in advance of the 
award (perhaps with each expecting a favourable award being received). If the case is 
successful, the pre-agreed terms are immediately executed within weeks of the award being 
received.  
That payment might be an outright purchase or more likely a partial monetization. The 
investor and claimant would then have an agreed earn-out split based on the proceeds 
ultimately recovered. 
iii) A combination of the above two proposals. For example, the investor advances payments 
in two tranches. Typically, it would be a smaller payment for the pre-award payment given 
the heightened risk to the investor, followed by a subsequent (and often larger) payment if 
and when a favourable award is received. 
iv) Any of the three points above but combined with a traditional litigation funding 
agreement. For example, the investor finances the legal fees and expenses (or portion thereof) 
from the outset, but also integrates some monetization structure into the deal. 
3.2. BUYING AND SELLING AWARDS 
The market for trading awards did not seem to exist except only in one case. In 2011, only 
one example of assigned awards appear to have come openly to light which concerned 
investment arbitration awards with DR Congo being the award debtor. This example provides 
some interesting illustration of potential markets that might arise if a proper framework 
comes to exist. 
In FG Hemisphere v DRC516, two International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) awards had 
been assigned from EnergoInvest, a Bosnian state company, to FG Hemisphere, a US fund. 
FG then sought to enforce the awards in a number of jurisdictions, including the US, Jersey 
and Hong Kong.  It is interesting to note that in the Hong Kong proceedings the judge was 
initially “concerned that the assignment of the awards might constitute maintenance or 
champerty”517. However, the court subsequently accepted that, “on case authorities, 
assignment of awards do not constitute maintenance and champerty”. 
In Euler Hermes v PJSC Odessa Fat and Oil Plant518, EH (the assignee) sought to enforce a 
Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations (FOSFA) award in Ukraine. The application 
was refused on the basis that only the original party to the arbitration had the standing to seek 
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enforcement of the award. Whilst the Ukrainian Cassation Court set aside the lower courts’ 
decisions, the case illustrates a potential hurdle in enforcing an award in certain jurisdictions. 
Interestingly, a similar point was raised, unsuccessfully, by Argentina before the US court in 
Blue Ridge Investments v Argentina.519 That case concerned enforcement in the US of an 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) award in the CMS 
Gas v Argentina case. 520 
The award was assigned to Blue Ridge Investments LLC. Similarly, in a recent decision of 
the Thai Supreme Court, Judgment No 9691/2554, it was confirmed that awards are a stand-
alone right of payment with legal tender that are transferable. It may therefore be enforced for 
the benefit of the transferee and ultimate recipient of the transferred award.521 
The benefit of the award had been assigned to Blue Ridge, the petitioner in the case. 
Argentina argued, amongst other things, that “as an assignee, Petitioner lacks authority to 
seek recognition and enforcement of the Award”, and “only a party to the underlying 
arbitration can seek recognition or enforcement of the award under ICSID Convention Article 
54(2)522, while a transferee or assignee cannot.” 
Nevertheless, the judge carried out a detailed textual analysis of the use of the term “party” in 
the ICSID Convention and concluded that it “[did] not always refer to a ‘party to the 
arbitration”. The New York court found that “[nothing] in the ICSID Convention, in 
Congress’s legislation implementing ICSID, or in New York law prevents an assignee from 
seeking recognition and enforcement of an ICSID award.” 523 
The CMS Gas/Blue Ridge award was eventually settled by Argentina in 2013, along with four 
other awards: Vivendi, Azurix, National Grid 524 and Continental Casualty 525. The latter two 
awards had also been assigned, reportedly to the US fund Gramercy. It seems that the 
assignment of those awards was part of the settlement structure, and it was not intended that 
the assignee companies would seek recognition and enforcement through courts. 
More recently, in October 2018, further ICSID awards against Greece, Venezuela and 
Argentina were assigned to third parties. The cases were Poštová Banka 526, Venoklim 
Holding B.V 527 and El Paso. All three awards were assigned to what appears to be special 
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purpose vehicle corporations. As with the National Grid and Continental Casualty awards, 
the assignees pursued enforcement through negotiations with the award debtors. 
It is worth noting, however, that the Argentine settlements in 2013 and 2016 were reported to 
have had over a 25% discount of the nominal value of the awards. This gives an indication as 
to the likely level of discounts that the assignors agreed with the assignees due to the bad 
credit rating Argentina was suffering from at the time. 
This brief overview suggests a few conclusions: 
1. The secondary market for arbitral awards seems to be gathering strength although 
limited to cases where the award may have enforcement issues. The other observation 
is that most of the publicly available information relates to investment arbitration 
awards that were traded publicly. 
2. Enforcement of assigned awards may give rise to certain legal issues such as the legal 
standing of the assignee. Whilst the likelihood of such matters arising as legal issues 
might be limited, particularly in arbitration-friendly jurisdictions, the examples above 
suggest that assignment of arbitral awards is striving and active. 
3. It seems that awards are “sold” at a deep discount when arbitration debtors may be 
facing financial difficulties. As noted above, the Argentine awards settled at over 25% 
below the nominal value, implying an even deeper discount on assignment. In FG 
Hemisphere, the underlying award for US $11.7 million was reportedly sold for US 
$2.6 million. 
However, in other reported cases  a leading litigation funder Burford Capita,l528 has sold a 
successful arbitration award for a premium of £77 million. The case, once again arose out of 
an Argentinian government’s expropriation of two Argentine airlines.  
In July 2017, an arbitration tribunal ruled that Argentina should pay £233m in damages plus 
pre- and post-award interest. Burford’s got involved as third party finance and their 
entitlement from the award was in the range of £101m with an ongoing and compounding 
interest entitlement. 
3.3. MONETIZING AWARDS THROUGH CLEARING 
The above brief overview suggests that the market for selling arbitral awards seems to be 
workable. However, whilst the idea of selling an award might sound appealing in principle, it 
seems that in practice the opportunities to do so are limited mainly to fairly large awards in 
investment arbitration cases against sovereign states.529 However, if a process of clearing 
awards rather than discounting them is available, awards may not need to be sold at a 
discount as they did in the case of Argentina530.  
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Recently, the mobility and enforceability of arbitral awards has arrived to unprecedented 
levels.  However, subject to specific limited exceptions, courts, even in such states which 
contract to the NY Convention, can render an international award non-enforceable in their 
jurisdiction.531 In industries such as the financial sector, it is of great importance that arbitral 
awards be acknowledged as an instrument capable of recognition and enforcement. For the 
arbitrating parties and the tribunal, the award is nothing but an ‘instrument recording the 
tribunal’s decision provisionally or finally determining claims of the parties’. 
It may deal with ‘legal or factual differences between the parties, may involve interpretation 
of contract terms or determining the respective rights and obligations of the parties under the 
contract’. Ultimately, it is the enforceability and indeed the enforcement of the award that 
gives credence to the entire arbitration process and justifies the cost and time that the parties 
to a dispute have invested in the resolution process.532  
It is against this background that this thesis is proposing the instant monetizing mechanism of 
arbitral awards resulting from banking disputes. The purpose for the choice of the financial 
sector as a pilot for such a proposal is the ready availability of funds within the interbank 
clearing networks. Such networks can play an important role in re-injecting funds back into 
the market through the ease of monetizing the awards and instantly transferring funds to 
claimant investors. 
Applying this concept particularly in the financial sector will clear backlogs of investors’ 
funds, which will unfailingly find their way back into the financial markets through the 
banks. Recycling the funds back into the markets will instantly speed markets’ recovering 
cycle and avert deep crises. 
4. EXECUTION, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT 
For the purpose of efficacy and speed, the interbank clearing of dispute awards should follow 
the same process as in the clearing of securities or promissory notes. Any clearing of 
financial instruments in the primary or secondary markets involves three processes: 
1. Presentation is the transaction whereby the award creditor agrees to present the financial 
instrument to the clearing bank for exchange of funds to be collected from the award debtor. 
Thereafter, all the processes that lead up to settlement are referred to as clearing, such as 
recording the transaction, authentication and processing of the award for payment.  
2. Clearing is the process of updating the accounts of the trading parties and arranging for 
accepting payment on behalf of the award creditor and the transfer of money and award 
between parties. 
There would be two types of clearing: 
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I. Bilateral Clearing is where the award creditor will present the award to the debtor 
financial institution which will voluntarily agree to undergo the steps legally 
necessary to settle the payment of the award as applied to any other financial papers. 
However, until 2008, many derivatives and repurchases (REPO) trades were settled 
bilaterally between banks. After the financial crash in 2008, the G20 governments 
decided that all derivatives trades are to be cleared through central counter party 
platforms (CCP’s). Those are namely clearing houses such as the London Clearing 
House and the NY Clearing House Association.533 
II. Award clearing will similarly be performed through one of those central counterparty 
clearing platforms (CCPs). It is worth noting that clearing houses are used by banks 
and financial institution who are members of those houses and who would also own a 
stake in it.534 
In the case of award clearing, the member banks would have financial responsibility to the 
clearinghouse for the transactions that are cleared. It is the responsibility of the member firms 
to ensure that the financial instruments are authenticated and are physically or electronically 
available for transfer between parties. If the award is presented to a member bank for 
clearing, it is the duty of the bank to verify the authenticity of the award. 
At the same time it is their responsibility to ensure the award debtor has provided payment, 
either directly or through setting up a credit margin to meet their obligation under the terms 
of the award. Otherwise, the member bank will have to make up for any shortfalls. 
If a member firm becomes financially insolvent, only then will the clearinghouse members 
have to collectively make up for any shortcomings in the transaction. In other transferable 
securities, clearinghouses aggregate the trades from each of their members and net out the 
transactions for the trading day. At the end of the trading day, only net payments and 
securities are exchanged between the members of the clearinghouse. 
Awards will be treated initially just like options and futures derivatives where the 
clearinghouse acts as a counterparty to both the buyer and the seller. That way the 
transactions can be guaranteed while virtually eliminating counterparty risk. Additionally, 
clearinghouses record all transactions by their members, providing useful statistics, as well as 
allowing regulatory oversight of the transactions. 
3. Settlement is the final step where actual exchange of money and securities between the 
parties. Most settlement of securities is done electronically and no actual physical exchange 
of documents is required.  The award settlement, as in trades of Futures contracts will refer to 
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the amount of money credited to the account of the award creditor accounts by the end of the 
day. Modern day settlement and clearing has evolved since the 1960s and 1970s, when 
payments were still made with paper cheques. Brokers and dealers at the time had to use 
messengers or the postal service to send paper documents and securities or cheques to settle 
the trades. 
The proposal here is that awards will change hands and be recorded electronically in a book-
entry format. In New York for example, the system is run through the Depository Trust and 
Clearing Corporation (DTCC). While in Europe, Euroclear and Clearstream are the major 
central clearing houses for securities who can handle award clearing processes. 
4.1. SMART CONTRACTS 
The introduction of the blockchain has given rise to the actualisation of smart contracts. A 
smart contract is an immutable automated software program that is built on a blockchain 
protocol and made possible by general-purpose computation that takes place on the 
blockchain. Smart contracts can be used for allocating digital transactions between two 
parties, when the requirements established in the contract are fulfilled. In short, smart 
contracts are programmable contractual tools that are embedded in a software code. Thus, a 
smart contract can include the contractual arrangement itself, governance of the preconditions 
necessary for the contractual obligations to take place and the actual execution of the contract 
or document. Smart contracts result from a pre-defined relationship between the legal concept 
of contract and the element of "smart".  That is the fact that the contract could be embedded 
within and defined by software with the possibility of self-enforcement.  
Self-enforceability means that the software executes the pre-agreed conditions in the 
document while adopting the role of conflict prevention. This is achieved as electronic 
execution limits the scope of potential disputes arising from the enforcement of a non-
modified and fully authenticated document.  In the document, the conditions of the document 
have the assets digitally allocated by the parties on the document. Receiving a payment is 
then no longer dependent on the willingness of the debtor to make the payment nor affected 
by bankruptcy proceedings that take place after entering the contract. The contract executes 
its content autonomously according to the embedded contract  terms such as the digital assets 
placed within the contract that are allocated by parties at the outset of the issuing of the 
document. 
To further elaborate how smart contracts function and what the possibility of having and 
arbitral award to be self-enforcement may entail, I depict here an example of a smart award: 
The scenario is intentionally a simple one: two parties receive an award about a commercial 
dispute. In the arbitration agreement it is agreed that the award may be in the form of a smart 
contract. The award itself decided how the assets of the award debtor will be allocated based 
on verified facts. The smart contract will then allocate the funds to the winner after the facts 
on the award are verified as to the pre-set conditions. 
It is noteworthy that the normal vocabulary of voluntary compliance, escrows, etc. does not 
actualise in this example. The objective of this example is to demonstrate, how legally 
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relevant information is embedded within the lines of the smart contract code. From a legal 
perspective the situation is simple: parties enter into a binding contractual relationship that 
obliges the losing party to pay the winner a certain amount of money after the facts have been 
established by a third party. 535 
On the other hand, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) in the US, 
announced in February 2020 the successful completion of a proof concept to manage the 
netting process for U.S. Treasury and repurchase agreements (REPO) transactions using the 
blockchain distributed ledger technology (DLT). Working with digital assets demonstrates 
the possibility of netting transactions such as arbitral awards within the interbank end-of-day 
netting of securities-like obligations in the clearing environment.536 
Nowadays, governments around the world are promoting, or even requiring, central clearing, 
so that they can assess the systemic risk being imposed upon economies by their financial 
institutions. Financial disputes, especially in the trading of derivatives, can be clear indicators 
for regulatory authorities, as was witnessed in the recent credit crisis of 2007-2009. 537 
4.2. AWARD INTERBANK CLEARING PROCESS 
Any clearing process starts with a paper that can exchange hands upon a traded value similar 
to a cheque or a promissory note. Arbitral awards have proven to be of such qualities where 
in certain cases actual arbitration awards were traded, discounted or exchanged for agreed 
monetary values. The assignees were not necessarily a party to the dispute, but they were 
granted the same enforcement rights as those of the prevailing party in the dispute. On the 
other hand financial dispute arbitration agreements may authorise for the award to be cleared 
through the CCP network.538 Obviously, the clearing house contractual duty to pay is not 
absolute. Rather, it is subject to the availability of funds in the accounts of the award debtor 
bank similar to any security clearing process.539 
Determining the point of time in which payment is made in the course of award clearing is 
not a matter of interpretation of clearing rules. Rather it is by reference to banking 
commercial usage and practices and it need not be strictly governed by one country and one 
specific clearing house rules.540 At the initial stages there will be instances where absence of 
definite applicable clearing rules will incur. This can be either because the process is not yet 
comprehensive or is in the process of being drafted. A pre-emptive consideration however, 
for the parties to agree at the outset for the tribunal to determine the rights and assumed 
responsibility of the award holders and debtors as the right to place the award for clearing is 
essential for the process. The certainty of award payment is a fundamental objective which 
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can be easily deduced from a clearing rule point of view by reference to cheque and 
promissory note statutory rules.541  
Yet, in the absence of such a legality, as far as the award clearing process is concerned, a 
result can be reached as a matter of statutory interpretation in conjunction with general 
principles of law at the place of enforcement. In other words, the award creditor, should they 
wish and with leave from the tribunal may resort to authorities under the NY Convention for 
the enforcement of the award within the clearing mechanism. 542 
4.3. AUTHENTICATION OF AWARDS FOR CLEARING 
The NY Convention (NYC) provides for the recognition of arbitral awards by excluding any 
review of the merits of foreign awards. On the other hand, it stipulates a number of provisos 
to be considered during enforcement, such as the duty of the party seeking enforcement to 
supply the court at the time of application with an authenticated original or duly certified 
copy of the award and arbitration agreement. 
This might raise some enforcement issues, as discussed in detail below. One of the most 
effective and efficient solutions to authenticate the electronic award in online arbitration is 
the electronic signature, which might be useful in enforcing the arbitral award. 
However, its application depends on whether the courts in the enforcement country validate 
and recognise such a process. Consequently, in explaining the authentication and certification 
of arbitral award in accordance with the NYC rules we need to explore the differences 
between authentication and certification, and identify some of the issues that might arise, 
such as the governing law, the competent authority and the required documents.  
Under article IV (1), the party seeking the enforcement and recognition of the arbitral award 
must provide the court of enforcement with authenticated copies of the arbitral award in 
addition to the original arbitral agreement. Because most national laws did not provide for a 
specific certificate of ‘finality’ other than getting an award declared enforceable in that 
country, this was ‘practically the only way to prove finality.543  
The NYC does not define the term ‘authenticated’, but the International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration defines it as ‘the process by which the signatures on the award are 
confirmed as genuine by a competent authority.544 According to Julian Lew, authentication 
means that the tribunal signed the award and it is genuine.545 
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Consequently, the main aim of authenticating the award is to assure the enforcing court 
where the party is seeking enforcement that the signature on the award is genuine and has 
been signed by the arbitrators. Something the Blockchain technology may have sorted. 
With the same approach to authentication, the NYC does not define the term ‘certification’. 
Its role was explained by the ICCA in Article (II. 2.2) as being ‘to confirm that the copy of 
the award is identical to the original’. In addition, Julian Lew and colleagues defined 
certification as ‘an assurance that submitted documents are a true copy of the original’.546 
Furthermore, the issue might arise whether the certified copy should be a copy of the 
authenticated original award, or just a copy of the original award. Some decisions547 and 
researchers suggest that the certification of the copy should be a copy of an authenticated 
original award. Otherwise, the certified copy does not guarantee that the original award is 
genuine. It is necessary for the copy to conform to the original.548 
On the other hand, other courts have not required a certified copy of an authenticated award 
and have considered it sufficient to produce the certified copy of the original award549. 
Arguably, this is the most appropriate approach, because it facilitates the general 
implementation of arbitration. 
The requirement of an authenticated original award was a later insertion.550 According to the 
NYC, the court has the choice to determine the applicable law to examine the validity of 
authentication or certification and the required documents.551 However, leaving the choice to 
the court to determine the applicable law may raise other issues with regard to the competent 
authority authorized to authenticate the award to consider that an authentication is valid.552 
4.4. THE GOVERNING LAW AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY 
Since there is no specific law stated by the NY Convention to govern the authentication or 
certification validity of the award, different views have emerged among national courts about 
how to determine the applicable law. Some courts have applied the law where the award was 
rendered to examine the authentication validity. In these cases, the party seeking enforcement 
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was required to fulfil the requirements of authentication under the law where the award was 
issued.553  
Other courts have required that in order to consider the authentication to be valid, the 
governing law is where enforcement and recognition is sought.554 Determining the applicable 
law to authenticate the award effectively determines the competent authority, which might 
vary from one country to another. 555 
For example, in some countries, the foreign ministry is the competent authority for 
authentication, while in other countries the public authority or a diplomatic or consular 
officer is authorised to authenticate.556 In some cases, the members of arbitral institutions 
(e.g., the secretary general) may authenticate awards. In the United States of America, 
attorneys or notary public officers have the authority to authenticate documents. 
4.5. ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION 
Relying on a protected electronic signature fulfils the requirements of article IV of the NYC, 
which is to confirm that the signature on the award is genuine and added by a competent 
authority. In this case, the competent authority is the Certificate Authority, which examines 
the identity of the digital signature holder, and confirms whether the digital signature belongs 
to the person who used it.  
It guarantees that it was controlled by the right person at the creation or usage at time of 
signing. It also examines whether the electronic record that is linked to the digital signature 
was not changed or amended. Relying on the protected electronic signature to authenticate an 
electronic arbitral can be valid and effective. Enforcing an electronic arbitral award that is 
signed electronically is not in opposition with the NYC provisions; on the contrary, it 
supports the NYC approach of speed and enforceability. 
4.6. AWARD AUTHENTICATION  
Under Article IV of the NYC, the party seeking enforcement of an award must provide the 
duly authenticated original arbitral award or a duly certified copy. Additionally, if the award 
is not in the official language of the country in which enforcement is sought, Article IV 
requires that an official or sworn translation be provided. It is clear that the creditor bears the 
burden of proving the existence of an award under Article IV. 
Many arbitration laws around the world contain provisions regarding proof of an arbitral 
award closely paralleling those of the NYC. Article 35(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
requires parties seeking to enforce an international arbitral award to provide the original 
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award and arbitration agreement, or “duly certified” copies thereof. Arbitration legislation in 
a few jurisdictions imposes less rigorous proof requirements than Article IV of the NYC. 
For example, the French Code of Civil Procedure omits any requirement for a certified 
translation or original copy of the award, instead embracing a simpler approach that an award 
can be proven in the same manner as contracts. Another preliminary issue concerns the 
procedures that apply in national courts for actions to recognize arbitral awards.  
The NYC leaves this issue largely to national law, subject to a general principle of non-
discrimination awards. The NYC thus does not require either speedy or efficient procedural 
mechanisms for enforcing awards. It merely requires contracting states to use procedures that 
are no more burdensome than their domestic enforcement procedures. 557 
It is clear that the NYC imposes a mandatory rule, requiring contracting states to recognize 
and enforce foreign awards, except where one of Article V’s exceptions applies. Article III 
provides that “each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding” and enforce 
awards in accordance with the NYC and its national procedural rules. 
One of the central objectives of the NYC was to eliminate the “double exequatur”, meaning 
that the award needed the confirmation in the place of the arbitration before it could be 
recognized internationally. If either court denied exequatur, the award could not be 
recognized and enforced. This process made the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards difficult, unreliable and slow. The NYC eliminated the double exequatur requirement, 
with the objective of making foreign awards efficiently enforceable and subject to fewer 
opportunities for judicial challenges. 
Blockchain - If the goal is to have foreign arbitral awards efficiently enforceable, blockchain 
technology can provide another perspective to this issue. As mentioned earlier, Blockchain 
can best be described as a digital platform or a distributed and immutable ledger that stores 
records, known as “blocks”. A key property of blockchain technology which distinguishes it 
from traditional database technology, is that it is publicly verifiable and supported by the 
integrity of the system. In other words, it would be practically impossible to change an entry 
in the database or in the wording of an award, because it would require changing all of the 
data that comes before it on the entire network. 
With this mechanism, it is possible to store a duly rendered award in an arbitration process by 
having this information in distributed ledger technology (DLT) format. The enforcing 
authority is then able to verify the existence of the award, authenticate the judicial 
proceedings, and the authenticity of the award itself. This means that once the award is 
created and placed in the smart contract format, it cannot be changed, altered or modified. If a 
financial smart contract codes are deployed, it means the contract is compiled and “stood up”. 
This means that the contract can run on the blockchain carrier system such as IBM World 
Wire or JP Morgan Payments Network. The smart contract will be located at its coded 
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address and will remain perpetually unchanged. The burden of proof to show the existence of 
the award and that it is duly certified is fulfilled. 
5. BLOCKCHAIN AND ARBITRAL AWARD ENFORCEMENT 
A stateless-award-enforcement model in interbank disputes can constitute a significant 
advantage. It will allow the award clearing forum to enforce the value of the award upon the 
award debtor bank autonomously and without incurring any delays which unavoidably affect 
parties involved in arbitral disputes generally. 
In financial disputes, where the disputants are financial institutions, banks and financial 
service providers, the blockchain DLT will support a decentralized mechanism for payment 
of wards within the interbank sector without the need for state interference. This is possible 
due to the possibility of the full-proof authentication facility provided by the nature of DLT 
environment. The Blockchain will serve as a conceptual space technology that fundamentally 
manages assets, and smart contracts to enable them to be zipped across the globe in a matter 
of seconds.558 
Below is a demonstration of how an international award generated via a tribunal can rely on a 
decentralized DLT Blockchain system to be cleared and paid through the interbank 
framework. Using a current platform such as the Interbank Information Network (IIN), it can 
function as a launching pad for the award clearing process proposed in this thesis.559 
Example - Starting by the final step of a financial dispute, the presiding tribunal will produce 
a legally enforceable award that can be managed and digitally signed via a blockchain DLT 
process. 
Due to the nature of bank clearing networks, only an interbank dispute awards may be 
presented for clearing through a network such as IIN. Once the award is signed and launched 
on the blockchain, the award creditor would trigger an online award proceeding transaction. 
Through this approach, the IIN protocol is able to increase the speed with which the 
transaction is documented and executed, while simultaneously providing contracting parties 
with an agreement containing a payment provision of the enforceability of the arbitrator’s 
decision in the real world. 
The IIN system normally implements and works through a programmatic interface with the 
member banks to easily incorporate a payment procedure, which in this case will be an award 
payment process. Once configured, IIN will send the smart contract notice of a confirmed 
award to the award debtor. The smart award will then transfer any identified digital assets to 
a virtual escrow account, thus locking these assets for payment through the “Award Clearing 
Forum”. 
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The award payment procedure can be accessed via parties of the Clearing Forum through a 
basic user interface. Using this interface, the Clearing Forum can notify each party that the 
funds are available for payment and agree on the blockchain address of whom the parties 
select as a receiving account. At that time, any of the parties can access the interface, review 
the statement of facts, render a decision, and have the arbitration award automatically 
transferred from the assets maintained in escrow. 
5.1. RISKS OF CROSS BORDER SETTLEMENT  
This is a demonstration of a comprehensive step towards a vision debuting an end-to-end 
transaction that incorporates a smart arbitration award system. Financial Disputes can be very 
complex and resolving them in a legally enforceable way requires flexibility to adapt to 
different jurisdictional requirements. However, once a decision is taken the real resolution of 
the disputes only occurs when the award is finally realised and paid. 
Making use of Blockchain data processing along with expanding operating models that work 
within an eco-system of third party partners will undoubtedly represent a challenge for 
traditional banks with inherited structures. Nevertheless, it is absolutely necessary for the 
stability of the financial markets. The future of banking will be determined by those banks 
that start early and those willing to disrupt traditional business models to push the boundaries 
of their interbank dispute resolution experience. 
If implemented, the end result would be game-changing as a globally accessible award 
payment forum where disputants in a financial arbitration process are able to produce  
immediate funds upon the issuance of an award. To build such a forum, the blockchain 
ecosystem needs several baseline tools. Those are mainly inter-forum/interbank agreements 
that will seamlessly interact with smart contract codes to ensure the enforceability of any 
arbitral awards. Those are similar to online interbank SIPA system.560 
Vulnerability in any financial system depends on a number of factors. The size and duration 
of participants' credit and liquidity exposures in the interbank settlement process are basic 
factors affecting the potential for systemic risk. As these exposures last for longer and 
become larger, the likelihood that some participants may be unable to meet their obligations 
increases, and any participant's failure to settle its obligations is more likely to affect the 
financial condition of others in a more serious manner.561 
Interbank funds transfer systems in which large intraday exposures tend to accumulate 
between participants therefore have a higher potential for systemic risk. 562 The settlement of 
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financial market transactions from a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) perspective means the 
transfer of balances in the books of a central bank (i.e. central bank money) or commercial 
banks (i.e. commercial bank money).  
In practice, settlement in the vast majority of large value funds transfer systems takes place in 
central bank funds. Although the rules and operating procedures of a system and the legal 
environment generally may allow for differing concepts of finality, it is typically understood 
that, where settlement is made by the transfer of central bank money, final settlement occurs 
when the final (i.e. irrevocable and unconditional) transfer of value has been recorded on the 
books of the central bank. 
5.2. FINAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERBANK FUNDS 
Interbank funds transfer systems can be classified in several ways. Differences in the way 
settlement takes place provide a useful framework to distinguish the settlement systems. A 
common distinction in this respect is to divide systems into net settlement systems and gross 
settlement systems. In a net settlement system, the settlement of funds transfers occurs on a 
net basis according to the rules and procedures of the system.  
A participating bank's net position is calculated, on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis, as 
the sum of the value of all the transfers it has received up to a particular point in time minus 
the sum of the value of all the transfers it has sent.  
The net position at the settlement time, which can be a net credit or debit position, is called 
the net settlement position. Net settlement systems for large-value funds transfers are 
primarily multilateral (rather than bilateral) net settlement systems in which each (settling) 
participant settles its multilateral net settlement position. In a gross settlement system, on the 
other hand, the settlement of funds occurs on a transaction-by-transaction basis, that is, 
without netting debits against credits. 
Interbank funds transfer systems can also be classified according to the timing (and 
frequency) of settlement. Systems can in principle be grouped into two types, designated-time 
(or deferred) settlement systems and real-time (or continuous) settlement systems, depending 
on whether they settle at pre-specified points in time or on a continuous basis.  
These two types are more narrowly defined in terms of the timing of final settlement. One 
type of system is thus a designated-time (or deferred) settlement system, in which final 
settlement occurs at one or more discrete, pre-specified settlement times during the 
processing day. Designated-time settlement systems, in which final settlement takes place 
only once, at the end of the processing day, are called end-of-day settlement systems.  
Currently, net settlement systems for large-value transfers are typically end-of-day net 
settlement systems that settle the net settlement positions by means of transfers of central 
bank money from net debtors to net creditors. In some countries, there are systems in which 
the final settlement of transfers occurs at the end of the processing day without netting the 
                                                                                                                                                        




credit and debit positions, on a transaction-by-transaction basis or on the basis of the 
aggregate credit and aggregate debit position of each bank. 
Such systems are often called end-of-day gross settlement systems. On the other hand, a real-
time (or continuous) settlement system is defined as a system that can effect final settlement 
on a continuous basis during the processing day. It is worth stressing here that the distinction 
between different systems such as RTGS and designated-time net settlement (DNS) systems 
concerns the form of settlement, not the form of transmission and processing. 
Like RTGS systems, many net settlement systems transmit and process payment messages in 
real time on a transaction-by-transaction basis, but they settle, by definition, on a net basis at 
discrete intervals. An important concept that is often used in connection with the timing of 
finality is intraday finality or an intraday final transfer capability. 
This finality mostly depends on the legal framework in which the system is operating. If the 
intraday finality is recognized in the legal framework where the system is operating, then the 
system can be defined as a true RTGS system. 
In some countries though, the IT systems offer the RTGS technically but the legal framework 
does not recognize the intraday finality, without which all the risk that can be eliminated 
because of RTGS system remains there.  
6. CENTRAL BANKS AND PRIVATE SECTOR CLEARING SYSTEMS 
Interbank funds transfer systems are sometimes classified according to whether they are 
central bank systems or private sector systems. The distinction typically depends on who 
owns and operates the systems (rather than on the identity of the settlement agent). 
At present, it is possible to identify two "typical" types of large value funds transfer system: 
 (a) Central bank systems owned and operated by the central bank (or its affiliated entities) in 
which the central bank also provides settlement 
(b) Private sector systems owned and operated by a private sector group (e.g. a banking 
association or clearing house), where the main operational role of the central bank is to act as 
the settlement agent. 
In the G-10 countries, for example, RTGS systems often belong to the former category and 
many DNS systems belong to the latter. Nonetheless, a number of DNS systems are owned 
and operated by the central bank. In some cases RTGS systems are owned and operated by 
private sector groups. 
Moreover, there are several DNS and RTGS systems in which ownership and operation are 
shared between the private sector and the central bank. 
6.1. MAIN FEATURES OF RTGS SYSTEMS 
An RTGS system is defined as a gross settlement system in which both processing and final 
settlement of funds transfer instructions can take place continuously (i.e. in real time). As it is 
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a gross settlement system, transfers are settled individually; that is without netting debits 
against credits. As it is a real-time settlement system, the system effects final settlement 
continuously rather than periodically at pre-specified times provided that a sending bank has 
sufficient covering balances or credit. Moreover, this settlement process is based on the real-
time transfer of central bank money. An RTGS system can thus be characterized as a funds 
transfer system that is able to provide continuous intraday finality for individual transfers. 
6.2. PAYMENT PROCESSING IN RTGS SYSTEMS  
Within this broad definition, the operational design of RTGS systems can differ widely. In 
particular, important differences may arise in the approaches to payment processing when the 
sending bank does not have sufficient covering funds in its central bank account. One 
possible way of treating transfer orders in such circumstances is for the system to reject the 
orders and return them to the sending bank.  
The rejected transfer orders will be input into the system again at a later time when the 
sending bank has covering funds. Until that time, sending banks may keep and control the 
pending transfers within their internal systems (internal queues). Alternatively, the RTGS 
system may temporarily keep the transfer orders in its central processor (system or centrally 
located queues) instead of rejecting them.  
In this case, the pending transfers will be released for settlement when covering funds 
become available on the basis of predefined rules agreed between the system and the 
participating banks. In many cases the transfer orders are processed and settled with the 
extension of central bank credit, normally provided for a period of less than one business day 
(intraday credit); in other words, the central bank provides banks with the necessary covering 
funds at the time of processing by extending such credit.  
The central bank could take a range of approaches to the provision of intraday credit in terms 
of: 
a) the amount of credit (including a zero amount) 
b) the method by which credit is extended (e.g. overdraft or repo) 
c) the terms on the credit (e.g. free or priced) 
d) the collateral requirements (if any) 
These possibilities of payment processing (i.e. rejected, centrally queued, and settled with 
central bank credit) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, when the provision 
of central bank credit is constrained in some way, the transfer orders for which the sending 
bank could or would not obtain central bank credit will be rejected or centrally queued. 
In recent years, new or planned RTGS systems have tended to apply a combination of these 
possibilities rather than being based on only one form of payment processing. 
6.3. LIMITING SYSTEMIC RISK  
RTGS systems can contribute substantially to limiting payment system risks. With their 
continuous intraday final transfer capability, RTGS systems are able to minimize or even 
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eliminate the basic interbank risks in the settlement process. More specifically, RTGS can 
substantially reduce the duration of credit and liquidity exposures.  
To the extent that sufficient covering funds are available at the time of processing, settlement 
lags will approach zero and so the primary source of risks in interbank funds transfers can be 
eliminated. Once settlement is effected, the receiving bank can credit the funds to its 
customers, use them for its own settlement purposes in other settlement systems or use them 
in exchange for assets immediately without facing the risk of the funds being revoked.  
This capability also implies that, if an RTGS system were linked to other settlement systems, 
the real-time transfer of irrevocable and unconditional funds from the RTGS system to the 
other systems would be possible. The use of RTGS could therefore contribute to linking the 
settlement processes in different funds transfer systems without the risk of payments being 
revoked. 
6.4. INTRADAY LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENT 
Provided that there are no legal problems with regard to settlement finality, the only 
structural impediment to continuous intraday finality is any liquidity constraint a sending 
bank may face during the day. A liquidity constraint in an RTGS environment has two basic 
characteristics, namely that it is a continuous constraint for settling funds transfers and that 
intraday liquidity requirements must be funded by central bank money; banks must therefore 
have sufficient balances in their central bank accounts throughout the processing day. 
Intraday liquidity requirements raise important issues for both the central bank and the 
private sector. Central banks, for their part, face a choice as to  whether or not to provide 
banks with intraday liquidity and, if so, what form that provision will take (e.g. by what 
mechanisms and on what terms the credit will be provided, and how any resulting exposures 
will be managed).  
The intraday liquidity requirements under a particular RTGS system depend critically on (a) 
the structure of financial markets and systems (e.g. the adequacy of private sector sources of 
liquidity, the amount of collateral or securities available, reserve requirement regimes) and 
(b) the central bank's policy regarding the provision of intraday credit. 
The means by which intraday liquidity is provided can significantly affect the extent to which 
immediate, or at least very timely, final settlement occurs, and, ultimately, it can influence 
the balance between the potential benefits and costs of RTGS systems. 
6.5. APPLICABLE LAWS  
In the case of security settlement, the issue of applicable law is particularly crucial and 
complex. This is especially true when securities are held on account with a financial 
institution in one country and then held through a chain of intermediaries, with a custodian in 
another country which itself then holds such securities with the central securities depositary 
system where the underlying securities have been directly issued and are primarily held. This 
is the daily management of securities held with international central securities depositaries 
systems such as Euroclear or Clearstream. 
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Global custodians and certain custodians are also acting through the same holding pattern. 
One may also think of the case of links between national central securities depositaries.563 In 
that context, the type of entitlement that is granted on the basis of the intermediary’s books to 
reflect such indirect holding of securities though sub-custodians and central securities 
depository (CSD) should be taken into account.  
A CSD is a specialist financial organization holding securities such as shares either in 
certificated or uncertificated (dematerialized) form so that ownership can be easily 
transferred through a book entry rather than the transfer of physical certificates. This allows 
brokers and financial companies to hold their securities at one location where they can be 
available for clearing and settlement. This is usually done electronically, making it much 
faster and easier than was traditionally the case where physical certificates had to be 
exchanged after a trade had been completed. 
Usually, in cross-border holdings, the securities accounts of the investor with its 
intermediary, recording a deposit of foreign securities, will represent not the underlying 
securities themselves but a securities entitlement. This will not be the case with arbitral 
awards. Entitlements under arbitral awards are the financial rights in the underlying award 
that may be protected by law as giving to the investor ownership rights in a book-entry pool 
of the award debtor assets. Such underlying awards may consist of physical award forms kept 
safe in the vaults of a custodian and circulating by way of book-entry transfers when traded 
or changing hands to be finally delivered to the award debtor. 
On the other hand the award can be kept, as mentioned earlier in the form of a DLT 
electronically registered form which is noted in the award creditor books and circulating in 
the books of the local central counter party platforms (CCP) or through the intermediation of 
correspondent banks. The test of applicable law here for the enforcement of proprietary rights 
in instruments or other rights in such instruments which are recorded in a register or a 
centralised deposit system. Rights of enforcement of arbitral awards in this case, shall be 
governed by the law of the state where the register or centralised deposit system is held or 
located unless agreed otherwise by the parties in the arbitration agreement.564 
In the case of clearing of securities, the law in England, Wales and N. Ireland provides for 
transfer of securities based on transfer of legal title on registration. The regulations covering 
each regime provide for electronic book entry transfer of title effected pursuant to settlement 
of a properly authenticated instructions attributable to one or more members in accordance 
with the rules of the securities settlement system. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In order to resort to this award clearing process it has been essential in this Chapter to 
establish: 
                                                 
563
 R. Guynn and N. Marchand, “Transfer of pledge of securities held through depositories” in “The law of cross-
border securities transactions”, Sweet & Maxwell (1999), p. 47 Richard Potok, “Legal certainty for securities 
held as collateral” in International Financial Law Review, Dec. 1999 
564
 The Hague Securities Convention of 5 July 2006, http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/menu36e.html  
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(i) Whether an arbitral award is equated to a local court judgment, irrespective of where it 
was made 
(ii) Whether the award can be deemed as a stand-alone right of payment instrument, capable 
of being cleared or traded in accordance with banking regulations 
In this regard the case law is reviewed above and shows that the practice of trading awards is 
consistent with an emerging trend as what occurred with Argentina.  
In financial disputes, clearing an award starts by introducing it to the clearing network via the 
holder’s financial institution.  It can then be processed for payment by charging the award 
debtor’s assets held with another financial institution. In that, the Blockchain technology 
lends a hand in providing self-enforcing smart awards. The introduction of the blockchain has 
given rise to the actualisation of smart awards that can resemble a smart contract. In essence, 
it will be an automated software program built on a blockchain protocol and its automated 
self-enforcement is made possible by general-purpose computation that takes place on the 
blockchain.  
Thus, a smart award can include the contractual arrangement itself, governance of the 
preconditions necessary for such obligations to take place and the actual execution of the 
award. Smart awards would result from a pre-defined relationship between the legal concept 
of arbitral awards and the element of "smart". The ground-breaking novelty of blockchain 
smart awards lies in the benefits of decentralisation. Decentralised smart awards will remove 
the authentication burden on local courts as the focal concept of enforcement. In addition, 
external influence is excluded from the blockchain and all transactions take place in public 




        CHAPTER SIX 
   CONTEXTUAL CONCLUSION 
The continuing importance and resonance of arbitration relies heavily, if not exclusively, on 
the enforceability of arbitral awards. A ‘speedy victory’ in arbitration will be a useless win if 
the outcome award cannot be enforced as efficiently and as speedy. However, not all cases 
suffer non-compliance. To a large extent voluntary compliance in banking and financial 
disputes is the norm. An interbank self clearing framework will then be of more use.  
Such a norm is what justifies arbitration as a self-standing jurisdiction, or even as an 
alternative juridical system. However, in those instances where awards are not voluntarily 
complied with, the assistance of national courts will be sought and judicial enforcement is the 
second best alternative, thanks to the provisions of the New York Convention. 
However, on occasion, the system may be tedious, long and subject to national or local law 
and court peculiarities, leaving a frustrated award creditor. Chapter One provided the basis 
for the need of a specialized award paying framework for international banking disputes. 
Such a process is well positioned to address many issues that arise in financial disputes and to 
fill the international void of delayed settlement of enormous inter-bank disputes.  
Chapter Two continued with the conclusion that New York Convention does not harmonize 
national court procedures and hence enforceability of international financial awards can 
occasionally be affected or even become hostage to domestic court practices, nationalistic 
public policies and the relevance of local procedural laws.  
Chapter Three continues to conclude the importance of promptness and authoritarian 
enforcement of arbitral award for the control of moral hazards. Disregard to social 
commitment and excessive risk-taking was certainly a recurring theme within the banking 
sector in the last financial crisis. No other industry than the financial sector has a compatible 
talent for privatising gains and socialising losses. However, when social gains are ascertained 
through efficient dispute enforcement, such talent may become more compliant. 
When international arbitration interacts with national courts there is potentially an increased 
legal risk that things may not develop exactly the way in which the prevailing party may have 
expected. Consequently, certain alternatives can be developed to ascertain the instant 
payment of arbitral awards resulting in financial and banking disputes. 
Post-arbitration settlement is usually a common practice between banks with tight 
correspondent and financial relations. Other choices such as transfer, selling or assignment of 
the arbitral award are known to have been transacted in the market, albeit with discount. 
On the other hand, arbitral awards offer tangible economic and monetary value as they 
embody real value. They function as an asset in the context of business negotiations and 
between the parties and funders in cases of third party finance. 
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As prescribed in Chapter Four, a legally potent enforcement process through banking 
clearing networks can be a viable solution. The clearance process is most importantly to 
avoid long legal delays that consume a vast amount of time and expenses while large sums of 
investment money lie idle waiting for a resolution. 
Chapter Five finally concludes by prescribing “smart awards” (as opposed to smart contracts) 
as a process that applies swift justice on rogue bankers and discharges panic runs as investors 
gain confidence in the enforceability of a compensatory judicial process. Operating the 
mechanism within a framework of the banking sector will also serve as an alternative to 
enforcement via national courts which may not be arbitration friendly. Difficulties and public 
policy inspired objections are particularly tested when action is brought by foreign parties 
against local banks. What is a clear and undisputed conclusion to draw is that the 
enforcement of commercial arbitration awards is not the sole objective for such framework.  
Investor protection from high risk and embedded moral hazard is the main concern. Fast and 
speedy implementation of compensatory awards that is ratifying to bank clients can impede 
actions of moral hazard in the financial industry. A function that instant remedy brought by 
an efficient interbank award payment framework, can fulfil. 
On the other hand, there may be certain banks that may initially decline joining the award 
clearing forum to avoid instant adherence to arbitral awards they do not agree to. In this case, 
and as proposed above, awards held against those banks and are traded in the market will 
start declining in value and trade at deep discounts as happened with Argentina. That in turn 
will have a negative impact on the ratings of such banks and their interbank borrowing rates. 
Eventually, the pressure of expensive interbank funding will lead such institutions to comply 
with the enforcement. 
It is to conclude that fast and efficient clearing of financial disputes arbitral awards is a high 
threshold and if implemented with success in the financial sector, it will have a positive and 
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